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EVALUATION REPORT

**COUNTRY STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME EVALUATION
THE BAHAMAS
WITH MANAGEMENT RESPONSE (APPENDIX 1)
FINAL REPORT**

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OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT EVALUATION

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COUNTRY STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME EVALUATION –THE BAHAMAS

April 23, 2024, FINAL REPORT



Office of Independent Evaluation
Caribbean Development Bank

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
Serena Rossignoli

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Background

Scope of the Evaluation

Country Strategy Paper period 2018-22, including major projects approved under the previous CSP period (2014-17) still under implementation.



The evidence base



50

People interviewed across CDB, government, partners and other stakeholders



100+

documents reviewed

High level Questions



Did the CSP achieve the intended results?

- Examines the **effectiveness** and **sustainability** of CDB support



Was the design of the CSP appropriate?

- Examines the **relevance** and **coherence** of CDB support, and how the **Results Monitoring Framework (RMF) design** has supported the CSP
- Includes a case study on **CSP traction**



Was CSP implementation efficient?

- Examines various aspects of the **efficiency** of CDB support
- Includes a focus on operationalisation of **gender and the environment**

Intended Use

- To inform CDB's new Country Engagement Strategy (CES) for The Bahamas
- To offer lessons and recommendations that may be used to course-correct CSP interventions that are still under implementation
- To improve overall development effectiveness going forward and provide options for improved future engagement with The Bahamas

Country context



Physical/ Environmental:

- Archipelago state, extremely vulnerable to environmental risks including hurricanes, coastal erosion and climate change, all worsened by climate change
- Government of the Bahamas (GOCB) making efforts to address climate change, including increased renewable energy (RE) and energy efficiency (EE)



Economic:

- Macroeconomy highly susceptible to external shocks, given its reliance on tourism, financial services, and international trade.
- Moderate economic growth from 2013-2019, but severely impacted by Hurricane Dorian (2019) and the onset of COVID-19 (primarily 2020-21).
- Rising levels of public debt in the wake of Hurricane Dorian and COVID-19.



Social:

- Mixed performance in governance in recent years
- Strong female, low male participation in education
- Need for improved pre-primary and vocational education provision
- High youth unemployment levels
- Large disparities between urban and rural populations in terms of poverty, employment (worse in rural areas) and citizen security (worse in urban areas)

Did the CSP achieve the intended results?



Effectiveness

Progress towards CSP results is mixed. Of the eight key outcomes that are relevant to the CSP period (five from the original CSP plus three Policy Based Loan (PBL) outcomes agreed during the CSP period), three outcomes (all from the PBL) were achieved, four were partially achieved and one was not achieved. CDB's contribution was significant to all three PBL outcomes (related to disaster response frameworks, COVID-19 policies and improved fiscal management) as well as under improved governance (CSP Outcome 4). CDB contribution was more limited in outcomes related to climate resilient infrastructure (CSP Outcome 1), productivity and competitiveness (CSP Outcome 5), with no progress in education (CSP Outcome 3). Outcome-level progress reflected implementation: achievement of intended PBL outcomes resulted from their successful and timely implementation, while more limited achievement of other outcomes reflected the implementation progress of key interventions.

High level Summary of Results Against CSP and PBL Outcomes:

Outcomes	Achievement	CDB Contribution
Pillar 1: Environmental Protection and Infrastructure		
CSP Outcome 1: Improved Access to Quality Climate Resilient Infrastructure	Partially achieved	Some
CSP Outcome 2: Increased EE and RE Options	Partially achieved	Some
PBL Outcome: Improved frameworks, enhanced risk identification, increased access to disaster recovery financing	Achieved	Significant
Pillar 2: Inclusive Social Development		
CSP Outcome 3: Enhanced Educational Outcomes	Not Achieved	Limited
PBL Outcome: A more responsive public policy to COVID-19	Achieved	Significant
Pillar 3: Improved Governance and Productivity		
CSP Outcome 4: Improved Governance	Partially achieved	Significant
CSP Outcome 5: Increased productivity, competitiveness & economic diversification	Partially achieved	Some
PBL Outcome: Strengthened Fiscal Management	Achieved	Significant

Key: Achieved ● Partially achieved ● Not Achieved ●

Sustainability


Likely sustainability of CSP results is also mixed. There are several positive examples of sustainability being supported through mainstreaming of environmental considerations and through integration of capacity building/institutional strengthening activities. Evidence of sustainability was clearer on infrastructure projects especially those that had clear outputs and designated responsibility for maintenance (for example the Streetlight Retrofitting Project). But limited and delayed uptake of TA, particularly in cross-cutting areas like gender and the environment, and ongoing capacity constraints in The Bahamas has limited the likely sustainability of CDB interventions to date. Overall, sustainability of CSP results was highly dependent on national leadership and ownership of projects, with the PBLs being a positive example of these factors being in place.



Relevance

Overall relevance of the CSP was affected by limited adaptation in response to major contextual changes. The CSP as drafted aligned generally well with both the National Development Plan (NDP) and with CDB's cross-cutting priorities, especially governance and the environment, but decreased during implementation as many planned interventions failed to proceed. Major events such as Hurricane Dorian and COVID-19 contributed to major shifts in GOCB priorities and contributed to this limited traction of planned interventions. Other key reasons for limited traction included limited in-country capacity and insufficient CDB engagement. While traction of original interventions was limited, CDB did make some significant successful adaptations to evolving GOCB priorities through the provision of PBLs focussed on governance, the economy and disaster response.

CSP Traction Figure: Fishbone diagram outlining causes of limited CSP traction



Coherence

While the 2018-22 CSP highlighted the importance of coordination and collaboration with other international development partner (IDPs), for the most part this failed to materialise. There is however clear will among IDPs to work with CDB, and mechanisms already exist to support this. CDB appears to be the only IDP providing substantial support to the education sector. In other sectors, one or more other IDPs are also providing support, but this appears to be complementary rather than duplicative to date.

RMF Design


The CSP RMF as designed was well aligned with NDP goals and CSP outcomes, but its utility was reduced as it was not updated in response to contextual changes. As a result, it could not effectively support ongoing monitoring or adaptive management (including identification of and response to new/emerging risks). More specifically, data against many RMF indicators was not (publicly) available, which posed a challenge for assessing progress, and many RMF indicators were no longer relevant: many of the interventions expected to contribute to these indicators/targets did not proceed, while other interventions which did go-ahead were not well captured by the indicators/targets as framed. Integration of gender into RMF indicators was also limited.



Efficiency

Efficiency in terms of disbursement and adherence to planned project timelines was also affected by changing GOCB priorities and the impact of Hurricane Dorian and COVID-19 and was relatively poor overall. Other key factors affecting efficiency included limited engagement by CDB at a strategic, cross-cutting level; constrained in-country capacity, and limited in-country buy-in for technical assistance, particularly related to gender, with implications for sustainability.

Reasons for and implications of limited integration of gender and the environment:



Conclusions and Recommendations

The conclusions below pull out the main over-arching strengths and weaknesses that have emerged from the findings and are mapped against the evaluation criteria. Each conclusion is presented with the corresponding recommendation, with suggestions for how each recommendation could be implemented included.

Key to evaluation criteria mapping:



Overall effectiveness of the CSP is mixed, with key positives in economic cooperation, but more limited results in other areas. Making a robust judgement of CSP effectiveness was challenging, as was assessment of CDB's contribution in an environment where multiple IDPs are supporting the same sectors. Due to limited publicly available development data on The Bahamas, this will always be a challenge, but was made more difficult as the RMF was not revised despite significant changes to CDB interventions. As a result, many RMF indicators were not irrelevant to the support which CDB proceeded. For CDB to be able to better judge its performance at a strategic level there is a need to review the framing and awareness of both the CSP and the linked RMF.

Conclusion 2



The Bahamian context was particularly challenging over the CSP period, and was impacted by two changes of government, a major hurricane and the COVID-19 pandemic. CDB was able to adapt to evolving GOCB priorities in the wake of these changes to some extent, for example via the successful PBLs, which is to be commended. Looking forward, limited in-country buy-in for the National Development Plan raises key strategic questions about how CDB should frame the next Country Engagement Strategy and its RMF to be more adaptable and better able to navigate a dynamic and politically charged context.

Recommendation 1: Formulate a more flexible CES which is focused at outcome level, and avoid including specific costed interventions/projects under outcomes unless these are already underway. Support the CES with a utilization-focused Results Monitoring Frameworks (RMF) which allows better monitoring of progress, adaptive management, and ultimately improved strategy-level performance.

Suggestions for implementation:

- Ensure the CES is aligned both with the National Development Plan, but given the dynamic political context in The Bahamas, also ensure it is well aligned with the SDGs as a broader development framework.
- Align RMF outcome indicators with easily available, relevant and regularly updated development indicators/data. These should, for example, speak to broad areas of educational access (e.g. school enrolment) and quality (e.g. proportion of trained teachers), and thus be relevant to any specific interventions in these areas.
- Ensure that project level RMFs explicitly feed into these RMF outcome indicators.
- Ensure mid-term reviews proceed (utilizing the RMF), and subsequently update the CES and RMF to ensure their ongoing relevance and utility even when contextual changes take place
- Consider integrating CSP and project level monitoring within a live M&E dashboard, which helps to visualize the links between specific CSP interventions and the overall CSP outcomes and reduces the ongoing reporting burden.

Conclusion 3



There is a need for CDB to improve and increase on-the-ground visibility and engagement with in-country stakeholders to improve overall traction and thus relevance and sustainability of specific interventions and the overall country strategy. There is an opportunity for CDB to better leverage the perceived comparative advantage it has in regional knowledge and expertise, while working with other IDPs to ensure better complementarity and coherence of support in line with all IDPs respective expertise.

Recommendation 2: Take practical steps to enhance and maintain on-the-ground visibility of and engagement by CDB with government, other implementing agencies and IDPs.

Suggestions for implementation:

- As an interim arrangement, organise (more regular) CES missions at specific, strategic intervals, e.g. after changes in government, key ministry leadership positions or other shifts
- Ensure ongoing engagement is with a broader range of in-country stakeholders across different sectors, so that CSP awareness is maximised and adaptation is better supported. This could be facilitated via Annual Portfolio Reviews, led by the Director of Projects.
- Building on discussions within CDB to date, explore whether having a Resident Implementation Officer (ROI) based in The Bahamas is a potential option.
- In the interim, ensure there is a clear CDB focal point for overall CES engagement and monitoring, and ensure they have the availability/ capacity to carry out the role effectively.
- Ensure that other IDPs are engaged directly during the formulation of the CES, so that CDB has a comprehensive picture of ongoing and planned support by other actors.
- Reach out to the Resident UN Coordinator and arrange to join regular UN-led IDP coordination meetings, as an avenue to share each other's work, progress and challenges.
- Through this, identify where CDB can work with other partners to support mutual cross-cutting priorities such as gender, the environment and climate change.
- Identify where CDB can fill gaps left by other IDPs either in a particular sector, or for example by focusing on smaller infrastructure projects.
- Maximise use of CDB's other communication channels, including CDB's website and social media channels

Conclusion 4



In the context of high brain drain and political change, there is a need for CDB to modify and better publicize existing and planned capacity building/institutional strengthening initiatives so that the knowledge and skills of Bahamians are built and retained.

Recommendation 3: Develop and implement a clear strategy for capacity building and institutional strengthening with the government of Bahamas, and ensure that TA support has the necessary country-level buy-in.

Suggestions for implementation:

- Review the role and structure of Project Execution Units which support CDB projects (in The Bahamas and, as appropriate, more broadly) to identify how longer-term, in-country capacity can be more sustainably developed including greater use of native Bahamian consultants.
- Increase in-country stakeholder involvement in the design of TA support, ideally through a collaborative co-creation process.

Conclusion 5



Perceptions of CDB processes including procurement, disbursement and other approvals are having a significant negative impact on overall perceptions of CBD as a partner, even where they are not substantially different from/more complex than those of other IDPs. This indicates a need to improve understanding and awareness of processes among in-country stakeholders, and to ensure that CDB communicates their requirements as coherently and efficiently as possible.

Recommendation 4: Increase engagement with in-country stakeholders to ensure that CDB processes are better understood (linking to Recommendation 2).

Suggestions for implementation:

- Increase/ optimize use of CDB's available roster of consultants to support this.
- Discuss with IDB the possibility of arranging further joint trainings on procurement and other key processes
- Consult with country-level counterparts when key processes are revised in the future so that processes and guidance are as clear and well-understood as possible

Conclusion 6



For CDB's cross-cutting priority of gender to be better integrated from design through to operationalization and thus better support sustainability, there is a need for CDB to be more aware of and directly address stakeholder misconceptions and sensitivities. In the environment, GOCB capacity is a key constraint, but there is still a need to build greater buy-in for technical support so that if/when capacity increases, support in these areas is more of a GOCB priority.

Recommendation 5: Improve CDB understanding of and engagement on gender in The Bahamas so that gender is better integrated from design through to implementation in the next country strategy.

Suggestions for implementation:

- Develop a stronger relationship with Ministry of Gender and Family Affairs and other key stakeholders in The Bahamas (including civil society), seeking to establish a gender National Focal Point.
- Related to Recommendation 4, work with other IDPs to establish whether a joint approach to improving awareness and understanding of gender may be appropriate.
- Look to examples of good practice from other countries, for example Belize, which could be used as case studies for key in-country stakeholders to better appreciate the value of mainstreaming cross-cutting areas such as gender.

Acronyms

AOP	Annual Operating Plan
BBSQ	Bahamas Bureau of Standards and Quality
BDB	Bahamas Development Bank
BEST	Bahamas Education Sector Transformation
BMC	Borrowing Member Country
BNTF	Basic Needs Trust Fund
BPL	Bahamas Power and Light
BSO	Business support organisations
BTVI	Bahamas Technical and Vocational Institute
CARICOM	Caribbean Community Intergovernmental Organisation
CCREEE	Caribbean Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency
CCRIF SPC	Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility
CDB	Caribbean Development Bank
CDRMP	Comprehensive Natural Disaster Risk Management Program
CES	Country Engagement Strategy
COB	College of The Bahamas
COVID-19	Coronavirus disease
CRCIMP	Climate-Resilient Coastal Infrastructure Management Programme
CRVA	Climate Risk and Vulnerability Assessments
CSEC	Caribbean Secondary Education Certification
CSP	Country Strategy Paper
CSPE	Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation
CTCS	Caribbean Technological Consultancy Services
CTE	Career technical education
CVC	Climate Variability and Change
DRA	Disaster Risk Authority
DRM	Disaster Risk Management
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
ECG	Evaluation Cooperation Group
ECPA	Enhanced Country Poverty Assessment
EE	Energy Efficiency

EQ	Evaluation questions
ESU	Environmental Sustainability Unit
EU	European Union
FAP	Flood Alleviation and Drainage Program
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FRA	Fiscal Responsibility Act
FRC	Financial Reporting Council
FGD	Focus group discussion
FNM	Free National Movement
FRC	Financial Reporting Council
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GE	Gender Equity
GHG	Green House Gas
GOCB	Government of the Commonwealth of The Bahamas
HDI	Human Development Index
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDP	International Development Partner
IFI	International Financial Institution
ILO	International Labour Organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IRRP	Integrated resource and resilience plan
KIIs	Key Informant Interviews
KPI	Key Performance Indicator
LAC	Latin America and the Caribbean
LED	Light-emitting Diode
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDB	Multilateral Development Bank
MDPMR	Ministry of Disaster Preparedness, Management and Reconstruction (Bahamas)
MEGJC	Ministry of Economic Growth and Job Creation
MoF	Ministry of Finance
MSME	Micro, small and medium enterprises

MTR	Mid-Term Review
NDP	National development plan
NEMA	National Emergency Management Agency
OECD DAC	OECD Development Assistance Committee
OIE	Office of Independent Evaluation (CDB)
PAHO	Pan-American Health Organisation
PBL	Policy-Based Loan / Lending
PCAM	Project cycle management
PCR	Project Completion Report
PEAP	Public Education and Awareness Programme
PFM	Public financial management
PIU	Project Implementation Unit
PLP	Progressive Liberal Party
PMDU	Prime Minister's Delivery Unit
PPAM	Public Policy Analysis and Management
PSD	Private Sector Development Unit (CDB)
PSR	Project Supervision Report
RAG	Red-Amber-Green
RCI	Regional cooperation and integration
RE	Renewable Energy
RMF	Results Management Framework
RIO	Resident Implementation Officer
SDG	Sustainable Development Goal
SGME	Social and Gender, Monitoring and Evaluation
SMART	Specific, Measurable, Attributable, Realistic, Time-bound
TA	Technical Assistance
TDEP	Targeted Dialogue on Energy Policy
ToR	Terms of Reference
TVET	Technical and Vocational Education and Training
UKAID	United Kingdom Aid
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollar

VAT	Value Added Tax
WB	World Bank
WHO	World Health Organisation
WSC	Water Services Corporation

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1 Introduction

1.1 Background

This Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation (CSPE) for The Bahamas is intended to:

- Provide a status report on the performance of Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) programming in The Bahamas, examining progress in achieving intended and sustainable results, whether the design of the programme was appropriate, and whether implementation was efficient.
- Be learning and utility-focused: Specifically, to provide valuable and realistic recommendations that can inform the development of the next Country Engagement Strategy (CES) for The Bahamas, and potentially wider CDB programming.

A list of those interviewed and documents consulted are listed in Annexes A and B.

The primary audience for the evaluation's findings is those charged with designing CDB's next CSP, now CES for The Bahamas, and project teams in the various sectors. General lessons will also be of interest to senior management and the Board of Directors.

1.2 Evaluation Methodology

The evaluation is utilisation-focused, based on a streamlined version of the Evaluation Cooperation Group (ECG) Good Practice Standards for Country Evaluations. The evaluation team used a mixed-methods approach, combining qualitative analysis from document review and key informant interviews (KII) and quantitative analysis of administrative/financial data. Findings are based on triangulated data (never using single sources) and based on thematic analysis against the EQs. A case study on the issue of CSP traction was included, which used primarily qualitative evidence from KIIs and background documents and brought evidence against several evaluation questions (EQs) under one case study. The main evaluation tool was the evaluation matrix (Annex C) structured around the key EQs in the Terms of Reference (ToR) and finalised during the inception phase and five OECD DAC evaluation criteria: relevance, coherence, efficiency, effectiveness, and sustainability.

1.2.1 Evaluation Scope

The evaluation was designed to serve both accountability and learning purposes in determining how well Bank interventions performed and the lessons that can be drawn to inform Bank operations in the future.

The evaluation focused on the CDB's implementation of the 2018–2022 CSP for The Bahamas, but some activities initiated under the previous CSP (2013–2017), which were still undergoing implementation during the 2018–2022 period, were included in the evaluation sample. In total, 14 projects were included in the evaluation (see Table 1).

1.2.2 Evaluation Process

The evaluation was initiated in August 2023 with a ten-week inception phase to finalise the design, data sources, main areas of focus and proposed work plan. A one-week mission visit to The Bahamas was conducted in late October 2023, with preliminary findings shared with key CDB staff in late November 2023 to increase buy-in, identify outstanding data gaps and start to think about possible recommendations. A follow-up co-creation of recommendations workshop was held with CDB staff in mid-December 2023 to help develop realistic and timebound recommendations.

Table 1: Summary of projects included in the CSP evaluationⁱ

CDB Sector	CSP Period	Project Name (those not indicated in the CSP as an indicative area of support in italics)
Economic Cooperation	2018–2022	First Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building Policy-Based Loan (PBL)
		Second Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL with Supplementary Financing for COVID-19
		Strengthening the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit (PMDU) to Support Reconstruction & Recovery
		TA – Consultancy Services to Support Institutional Strengthening – PMDU
Economic Infrastructure	2018–2022	Streetlight Retrofitting Project
		Climate Resilience of the Water Sector
	2013–2017	Water Supply Improvement Project
Environmental Sustainability	2018–2022	Disaster Management Emergency Relief Grant – Hurricane Dorian (2019)
Private Sector	2018–2022	Enhancing National Quality Infrastructure through Establishment of Metrology Laboratory
Social Sector	2018–2022	Bahamas Education Sector Transformation (BEST) Project
	2013–2017	Bahamas Technical and Vocational Institute (BTVI) Enhancement Project
Technical Cooperation	2018–2022	PPAM and PCAM Training
		National Workshop in Improved Practices for the Construction of Houses
		Creative Industries support (Orange Loan)

1.2.3 Data Collection

The evidence base for the evaluation consists of a range of qualitative and quantitative sources, specifically:

- 5 cross-cutting CDB documents received from the OIE team;
- 126 Project-specific documents received directly from the OIE team, other CDB staff or in-country stakeholders;
- 25 documents sourced independently by the evaluation team; and
- Semi-structured KIIs with 50 key informants.

KIIs were performed using semi-structured guides based on the evaluation criteria and adapted in line with the specific stakeholder, the relevant project(s) and evidence already available from document review.

1.2.4 Data Analysis

Narrative documents and notes from KIIs were qualitatively coded against the EQs using MAXQDA software, which also supported coding against broad evaluation criteria as appropriate. This coding allowed for robust triangulation of evidence from different sources. Financial project summaries and other quantitative administrative data were analysed using Microsoft Excel.

1.2.5 Stakeholder Engagement

To improve the utility of the evaluation, various efforts were made to interact with key stakeholders at various stages of the evaluation, as follows:

- Ongoing engagement with the OIE throughout to ensure that the methodology and planned outputs of the evaluation met intended objectives. This engagement included revisions to the design of planned case studies in line with the available data;
- Engagement of the former and current country economists from the start of the inception phase, through data collection, to delivery of preliminary findings and conclusions, development of recommendations and delivery of draft and final reports;
- A Mission Debrief session offered to key GOCB stakeholders (although this was not taken up) at the end of the mission visit in late October 2023;
- A Preliminary Findings and Conclusions Workshop held in late November 2023 with key CDB staff. This presented preliminary findings and conclusions based on inception and mission KIIs and a review of documents received to date. The workshop included a group discussion examining gaps in the evidence base, highlighting additional documents and/or KIIs that could close these gaps, and initial discussion of recommendations arising from the preliminary findings and conclusions presented;
- A Co-Creation of Recommendations Workshop held in mid-December 2023 with key CDB staff to improve buy-in for and utility of evaluation recommendations. This presented updated findings and posed strategic questions against each of these. A session was then held utilising a Miro online, interactive whiteboard to identify potential recommendations that were specific, owned, realistic/actionable, timebound, and coherent. (See Annex D for Miro whiteboard from this session); and
- Initial and follow-up drafts of the Evaluation Report shared initially with OIE and then with the wider OIE team to elicit and address feedback before submission of the final report.

1.2.6 Limitations

Some significant limitations were experienced during the evaluation process, as described below. Despite these challenges, we consider the overall strength of evidence for the findings presented to be strong in most cases (based on multiple pieces of evidence from a variety of sources/stakeholders) and at least moderate in all cases (based on multiple pieces of evidence but from a narrower range of sources/stakeholders). We have noted within the report where it was not possible to present specific analysis or findings due to some of the challenges mentioned below:

- **Limited availability of key CDB background documents:** Despite considerable effort to support the evaluation team with access to key documents, several key documents either did not exist or proved hard for the CDB to locate. Some examples of key documents that remain missing from the data set include Project Supervision Reports (PSRs) and/or Project Completion Reports (PCRs) for many sampled interventions over both CSP periods.¹ As a result, our assessment of project-level effectiveness and efficiency was constrained for some interventions, as we were unable to verify if/when several projects had been completed, whether defined project-level outputs and outcomes had been achieved and were unable to compare projected and actual project timelines. Furthermore, as no Mid-Term Review (MTR) of the CSP had taken place, the evaluation had to rely more heavily on the perceptions of key informants. The extension of the data collection window mitigated the above challenge to some extent, as some key documents were retrieved later in this window via the CDB or in-country key informants themselves. During interviews with key informants from interventions where no PCRs or PSRs were available, the evaluation asked specific questions about the perceived achievement of intended outputs and outcomes and for any consultant reports they had available. As a result, we were able to gather qualitative views of progress based on the documents and key informant insights for most projects. In addition to some publicly available documents on the internet, this research helped us to outline some degree of progress, but quantitative analysis of progress against some indicators and timelines was not possible for all projects.
- **The need to amend plans for the gender and environment-focused case study:** Based on insights from inception phase interviews with CDB staff, the CSPE Inception Report proposed two case studies focusing on CSP traction and the operationalisation of gender, social inclusion and the environment. However, following the October mission visit, it became apparent there was insufficient data to provide a gender and environment case study as envisaged. However, several of the EQs speak specifically to the integration of gender, and findings and a short summary box related to this area are presented.

¹ We did not receive any documentation for three projects: (a) Consultancy Services to Support Institutional Strengthening – PMDU; (b) Enhancing the National Quality Infrastructure of The Bahamas through the Establishment of the Metrology Laboratory; and (c) PPAM and PCAM training (although we did source some documents online for the latter). We did not receive any progress reports for four projects: (a) the Bahamas Education Sector Transformation (BEST) Project; (b) Climate Resilience of the Water Sector in The Bahamas; (c) Strengthening the PMDU to Support Reconstruction and Recovery; and (d) Disaster Management Emergency Relief Grant: Hurricane Dorian (2019).

2 Country Context

2.1 Geography, Population and Demographics

The Bahamas is an archipelago in the North Atlantic Ocean consisting of over 700 islands covering approximately 100,000 square miles. The Bahamas has a population of approximately 393,244.ⁱⁱ The country's population is characterized by a relatively high urbanization rate, with the majority residing in Nassau, the capital city. The population is ethnically diverse, with the majority being of African descent, followed by European and other ethnic groups. The age distribution is skewed towards younger people.


The Bahamas' location exposes it to various environmental challenges, including vulnerability to hurricanes, coastal erosion, and rising sea levels, all worsened by the effects of climate change. The Bahamas' Exclusive Economic Zone covers approximately 242,970 square miles.² This extensive maritime territory gives The Bahamas jurisdiction over significant marine resources, including fisheries, minerals, and other economic activities within this area.

2.2 Economic and Financial Context

The Bahamas has been a member of the CDB since its inception in 1970. Over the years, the Bank has played a significant role in supporting the country's development efforts through various projects and initiatives, focusing on sectors such as infrastructure, education, and healthcare. The Bahamas holds 5% of CDB shares (as of December 2019)ⁱⁱⁱ and has had a total of USD 203,511,000 in approvals from the CDB between 1971 and 2023.^{iv}


Macroeconomic stability in The Bahamas is highly susceptible to external shocks, given its reliance on tourism, financial services, and international trade. In recent years, the country has experienced fluctuations in gross domestic product (GDP) growth, driven by factors such as global economic conditions, natural disasters, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Efforts to maintain stability have involved fiscal policies, public debt management, and initiatives to diversify the economy. The government's commitment to resilience building measures, alongside engagement with international financial institutions, has been pivotal in navigating challenges around sustainable macroeconomic stability.^v While the country experienced moderate economic growth between 2018 and 2019, the COVID-19 pandemic severely impacted its tourism-dependent economy.^{vi}

Figure 1: GDP per capita (USD): The Bahamas other CDB member states^{vii}




The contraction of the tourism sector (tourism receipts fell by more than 75% in 2020) resulted in a significant economic downturn, as shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) expects tourist arrivals and real average spending, which surpassed pre-pandemic levels in 2023, to continue to rise in the near term, boosting real GDP and helping to narrow external and fiscal imbalances.^{viii} Tourism and related services contribute approximately 70% of the country’s GDP and employ just over half of the workforce.^{ix} It should also be noted that 21.5% of The Bahamas’ GDP can be attributed to the “blue economy” (i.e., economic activity connected to the marine environment). When indirect impacts are included, the “blue economy” contributes 50% of GDP, along with 54.5% of wages and 73% of employment.^x

Figure 2: GDP growth in The Bahamas (% annual change, 2002–2022)^{xi}



The Bahamas’ debt situation is concerning, with average public debt levels over 80% of GDP between 2020 and 2023 (see Figure 3), leaving little fiscal space to invest in diversifying the economy and increasing investment in resilient infrastructure, for example.^{xii} The Bahamas’ Fiscal Responsibility Law does provide a legally binding mechanism for returning the fiscal balance and debt to established targets. Gross financing needs also remain high, and fiscal financing costs are elevated. Therefore, managing and reducing debt while fostering sustainable economic growth remains a key challenge.

Figure 3: Current account balance (% GDP) and gross debt position (% GDP), 2002–2023^{xiii}



Hurricane Dorian, a Category 5 hurricane, struck The Bahamas in September 2019, causing extensive damage to infrastructure, housing, and communities, particularly on the islands of Abaco and Grand Bahama. The economic impact was substantial, as key sectors, including tourism, agriculture, and fisheries, were severely affected. The cost of recovery and rebuilding was immense, requiring international aid and assistance. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) estimated that the damages and losses amounted to USD3.4 billion (about 25% of GDP) and that monthly economic activity was down by 54% for September 2019 compared to the previous year.^{xiv} The aftermath of the hurricane highlighted the need for disaster preparedness, climate resilience, and the development of infrastructure that can withstand natural disasters.

The COVID-19 pandemic, which closely followed the devastation caused by Hurricane Dorian, had profound compounded effects on the Bahamian economy, leading to a contraction in GDP, rising unemployment, and reduced government revenues. Travel restrictions and lockdowns severely impacted the tourism industry, a critical source of employment and foreign exchange, with receipts down by more than 75%.^{xv} Although the economy has been recovering strongly since 2021, the pandemic had significant human and social consequences and weakened public finances considerably. In addition, inflationary pressures following COVID are elevated in The Bahamas in line with global developments.


2.3 Social Context

Governance: Governance in The Bahamas, as assessed by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, reflects a mixed performance (see Figure 4).² While The Bahamas demonstrates relative

² **Voice and accountability** captures perceptions of the extent to which a country’s citizens can participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media. **Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism** measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism. **Government effectiveness** captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the civil service and the degree of independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. **Regulatory quality**

strengths in areas such as voice and accountability and control of corruption, reflecting a degree of citizen engagement and government responsiveness, challenges remain concerning the rule of law and regulatory quality. These indicators suggest ongoing efforts are needed to enhance transparency, strengthen legal institutions, and improve the regulatory environment.

Figure 4: The Bahamas governance indicators between 2017 and 2021^{xvi}



Gender and Social Inclusion: Gender equality in The Bahamas has progressed in areas such as education with higher female participation rates, as indicated above. However, this is not reflected in the employment sector, with women’s workforce participation rates falling and the gender gap widening since 2019, as previously highlighted. There are also challenges in achieving equal representation in leadership (only 12.7% of seats in parliament are held by women) and addressing violence against women. The country’s legal framework provides some protections, but implementation and cultural norms can hinder full gender parity. Efforts to advance gender equality involve policies to promote women’s empowerment, eliminate discrimination, and enhance access to education, healthcare, and economic opportunities.^{xvii}

Vulnerable groups in The Bahamas encompass a range of individuals facing distinct challenges, including youth, indigenous populations, and those living in poverty. Youth unemployment (24% in 2022^{xviii}) and limited access to quality education pose obstacles to prospects among the young population. Indigenous communities, such as the Lucayan and Taino, grapple with cultural preservation amid modernization. Vulnerable groups have been particularly affected by rising food and oil prices.^{xix}


Business Environment: The business environment in The Bahamas is characterised by a blend of opportunities and challenges. The country’s advantageous tax regime, strategic location, and attractive sectors like tourism and financial services have historically drawn interest from investors. Micro, small and medium enterprises (MSME) are critical in the Bahamian economy and are estimated to make up 98% of the country’s businesses.^{xx} MSMEs have been deeply affected by recent disasters, including Hurricane

captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private-sector development. **Rule of law** captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. **Control of corruption** captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites and private interests.

Dorian, with a study finding that over 60% of them have seen adverse effects.^{xxi} Other ongoing challenges include complex regulatory processes, bureaucracy, limited access to financing, and vulnerability to natural disasters, which can impede the ease of doing business.

Despite government initiatives to streamline procedures, improve infrastructure, and encourage foreign investment, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) trends in The Bahamas have shown a mixed pattern over the past decade (see Figure 5 below).


Figure 5: Foreign direct investment, net inflow (USD), 2002–2022^{xxii}



Poverty and Welfare: The Bahamas faces a complex poverty and welfare situation marked by large disparities between urban and rural areas. This situation is further complicated by the island nation's archipelagic characteristics and the population's spread across several islands. While the bulk of the population is concentrated in New Providence, where the capital city can be found, the rest of the population is spread across the Family Islands. The Bahamas also suffers from a high cost of living due to its dependence on imports. The Bahamas ranks relatively high on the Human Development Index (HDI), reflecting a reasonable standard of living, access to education, and life expectancy (71.6 years).^{xxiii} In 2021, The Bahamas had an HDI of 0.812, placing it in the category of “very high human development”, or 55th out of 187 countries. This result represents a slight drop from 2018 when the HDI was at 0.827. However, inequalities persist, with pockets of poverty and social challenges, particularly on the Family Islands.^{xxiv}

The total labour force stands at 219,465 (50% of the population) as of May 2023. Women represent 54% of this figure, while 23% of the labour force are aged between 25 and 34 years old, 26% had a bachelor's degree or higher, and 21% had no qualifications.^{xxv}

Figure 6: Unemployment, total (% of total labour force) 2003–2023^{xxvi}



The unemployment rate has fluctuated in recent years, decreasing to 8.8% in 2023 from a peak in 2020, likely corresponding with the impact of COVID-19 (see Figure 6). The rate is slightly higher for men (9.1%) than for women. The youth unemployment rate remains higher than this (although lower than most other countries in the region) at 19.2% for men and 18.2% for women.^{xxvii}

Education: The education system in The Bahamas has focused in recent years on achieving universal education and improving literacy rates. However, World Bank figures³ indicate that since 2000, net school enrolment rates have fluctuated between 28–40% in pre-primary education, 74–80% in primary education and 58–72% in secondary education.^{xxviii} These figures also indicate significant gaps remaining in enrolment in pre-primary and progression to secondary levels. Gender-disaggregated data indicates that female participation in education is generally marginally higher than male participation at all levels, with a wider gap at the secondary level.^{xxix} The country has a mix of public and private institutions. While strides have been made in enrolment and literacy rates, challenges persist in terms of quality, especially in remote areas, as well as in pre-primary education and vocational education.^{xxx} In addition, education gaps have increased, given the varied quality and access to remote learning due to the COVID-19 pandemic. National efforts to enhance education include curriculum reforms, teacher training, and technology integration. Collaboration between government, educators, and stakeholders remains pivotal in sustaining improvements and ensuring equitable access to quality education. However, spending on education as a share of GDP remains well below that of other countries in the region.^{xxxi}

Citizen Security: The citizen security situation in The Bahamas presents a multifaceted challenge, with concerns related to crime rates, particularly violent crime and property-related offences. While the overall crime rate has fluctuated, the homicide rate has increased by 40% since 2018.^{xxxii} Crime incidence tends to be concentrated in certain areas, such as Nassau. The Bahamas has taken steps to address these issues, including law enforcement efforts, community engagement, and crime prevention initiatives. However, sustained collaboration between law enforcement, government agencies, and communities is crucial to tackle crime effectively and enhance citizen security.

³ GOCB education statistics could not be found online.

2.4 Environmental Context

Climate resilience, environmental sustainability, and sustainable energy: The Bahamas has been actively addressing climate resilience challenges, given its vulnerability to climate change impacts like hurricanes and sea-level rise. The country has made strides in developing climate-resilient infrastructure, particularly in the aftermath of events like Hurricane Dorian. Initiatives include enhancing building codes, improving disaster preparedness, and investing in sustainable energy solutions. International collaborations, community engagement, and policy frameworks contribute to advancing climate resilience and safeguarding the country's natural and built environments.

Environmental sustainability in The Bahamas is a critical focus due to its fragile ecosystems and vulnerability to climate change. The country is actively working to protect its marine and terrestrial biodiversity through initiatives such as marine protected areas and conservation efforts. Specific challenges include overfishing, habitat degradation, and waste management. The Bahamas is working to balance economic development with environmental preservation, emphasizing sustainable tourism, renewable energy (RE), and community engagement to ensure the long-term health of its natural resources. The Bahamas has also made strides in advancing blue economy opportunities with support from the IDB.

The Bahamas ratified the Paris Agreement in 2016, submitting Nationally Determined Contributions, committing to a 30% decrease in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030. As part of this, The Bahamas is actively pursuing energy efficiency and sustainable energy solutions to reduce reliance on fossil fuels and mitigate environmental impacts. The country has implemented policies encouraging the adoption of RE, such as solar power, wind energy, and energy-efficient technologies. These efforts align with The Bahamas' commitment to international climate agreements. While progress has been made with negative greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions growth in 2020 and 2021,^{xxxiii} challenges include high energy costs, infrastructure development, resources to build public- and private-sector capacity, and trade-offs between development and climate action, including potential increases in unemployment.^{xxxiv} Continued investment in RE projects, policy support, and public awareness campaigns contribute to The Bahamas' transition to a more sustainable energy future.

3 Performance

3.1 Introduction

This section of the report examines the performance of CDB's activities in The Bahamas since 2018 under three high-level questions and against the following evaluation criteria:

<i>High-Level Question</i>	<i>Evaluation Criteria</i>
Did the CSP achieve the intended results?	Effectiveness, Sustainability
Was the CSP design appropriate?	Relevance, Coherence, RMF Design
Was CSP implementation efficient?	Efficiency

3.2 Did the CSP Achieve the Intended Results?

High-Level Finding: *Overall achievement of intended results and CDB's contribution to these was hard to robustly assess due to limited data and significant changes against what was originally planned under the CSP. There were significant successes in the areas of fiscal management and public policy and frameworks related to disaster response and COVID-19, but other areas made more limited progress. In terms of sustainability, the results were mixed, with a greater likelihood of sustainability in projects that supported fiscal management and governance. However, overall sustainability was constrained by delays in critical support through technical assistance (TA).*

3.2.1 Effectiveness (EQ1)

Finding 1: *Progress towards intended CSP results is mixed. Of the eight key outcomes relevant to the CSP period (five from the original CSP plus three PBL outcomes agreed during the CSP period), three outcomes (all PBL outcomes) were achieved, four were partially achieved, and one was not achieved. The CDB's contribution to progress was significant in supporting all three PBL outcomes (related to disaster response frameworks, COVID-19 policies and improved fiscal management) as well as under improved governance (CSP Outcome 4). The CDB contribution was more limited in outcomes related to climate-resilient infrastructure (CSP Outcome 1), productivity and competitiveness (CSP Outcome 5), with no progress in education (CSP Outcome 3). Outcome-level progress reflected implementation: achievement of intended PBL outcomes resulted from their successful and timely implementation, while more limited achievement of other outcomes reflected the implementation progress of key interventions.*

3.2.1.1 PROGRESS TOWARDS CSP OUTCOMES (EQ1, 1.2)

As outlined in Table 2 below (and in more detail in Section 3.3.1, Table 5), the 2018–2022 CSP was originally framed against three pillars and five outcomes, which align with CDB's overall strategic objectives of supporting inclusive and sustainable growth and development and promoting good governance.^{xxxv} During the CSP period, two-series programmatic PBLs worth a combined \$90m were

approved as part of CDB's response to Hurricane Dorian and COVID-19.^{xxxvi} Considering the significance of PBLs to the CDB's support during the 2018–2022 CSP period, we have included the three key outcomes outlined in the PBLs under the relevant CSP pillars in Table 2. CSP progress against intended outcomes (including PBL outcomes) is overall reasonably positive, with all except one outcome (in education) at least partially achieved. Progress against the three PBL outcomes was very positive, with all three outcomes achieved.⁴

As the evaluation will explore in more detail in Section 3.4.5, the more positive progress and CDB contribution against the PBL outcomes reflects CDB's successful adaptation to the Hurricane Dorian and COVID-19 crises, particularly in designing these interventions. More limited progress and contribution in other areas reflects limited traction of CDB support in these areas.

Table 2: Assessment of achievement and CDB contribution against CSP and PBL outcomes

Outcomes	Achievement	CDB Contribution
Pillar 1: Environmental Protection and Infrastructure		
CSP Outcome 1: Improved Access to Quality Climate-Resilient Infrastructure	Partially achieved	Some
CSP Outcome 2: Increased EE and RE Options	Partially achieved	Some
PBL Outcome: Improved Frameworks, Enhanced Risk Identification and Increased Access to Disaster Recovery Financing	Achieved	Significant
Pillar 2: Inclusive Social Development		
CSP Outcome 3: Enhanced Educational Outcomes	Not Achieved	Limited
PBL Outcome: A More Responsive Public Policy to COVID-19	Achieved	Significant
Pillar 3: Improved Governance and Productivity		
CSP Outcome 4: Improved Governance	Partially achieved	Significant
CSP Outcome 5: Increased Productivity, Competitiveness, Economic Diversification	Partially achieved	Some
PBL Outcome: Strengthened Fiscal Management	Achieved	Significant

Key:

Achievement	Contribution
Achieved	Significant
Partially achieved	Some
Not achieved	Limited

Section 3.2.1.2 (Progress at Intervention Level) provides an overview of all progress at the intervention level, which feeds into the above assessment.

⁴ See Annex C for detailed references

Box 1: Note on CSP progress assessment methodology

The evaluation elaborated a detailed summary of achievement against RMF indicators under each CSP and PBL outcome (Annex E), but for a majority of these, data for the specific indicator provided in the RMF were not available. Where possible, the evaluation has sought to provide a relevant alternative indicator or other data to provide some indication of progress, but these are not always rigorous. For example, one indicator under CSP Outcome 2 was framed around the percentage reduction in energy intensity in the public sector between 2018 and 2022. However, as there was no available data, the evaluation used alternative available data from the Streetlight Retrofitting Project, which showed annual savings of 15,005MWh in 2023 and 12,746 tonnes of carbon dioxide emissions being reduced, indicating the CDB had made some contribution to progress under this outcome. It is important to note that outcome-level results, by their nature, cannot be completely attributed to the CDB, as other donors and the GOCB also provide significant input into results at this level. In line with this, we have also provided a qualitative assessment of the CDB's contribution to CSP and PBL outcomes based on a combination of the number and size (in terms of financial investment) of projects, their implementation, and known achievement of project-level results. *Significant contribution* indicates that without the CDB's support, this outcome would likely not have been achieved. *Some contribution* indicates that the Bank's support was valuable, but the outcome may still have been achieved without its support. *Limited contribution* indicates that the CDB's contribution was minimal and made a limited impact on any progress made.

3.2.1.2 PROGRESS AT INTERVENTION LEVEL (EQ1.1)

The status of delivery for the various intervention-level outputs and outcomes is mixed, primarily due to delays in the implementation of projects. Based on available data⁵, nine of the sampled projects were complete or mostly complete, with five in earlier stages of progress (see Table 3 for details). Within this overall mixed picture, there are some examples of progress, outlined as follows:

- **CSP Outcome 1: Improved Access to Quality Climate-Resilient Infrastructure – Partially achieved / Some contribution**
 - **Water Supply Improvement Project:** The Water Supply Improvement Project is a critical component of the GOCB's strategy, helping to provide water for those in the north and south of The Bahamas. The intended outcomes were (a) improved climate-resilient water supply systems and operations performance of the Water Services Corporation (WSC) and (b) enhanced WSC institutional capacity for climate variability and change (CVC) adaptation, mitigation planning and employee effectiveness. KIIs indicated that will be met with the completion of the works and remaining consultancies.^{xxxvii} Overall, while most water-related works are complete, there were substantial delays in the implementation of linked TA such as climate risk and vulnerability assessments (CRVA), social and gender monitoring and evaluation (SGME) and the Public Education and Awareness Programme (PEAP), most of which were originally intended to take place at the start of the project.^{xxxviii} Reports outlining project outcome indicators were not available to the evaluation team, but a late 2022 PSR indicated that eight out of 15 output

⁵ As outlined in the Limitations section (Section 1.2.6), due to lack of progress reports from many projects, data against intervention-level outputs and outcomes was not available in many cases.

indicators had been achieved at that time, with four of those not achieved due to delays with TA. However, all infrastructure-related outputs had been achieved by that time, thus contributing to CSP Outcome 1.^{xxxix} The delays to key TA, such as the CRVA and Social and Gender consultancies, are of some concern, especially regarding the prospects of sustainability. In addition, as the project was originally designed in the previous CSP period, some stakeholders said that while multiple changes had been made, those changes may not have been as adaptive as necessary to the revised needs in the aftermath of Hurricane Dorian and COVID-19.

- **National Workshop in Improved Practices for the Construction of Houses:** The main objective of the workshop was to improve the resilience of houses in The Bahamas against hurricanes up to Category 5 and thus mitigate related adverse social and economic impacts. The workshop was a follow-on from a regional training-of-trainers held in mid-2018, attended by key personnel from the Ministry of Works in The Bahamas (and 15 other BMCs).^{xl} The Bahamas workshop reportedly reached 286 local contractors (254 male, 32 female) from 51 MSMEs (44 male-owned, 7 female-owned).⁶ Over 95% of attendees who completed feedback forms stated that their knowledge and skills had increased as a result of the training, that they were prepared to use their new knowledge and skills in the construction industry, and that the training had enhanced their overall understanding of the topic.^{xli} Overall, the workshop met its intended objective, and due to the positive reception, the Ministry of Works plan more workshops once further building code updates have been made.
- **The Climate Resilience of The Water Sector and Enhancing the National Quality Infrastructure of The Bahamas through the Establishment of the Metrology Laboratory** are both projects that are still in relatively early stages of implementation due to delays arising from COVID-19.
- **CSP Outcome 2: Increased EE and RE Options – Partially achieved / Some contribution.**
 - **Streetlights Retrofitting Project:** The Streetlights Project was able to progress on many of its objectives, especially those around energy efficiency. Reporting data highlights that 37,700 lamps are installed and operational, while a reduction in monthly kilowatt hours (kWh) and an annual reduction in carbon dioxide emissions has occurred since 2018.^{xlii} The lifetime of the lights is also expected to last much longer than the previous lights, helping to ensure efficiency and overall sustainability. The low level of disbursement for this project (21%) is primarily due to the LED bulbs not being procured using CDB funds as initially intended but rather via the GOCB's own funds due to issues arising in the procurement process.^{xliii} As a result, the CDB's contribution to outputs under this specific project and to the CSP outcome is less than it might have been. In late 2023, Bahamas Power and Light (BPL) requested reprogramming of remaining funds to install remaining LED bulbs in additional areas of New Providence and in select Family Islands.^{xliv}
 - **PBL Outcomes: Improved frameworks, risk identification and access to disaster financing (Achieved, significant CDB contribution); Strengthened Fiscal Management (Partly achieved / Significant CDB contribution); A more responsive policy to COVID-19 – (Achieved / Significant CDB contribution)**

⁶ This turnout was much lower than the target of 400 persons. However, it is possible that attendance figures were reported lower than reality as many persons did not complete the evaluation forms, which attributed to the low count as evident in the MSMEs standard indicator.

- **First Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL and Second Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL with Supplementary Financing for COVID-19:** The series of loans was initially deployed to assist the GOCB to cope with the fallout from Hurricane Dorian. By the time the second operation in the series was appraised, The Bahamas had been struck by a second catastrophic shock, the COVID-19 pandemic, which severely impacted tourism, the country's leading source of income and employment. In response, the CDB adjusted the operation's objectives and design to address the effects of the pandemic, in addition to the original goals of the series, namely the restoration of fiscal sustainability and the strengthening of environmental and climate resilience. Both loans were fully dispersed and all intended outcomes of the PBLs were achieved. Evidence gathered from document review and KIIs supports the conclusion that the PBL was effective in helping to establish a basis for improved fiscal sustainability via improved legislation and access to funds. For example, The PBLs contributed to increasing liquidity to facilitate social protection support, lessening the negative impacts of the pandemic. From a fiscal standpoint, key achievements because of the loan are the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) enacted in Q3, 2021, a modern PFM Bill in 2020 and a Public Procurement Legislation, amongst other things. From a disaster risk perspective, notable outputs were the enactment of the Disaster Preparedness and Response (Amendments) and approval of the CDRMP, while NEMA was restructured and a plan of action for institutional reforms towards improving its responsiveness was established.^{xlv} The COVID-19 supplement aspect also enabled financing of at least 1% of GDP to be allocated and utilized for COVID-19 response initiatives.^{xlvi}
- **TA for the Consultancy Services to Support Institutional Strengthening and the Disaster Management Emergency Relief Grant – Hurricane Dorian (2019)** were also viewed positively, although there was limited evidence on whether the intended outcomes were reached.⁷ Nevertheless, the grant for relief from Hurricane Dorian was fully dispersed. The CDB disbursed USD 200,000 as an Emergency Relief Grant to The Bahamas National Emergency Management Agency for humanitarian assistance and allocated a USD750,000 Immediate Response Loan to assist with the clean-up and short-term recovery.^{xlvii}
 - **CSP Outcome 3: Enhanced Educational Outcomes Not Achieved / Limited**
 - **The Bahamas Technical and Vocational Institute (BTVI) Enhancement Project (CSP Outcome 3: Enhanced Educational Outcomes):** While this project is now getting closer to completion, there have been substantial delays and changes of scope to both the infrastructure and TA components of the intervention. As a result, as of October 2023, the main infrastructure component had not been finished, and several TA components were still outstanding. The evaluation team received no PSRs outlining progress against project-level outputs or outcomes,⁸ but given the substantial delays, the CDB's contribution to CSP Outcome 3 from the BTVI project is limited to date.

⁷ Due to a lack of project supervision and/or closure reports or other documents providing this information we are unable to provide information on expected completion dates, etc.

⁸ Monthly reports from the consultants overseeing the TA components of the intervention were received, but these did not provide updates against official project outputs and outcomes.




Table 3: Results matrix of CSP programming against CSP pillars and outcomes

Overall Outcome	Target Sector Outcome	CSP Programming	Summary Assessment
Pillar 1: Environmental Protection and Infrastructure			
CSP Outcome 1: Improved Access to Quality Climate-Resilient Infrastructure	Improved access to quality climate-resilient infrastructure	National Workshop in Improved Practices for the Construction of Houses (<i>Complete</i>) Water Supply Improvement Project (<i>Mostly complete</i>) Climate Resilience of The Water Sector (GCF) (<i>delayed but in progress</i>)	Partly achieved: Reports indicate that infrastructural benefits have been achieved. CDB Contribution – Some: Contribution more evident in rural areas and is focused on water-related issues.
	Strengthened environmental management		
	Environmentally sustainable infrastructure	Not implemented: Glass Window Bridge; Family Islands Infrastructure Upgrade; Geomatics Capacity Enhancement Project; Capacity-building to access climate financing	
CSP Outcome 2: Increased EE and RE Options	Improved GOCB capacity to implement RE/EE projects	Mostly complete: Streetlights Retrofitting Project	Partly achieved: There has been some progress in improving EE, but a more diversified energy mix is still required. CDB contribution – Some: Overall there is clear evidence of CDB contributing to improved EE on New Providence, although contribution from the Streetlights project was less than planned as ultimately CDB funds were not used to procure the LEDs
	Increased RE contribution	Not implemented: TA for capacity support – convening of TDEP for elaboration of Sustainable Energy Plan for Family Islands; TA to conduct energy audits/RE assessments, development of public sector EE programme; Family Island RE capital projects and mini-grids	
	Improved EE in public, private sector		
	Improved grid resilience in the Family Islands		
PBL Outcome: Improved frameworks, risk identification & access to disaster financing	Enhanced natural disaster resilience	Complete: First Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL Second Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL Disaster Management Emergency Relief Grant – Hurricane Dorian (2019)	Achieved: Good progress has been made in improving the resilience of disaster preparedness through institution reform and policy development. CDB Contribution – Significant: The BPLs were instrumental in policy development and institutional reform. The relief grant supported immediate Hurricane Dorian relief
Pillar 2: Inclusive Social Development			
CSP Outcome 3: Enhanced Educational Outcomes	Enhanced access to quality, demand-driven post-secondary, tertiary education	In progress: BTVI Enhancement Project (<i>in progress</i>)	Not achieved: Review of (limited) available evidence against RMF indicators and other available public data shows limited progress in enhancement of educational quality.

Overall Outcome	Target Sector Outcome	CSP Programming	Summary Assessment
	Expanded supply of certified, skilled labour	Bahamas Education Sector Transformation Project (BEST) (<i>Delayed, recently started</i>)	<p>Given the impact of lockdowns from the pandemic, it is likely that The Bahamas has suffered.^{xlviii}</p> <p>CDB Contribution – Limited: Delays to both education projects have limited CDB contribution</p>
	More children receiving quality early childhood education	Not implemented: Expanded access to competency-based, ICT-enabled skills training; Expanded access to quality early childhood education (ECD) provision; Project to support teacher effectiveness	
PBL Outcome: A more responsive policy to COVID-19	Strengthened Immediate Response in the Health and MSME sectors related to COVID-19	<p>Complete:</p> <p>First Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL</p> <p>Second Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL with Supplementary Financing for COVID-19</p>	<p>Achieved: The PBLs boosted liquidity and supported provision of social protection to mitigate COVID-19</p> <p>CDB Contribution – Significant: KIIs outlined the significance of the PBLs in achieving intended outcomes⁹</p>

⁹ Other IDP contributions were also significant, e.g., the World Bank approval of US\$100 million for COVID-19.

Pillar 3: Improved Governance and Productivity			
CSP Outcome 4: Improved Governance	Improved capacity to develop national policies, procurement regulations and capacity, and improved project management skills	<p>Complete:</p> <p>PPAM and PCAM Training First Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL Second Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL</p> <p>In progress:</p> <p>Strengthening the PMDU to Support Reconstruction & Recovery Institutional strengthening support, PMDU</p>	<p>Achieved: Positive steps have been taken to reduce vulnerability by developing more resilient infrastructure and the development of new structure for disaster management</p> <p>CDB Contribution – Significant: Good contribution in developing resilient infrastructure. PBLs also contributed to capacity strengthening for disaster management</p>
CSP Outcome 5: Increased Productivity, Competitiveness and Economic Diversification	Enhanced capacity of BDB to deliver MSME services	Creative Industries support (Orange Loan) (<i>Complete</i>)	<p>Partly achieved: The BDB support has supported new partnerships and helped BDB to develop a stronger strategic plan. Unclear, however, how much the creative industry has benefited so far</p> <p>CDB Contribution – Some: The Orange Loan support is helping to grow the Bahamian creative industry. BDB see CDB as more collaborative compared to other actors</p>
	Improved capacity of Business support organisations (BSOs) to deliver services to MSMEs	<p>Enhancing the National Quality Infrastructure of The Bahamas through Establishment of the Metrology Laboratory (<i>In progress</i>)</p> <p>MSME sector training in key business skills, including procurement. TA to build capacity of BSOs (<i>Not implemented</i>)</p>	
PBL Outcome: Strengthened Fiscal Management	Restored fiscal sustainability and responsibility	<p>Complete:</p> <p>First Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL Second Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL PPAM and PCAM training</p>	<p>Partially achieved: Government debt ratios are starting to fall since 2022 highs. GOCB access to capital increased and fiscal management was strengthened via new legislation</p> <p>CDB Contribution – Significant. The PBLs played a key role in stabilising debt. The CDB was instrumental in the development of Bahamas Public Procurement Act</p>

	Complete/ Fully achieved		Ongoing/ Partly achieved		Not achieved
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- **CSP Outcome 4: Improved governance (Partly achieved / significant CDB contribution)**
- **First Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL and Second Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL with Supplementary Financing for COVID-19:**
As outlined above, the PBLs supported various governance-related initiatives, such as the enactment of the FRA, development of Public Procurement Legislation and enactment of the Disaster Reconstruction Authority (DRA) Act.^{xlix}

- **PPAM and PCAM Training:** The Public Policy and Analysis Management (PPAM) and Project Cycle Management (PCM) Training programme was successfully implemented. Anecdotal experience from attendees found the training to be of benefit and incorporated a practical utility for implementing learnings in future use cases.¹
- **Strengthening the PMDU to Support Reconstruction & Recovery project** is still in progress, but stakeholders report that the support is valuable and is starting to support some of the intended project-level outputs and outcomes.
- **CSP Outcome 5: (Increased Productivity, Competitiveness and Economic Diversification)** **Partially achieved / Some contribution.**
 - Supporting **CSP Outcome 5 (Increased Productivity, Competitiveness and Economic Diversification)**, limited evidence suggests that the **Creative Industries Support (Orange Loan)** to the Bahamas Development Bank (BDB) and related support had led to some positive developments in providing loans in the creative sector, although stakeholders perceived that the quality of the consultancy services received could have been stronger.
 - **Enhancing National Quality Infrastructure through Establishment of the Metrology Laboratory** project (CSP Outcome 5). As of January 2024, disbursement levels were only 28%.^{li} The project was intended to result in enhanced capacity at the Bahamas Bureau of Standards and Quality (BBSQ), an increase in the provision of services to the private sector by BBSQ, and an increase in the competitiveness of the private sector. Given the delays in the project, it is unlikely there has been any significant improvement to date.

3.2.1.3 UNINTENDED RESULTS OF CDB SUPPORT (EQ1.3)

Unintended (negative) results from CDB interventions are primarily due to how CDB's operations were perceived by stakeholders. While some stakeholders were satisfied with the CDB interactions, many expressed frustrations with issues, including long time frames to receive responses to queries, administrative delays due to key CDB staff being on leave and challenges in making adaptations to project design or implementation. In-country counterparts on two of the largest CDB interventions stated that they would have to consider whether to work with the CDB again in the future due to their negative perceptions of the experience of working with the CDB. This reluctance was further exacerbated by having to pay interest on loans for projects that have yet, in their minds, to produce significant tangible outputs. It is important to note that this is all perception-based. No documentary evidence was seen that backed up these perceptions, and it is noteworthy that some CDB procedures (e.g., around procurement) are, in fact, very similar to other IFIs, such as the IDB.¹⁰

There are also some indications that the CDB's attempts to mainstream gender into projects are meeting resistance, with some counterparts seeing this as a donor imposition and of low priority. Further discussion of the challenges around operationalising gender are discussed in Section 3.4.3 and Box 3.

¹⁰ Based on rapid review of IDB and CDB procurement documentation and KIIs.

3.2.2 Sustainability (EQ2)

Finding 2: *The likely sustainability of CSP results is also mixed. There are several positive examples of sustainability being supported through the mainstreaming of environmental considerations and the integration of capacity-building/institutional strengthening activities. However, limited and delayed uptake of TA and ongoing capacity constraints in The Bahamas have limited the likely sustainability of CDB interventions.*

Evidence of sustainability was more evident with infrastructure projects, especially those with clear outputs and designated responsibility for maintenance (see Table 4 for specific examples). However, projects with less tangible outputs had fewer clear signs of sustainability, especially since many TA activities were delayed. This finding demonstrates that the sustainability of CSP results is highly dependent on the national leadership and ownership of projects. For example, strong GOCB ownership of the PBLs increased the outlook for the accompanying policy and institutional reform sustainability.¹¹ See Table 4 below for a summary of the likely sustainability of project outputs/outcomes by project based on a combination of document review and KII insights.

Table 4: Likelihood of sustainability of project outputs/outcomes for projects complete/in progress¹¹

Project	Likely Sustainability	Reasons for Likely Sustainability
PBL Loan Series	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Policy and institutional reform measures under the PBLs have led to increases in GDP growth, decreased fiscal deficit and public debt The accompanying economic reforms have strong GOCB ownership
Streetlight Retrofitting Project	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Energy-efficient streetlamps are more durable There were clear roles and responsibilities for maintenance
Climate Resilience of the Water Sector	High	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consideration of climate mitigation/adaptation throughout Defined exit strategy developed during application phase Clear roles and responsibilities for handover and maintenance
Creative Industries Support Loan	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trying to fill gaps and looking at strategic investment for capacity-building and market access for the wider community No exit strategy
Disaster Mgmt. Emergency Relief Grant – Hurricane Dorian	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The grant is based on temporary relief measures The grant was accompanied by TA to strengthen the PMDU

¹¹ No assessment has been made of PPAM/PCAM training; Enhancing National Quality Infrastructure through Establishment of the Metrology Lab; Bahamas Education Sector Transformation (BEST) Project or Consultancy Services to Support Institutional Strengthening – PMDU as there was insufficient data to make a judgement.

Strengthening the PMDU for Reconstruction/ Recovery	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Salaries for unit have been absorbed into the Bahamian civil service and the unit survived the change in administration in 2021 Skills developed are expected to remain in GOCB, although staff turnover in government remains an issue Inflation is increasing project costs and impacting implementation
National Workshop Improved Practices House Construction	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Climate resilience built into the project No ongoing support to/follow-up with participants
BTVI Enhancement Project	Medium	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Highly dependent on GOCB ownership, which is at risk during changes in government, as evidenced by period without a Board Delays risk uptake and sustainability Tracer study built into framework allows for tracking
Water Supply Improvement Project	Low	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Some attempts to improve climate resilience (e.g., on materials used) Project not adapted following climate events (i.e., Hurricane Dorian) Water supply to the Family Islands is subsidised by GOCB and thus reliant on ongoing GOCB subventions Low uptake of accompanying TA

STRENGTHENING OF NATIONAL SYSTEMS (EQ2.1)

There were several strong examples where CDB support had strengthened national systems. They included the economic reforms that had taken place under the PBLs and support to the PMDU, which supported ongoing disaster risk management capacity (although there were questions about the long-term capacity of the government to maintain the unit with documents and interviews pointing towards the need for ongoing training and capacity-building for the staff and the limited government resources to maintain the unit).^{liii} TA is also important in addressing government capacity (including TA for the aforementioned PMDU), but the evaluation found that many TA interventions were either delayed (8 out of 17 or 47% of planned TA interventions) or were not taken up (7 out of 17 or 41% of planned TA interventions).^{liv} Some in-country counterparts suggested that TA needs to be co-created to improve buy-in and thus sustainability, rather than just made a condition of loans.¹²

The evaluation found several good practices that worked towards enhancing sustainability. Specifically, these were present in projects in which clear responsibilities for maintenance of the outputs had been assigned, such as BPL for the Streetlight Retrofitting project or the Green Climate Fund (GCF) project on

¹² The evaluation did not probe on the process for planning and developing of TA, but KIIs with in-country stakeholders suggested that there is a perception that at least some types of TA are based on CDB requirements rather than in-country needs and priorities. However, other KIIs with some CDB staff indicated that there is some level of discussion over TA needs. Still, the overall picture is that more engagement is needed from the planning stage for buy-in to be maximised.

Climate Resilience of the Water Sector, which includes a detailed exit strategy.^{lv} Secondly, projects with built-in components to provide a framework for continuity (e.g., the BTVI tracer study and action plan monitoring) were also useful for ensuring continuity.

However, numerous factors tended to undermine the Bank's efforts to strengthen national systems. Several of these were related to political shifts, including changes in government (with limited knowledge handover between governments) leading to shifts in political direction, brain drain from the government, and lack of cross-party buy-in for the NDP V2040. Other factors that limited sustainability included turnover in counterpart organisations, affecting relationships with the CDB. More generally, multiple informants referred to the limited local capacity in The Bahamas, making it difficult to find and retain contractors/staff. Feedback suggests that the CDB should focus on utilising native Bahamian expert consultants for reporting to build capacity in the country and for contextual understanding.

3.3 Was the CSP design appropriate?

***High-Level Finding:** Overall CSP design could have provided more relevant and coherent support, which is reflected in the results. The relevance of CDB support to country needs was strongest in areas where new interventions were offered in response to changing priorities, for example, the PBLs in response to Hurricane Dorian and COVID-19. However, the limited traction of planned support in education and key TA reduced the overall relevance of the CSP. There were missed opportunities to potentially improve the impact of results through better integration of cross-cutting CDB priorities such as RCI and through more intentional alignment and coherence with the work being done by other International Development Partners (IDPs).*

Over the period 1971–2023, the CDB approved a total of USD \$458m in loans to The Bahamas, covering 17 sectors, with financial policy and administrative management, financial, business and other services, trade facilitation, and water sector policy and administrative management the only sectors not receiving any support.^{lvi} In 2022, The Bahamas was the CDB's largest borrower at 46% of CDB's total lending, with Saint Lucia a distant second at 14%.^{lvii} Over the 2018–2022 period, the CDB's risk exposure in The Bahamas rose from 2% to 10%, making it the CDB's second largest risk exposure behind Barbados and equal to Belize and Antigua and Barbuda. There has been a significant increase in lending to The Bahamas in recent years, with 150.5m of lending from 2018–2022, compared to only \$100m from 1970–2017.^{lviii} A total of \$106.5m was provisionally allocated to the CSP (see Table 10). The approved CSP allocation was already significantly larger than that under the previous CSP, and ultimately, USD \$80.3 m (75%) more than what was planned was approved.

3.3.1 Relevance (EQ3, 4, 5, 6, 14)

***Finding 3:** The overall relevance of the CSP was affected by limited adaptation in response to major contextual changes. The CSP, as drafted, generally aligned well with both V2040/the NDP and the CDB's cross-cutting priorities, especially governance and the environment, but decreased implementation as many planned interventions did not proceed. Major events such as Hurricane Dorian and the COVID-19 pandemic contributed to significant shifts in GOCP priorities, thus playing a role in the limited traction of planned interventions. Other key reasons for limited traction included limited in-country capacity and insufficient CDB engagement. While the traction of original interventions was limited, the CDB did make*

some significant successful adaptations to evolving GOCB priorities by providing PBLs focused on governance, the economy and disaster response.

CSP ALIGNMENT WITH THE BAHAMAS' DEVELOPMENT NEEDS, INCLUDING THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN (EQ3, 3.1)

The 2018–2022 CSP was underpinned by the NDP V2040, a draft of which was published in December 2016 during the Progressive Liberal Party (PLP) administration. The NDP V2040 is framed around 4 pillars — namely, governance, human capital, the economy and the environment — and a total of 15 goals. Over the 2018–2022 period, the CDB planned to provide support under all four of these pillars and eight goals, as outlined in Table 5.^{lix} The 2018–2022 CSP pillars and target outcomes were generally well aligned with the NDP V2040 pillars and goals, and stakeholders familiar with V2040 confirmed the perceived relevance to GOCB priorities of the interventions outlined in the CSP.

Table 5: Alignment between GOCB and CDB strategies^{lx}

NDP V2040		CDB CSP 2018–2022	
Pillar	National Goals	Pillars	Target Outcomes
Governance	• Respect for the rule of law	Improved Governance and Productivity	• No interventions
	• Administration of justice		• No interventions
	• Well-governed public institutions		• No interventions
	• Modern, open and accountable government		• CSP Outcome 4: Improved governance
The Economy	• Healthy Macro economy		• PBL Outcome: Strengthened fiscal management
	• Competitive Business Environment		• CSP Outcome 5: Increased productivity, competitiveness, economic diversification
	• Diversified Economy		• No interventions
	• Fair and Flexible Labour Regime		• No interventions
Human Capital	• Education	Inclusive Social Development	• CSP Outcome 3: Enhanced Educational Outcomes
	• Modern, sustainable universal healthcare		• PBL Outcome: A more responsive public policy to the global pandemic
	• Poverty and discrimination		
The Environment (built and natural)	• Land administration	Environmental Protection and Infrastructure	• No interventions
	• Modern infrastructure		• CSP Outcome 1: Improved access to Quality Climate-Resilient Infrastructure
	• Interconnected transport		• No interventions
	• Natural Environment		• CSP Outcome 2: Increased EE/RE options • PBL Outcome: Improved frameworks, enhanced risk identification and access to disaster recovery financing

While some V2040 goals were not supported by the Bank (see Table 5), no GOCB stakeholders referenced these goals as areas in which the CDB should have invested. Stakeholders saw the CDB interventions that did proceed as highly relevant. However, several interventions outlined in the CSP did not proceed, and many stakeholders outside of the **Ministry of Finance** (MoF) were unaware that the CDB support had originally been offered in these areas. Some stakeholders felt this reflected more limited CDB engagement at the CSP level with broader government and other stakeholders (see, also, Section 3.4).

There were several shifts from the plans originally outlined in the CSP to the interventions, which were ultimately approved and then disbursed. Planned investments in the Environmental Protection and Infrastructure and Inclusive Social Development CSP pillars did not materialise, but large investments in Governance and Productivity went ahead in the form of two-series programmatic PBLs worth a combined USD\$92.6m (see Table 6).^{lxi} The primary reason for these shifts was evolving government priorities over the period: From the time the NDP V2040 was drafted in late 2016 to the end of 2018, there were two changes in government (in May 2017 and September 2021), the significant impact of Hurricane Dorian (September 2019) and the protracted COVID-19 crisis (from March 2020). The NDP V2040 does not

appear to have been actively used as a development framework for much of this period, particularly during the Free National Movement (FNM) administration from May 2017 to September 2021, despite the process of drafting the NDP involving stakeholders from the opposition party, private sector and civil society.^{lxii, lxiii} Nevertheless, specific outcomes under NDP pillars and goals were reaffirmed as priorities via annual budget communications and related documents over the 2018–2022 period.^{lxiv} The GOCB's focus on the NDP pillars and goals that the CDB planned to support (whether in the original CSP or the PBLs) varied over the 2018–2022 period, as indicated in Table 7 and Figure 7.

CSP ADAPTATION (EQ14)

There were some significant positive examples of adaptation to changes in GOCB priorities, particularly in the form of the PBLs, which clearly demonstrated the CDB's flexibility in supporting the emerging needs arising from these successive shocks.^{lxv} The BTVI Enhancement Project is also a leading example of adaptation, as some TA funding was reallocated to support the rehabilitation of the campus on Grand Bahama following Hurricane Dorian. Overall, CSP adaptation was limited, and some in-country stakeholders felt adaptation was constrained by the difficulties experienced by implementing agencies in requesting and making changes to projects already under implementation (see Section 3.4.2 for further discussion). As a result, while the CSP activities as originally planned were highly relevant, limited adaptation to changing priorities in The Bahamas resulted in reduced relevance of the CSP over time.

Table 6: Planned, approved and disbursed 2018–2022 CSP funds by CSP pillars^{lxvi}

	Activities	Indicative Allocation (USD million)		Approved (USD million)		Disbursed (USD million)	
CSP 2018–2022	Environmental Protection and Infrastructure	91.5m		44.0m		27.3m	
	Improved Access to Climate-Resilient Infrastructure	61.5m	86%	29.4m	24%	24.2m	23%
	Increased EE and RE Options	30.0m		14.6m		3.1m	
	Improved frameworks, enhanced risk identification and increased access to disaster recovery financing	0.0m		0.0m		0.0m	
	Inclusive Social Development	15.0m		49.8m		1.8m	
	Enhanced Educational Outcomes	15.0m	14%	49.8m	27%	1.8m	1.5%
	A more responsive public policy to the global pandemic	0.0m		0.0m		0.0m	
	Improved Governance and Productivity	TBD		92.6m		90.4m	
	Improved governance; Strengthened Fiscal Management ¹³	TBD	TBD	92.6m	50%	90.3m	76%
	Increased Productivity, Competitiveness, Economic Diversification	TBD		0.4m		0.1m	
	TOTAL	106.5m		186.8m		119.5m	

¹³ Two separate activities have been combined in one row, with PBL funds, which cut across these areas, included.

Table 7: GOCB explicit NDP V2040 evolving priorities, 2018–2022

NDP V2040 (Published November 2016)			Apr '18 Budget	Apr '19 Budget	Jan '20 Dorian Budget	Apr '20 Budget	Aug '21 PLP Agenda	Apr '22 Budget
Pillar	National Goals	Outcome Areas						
Governance	Modern, open and accountable government	Evidence-based decision-making						
		Public workforce development						
		Government transparency						
		Government financial accountability						
		Government interface/ services						
The Economy	Healthy Macro- economy	National fiscal management						
		Economic growth and GDP						
		Progressive, efficient tax system						
	Business	Access to MSME financing, development						
Human Capital	Education	Improve education infrastructure						
		Improve accessibility and quality of TVET						
		Enhance early childhood education						
		Enhance Teacher Training, Quality Assurance						
		Strengthen adult education opportunities						
	Health care	Ensure universal access to health						
		Integrated people-centred healthcare						
	Poverty and discrimination	Economic participation of vulnerable groups						
		Strengthen social protection						
		Improved housing, water, sanitation						
The Environmen t (built and natural)	Modern infrastructure	Implement strategic framework for infrastructure						
		Access to affordable and reliable utilities						
	Natural Environment	Support CC mitigation and green technologies						
		Integrate DRR into development policies, plans						
		Sustainably manage and use natural resources						

KEY: Explicit NDP V2040 priority as outlined in budget documents, etc.

ALIGNMENT WITH CDB CORPORATE PRIORITIES (EQ4)

The CSPs were designed with CDB's corporate priorities of gender, environmental sustainability, EE and governance considerations in mind. A summary of the level of integration of different cross-cutting priorities is provided individually below in Table 8 and the following sub-sections. Governance and the environment were relatively firmly integrated into a significant number of interventions at the appraisal

stage, and gender was moderately well integrated overall. Weaker integration of EE and RCI was generally seen as reflective of these priorities not being as broadly cross-cutting, although some CDB stakeholders felt that there were some missed opportunities for integration of RCI.

GENDER

The 2018–2022 CSP contains contextual analysis on gender but had a low **gender marker** score of 2.0 — “marginally mainstreamed”. The assessment stated, “The CSP has taken gender considerations partially into account and has limited potential to contribute to gender equality”. While gender was mainstreamed in some projects, particularly those in the social and education sectors, overall scores remained low. These low scores indicate there was limited potential for gender equity to be operationalised, and as outlined in Section 3.4.3, the operationalisation of gender was even more limited.

Table 8: Sampled project alignment at appraisal with CDB cross-cutting priorities^{lxvii}

Integration of CDB Cross-cutting Priorities	Gender ¹⁴	RCI	Energy	Environment	Governance
Streetlight Retrofitting project	3.0				
Climate Resilience of The Water Sector in The Bahamas	3.0				
Water Supply Improvement Project	3.0				
First Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL	2.0				
Second Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL	2.0				
Strengthening the PMDU To Support Reconstruction and Recovery	2.0				
Consultancy Services to Support Institutional Strengthening – PMDU	No data		No data	No data	
PPAM And PCAM Training					
Disaster Management Emergency Relief Grant – Hurricane Dorian	No data				No data
Enhancing The National Quality Infrastructure of the Bahamas through Establishment of the Metrology Laboratory	No data	No data	No data	No data	No data
Bahamas Education Sector Transformation (BEST) Project	3.0				
Bahamas Technical and Vocational Institute (BTVI) Enhancement Project	3.0				
National Workshop in Improved Practices for Construction of Houses					
Creative Industries Support (Orange Loan)					

Strong integration		Partial integration		No integration		Not applicable	
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* Gender marker scores provided. A score of 3+ indicates “gender mainstreamed”, 2–3 “marginally mainstreamed”, < 2 “not mainstreamed”. Where no gender marker analysis was available, qualitative review of planned project activities and results was reviewed to provide a rating.

REGIONAL COOPERATION AND INTEGRATION

The 2018–2022 CSP was outlined as in line with the CDB’s cross-cutting objective of RCI, and The Bahamas was seen as well positioned to benefit from the CDB’s regional initiatives, including PPAM and PCM technical assistance; support to conduct an Enhanced Country Poverty Assessment (ECPA); TA for MSME development through CTCS; and the Regional Procurement Training initiative.^{lxviii} Out of these, all except the ECPA went ahead, and other support was also based on or grew from regional initiatives, including the National Workshop in Improved Practices for Construction of Houses. Some other projects referenced regional frameworks to guide interventions, such as the Climate Resilience in the Water Sector Project and the BEST education project.^{lxix} Several stakeholders within the CDB and in-country felt that beyond specific interventions, RCI could be better leveraged during CSP implementation generally, for example, by sharing best practices/positive experiences in key cross-cutting areas such as gender and the environment, in order to improve support for and thus buy-in for support in these areas.

ENERGY SECURITY

Energy security, which includes energy efficiency (EE), was also outlined as a cross-cutting and standalone focus in the 2018–2022 CSP.^{lxx} As previously outlined, EE and RE formed one of the CSP’s target outcomes under the CSP’s Environmental Protection and Infrastructure Enhancement pillar, aiming to increase public sector efficiency and access to EE and RE options. Improved EE and increased use of RE were anticipated to be the second largest CDB investment by CSP outcome, with a provisional envelope of \$30 million allocated. However, only one infrastructure-focused intervention ultimately proceeded, namely the Streetlights Retrofitting Project (see Section 3.2.1 for further details). TA support and other infrastructure projects, such as mini grids in the Family Islands, did not proceed. Some apparent reasons for this are further discussed in Section 3.4 but were broadly due to shifting GOCB priorities and limited CDB capacity. EE or RE (or both) were also integrated into the design of other infrastructure projects, such as the Water Supply Improvement Project and education infrastructure projects. Overall, it was moderately well integrated into the CSP as a whole and into relevant projects, but limited traction of EE/RE-focused interventions reduced overall levels of CSP integration/focus in this area.

ENVIRONMENTAL SUSTAINABILITY

Environmental considerations are mainstreamed within the CSP 2018–2022^{lxxi} and project appraisal documents. There is a clear recognition that climate change and environmental degradation are significant challenges for The Bahamas. Documents include an analysis of environmental challenges affecting The Bahamas. Certain projects explicitly focused on supporting The Bahamas in addressing environmental and climate-related challenges. These include the Streetlight Retrofitting Project, intended to directly reduce the country’s environmental impact through improved EE and the National Workshop on Improved Practices for the Construction of Houses, which upskilled local constructors and artisans to build more climate-resilient homes. Amongst national stakeholders, there is clear recognition of the climate risks affecting The Bahamas and the pressing need to address these challenges. Appraisals of CDB interventions always appeared to include an environmental sustainability assessment, and beyond the design stage, robust environmental sustainability implementation plans reportedly were prepared.¹⁵

¹⁵ A key regional level climate change intervention was also completed during the 2018–2022 CSP period, which is seen as a key initiative for enhancing environmental sustainability (See [State of the Caribbean Climate report](#)).

GOVERNANCE

The 2018–2022 CSP referenced governance as mainstreamed in the CSP and specific interventions.^{lxxii} Improved GOCB governance was an explicit pillar of the CSP and was also integrated into planned interventions under other CSP pillars and target outcomes. Despite shifts in the interventions which proceeded, governance remained well integrated across CDB interventions in CSP and PBL. As a result, governance was integrated into a majority of CDB interventions that proceeded during the CSP period.

ALIGNMENT OF CDB SUPPORT WITH IN-COUNTRY IMPLEMENTATION CAPACITY (EQ5)

The evaluation found that limited in-country capacity was a significant constraint which affected CDB implementation, with capacity within some government departments seen as a particular challenge. For example, while GOCB sees the environment as a clear-cut priority for the country and has frameworks for ensuring environmental assessments and safeguards are in place for infrastructure projects, the extremely limited staffing within the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources constrained their ability to ensure the relevant work proceeded in a timely manner. Similar constraints within other government departments were also cited. Multiple stakeholders cited the existence of the necessary skills and experience in-country, but that brain drain both from the public sector to the private sector and was a significant challenge. The 2018–2022 CSP explicitly identified the weak implementation capacity of GOCB as a risk for CSP implementation and planned to “directly address capacity constraints within the design of each project”. Specific plans to do this included strengthening implementation capacity by providing PPAM and PCM training and supporting improved public procurement. While these initiatives did go ahead, along with other institutional strengthening support to the PMDU, limited GOCB capacity still constrained implementation. Several TA activities related to capacity strengthening did not proceed (see Section 4.4.4.1 for details). Thus, as outlined in Table 9, Section 3.3.3 (RMF Design), the Bank’s plans to mitigate this risk had limited success.

CAUSES OF LIMITED CSP TRACTION (EQ6)


Limited traction of the interventions outlined in the original CSP was identified as a significant concern by multiple CDB staff. While the PBLs are seen as a significant success by both CDB and GOCB stakeholders, the lack of traction experienced by some planned education, EE and infrastructure interventions was highlighted. The factors most frequently cited as contributing to limited traction were:

- **Changing GOCB leadership and priorities:** As outlined in Section 3.3.1, GOCB priorities shifted considerably over the 2018–2022 CSP period. In general, many CDB and other IDP stakeholders perceived the political context in The Bahamas to be intensely partisan (more so than other Caribbean countries), and plans agreed under one administration struggle to maintain traction once government changes. Some suggested aligning strategies with political cycles, but others highlighted that there is no guarantee elections will be held to a regular five-year cycle. Figure 7

confirms that, in general, the traction of interventions in a specific outcome area decreased when it dropped off the list of the GOCB's key priorities as laid out in annual budget communications.¹⁶

- **Limited in-country capacity:** As discussed in more detail in Section 3.4 (Efficiency), limited in-country capacity was acknowledged by all stakeholder groups as a significant limitation to CSP operationalisation overall. It also affected the overall take-up of activities, as implementing agencies had limited capacity to implement multiple projects simultaneously.
- **Insufficient CDB engagement:** As discussed in more detail in Section 3.4 (Efficiency), insufficient engagement by CDB was cited by most in-country stakeholders as a key contributory factor behind limited CSP traction, and several stakeholders, including those within the MoF, felt that there was a need for more strategic ongoing, cross-cutting engagement by the CDB with in-country stakeholders and with departments beyond the MoF.

Figure 7: Mapping of CSP outcome traction against evolving GOCB priorities



¹⁶ One exception to this is Outcome 2: Increased EE and RE options, which remained a key priority throughout most of the 2018–2022 CSP period, but which only achieved moderate traction. KIIs indicated this was due to a combination of limited CDB engagement and challenges with overall traction of TA.

Other causes of limited traction related to the perceived relevance of the instruments or interventions offered (see “Instruments” in Box 2). For example, as outlined in Section 3.2.2 (Sustainability), TA often struggled to achieve traction. Both in-country and CDB stakeholders felt this was due to the prioritisation of more tangible infrastructure projects over TA, where benefits are longer-term and less tangible, and the lower GOCB priority afforded to TA focused on areas such as gender. See Section 3.4.3 and Box 3 for further discussion on the operationalisation of gender and the environment.

There are also linkages between some of the causes identified. For example, limited CDB capacity (included under both “Methods” and “People/Capacity” in Box 1) was perceived by some stakeholders as both limiting engagement levels with The Bahamas and as contributing to limited CDB understanding of the Bahamian context. While limited CDB understanding of the Bahamian context was only cited by a few stakeholders, many stakeholders perceived the CDB as failing to leverage the key comparative advantage that the Bank is seen to have over other IDPs: that of regional knowledge and expertise. No other significant comparative advantages were cited by stakeholders, and as explored in Section 3.4 (Efficiency), some of the comparative advantages which the Bank outlines in the CDB Strategic Plan Update 2022–24 were often seen as weaknesses (namely staff accessibility).

In-country stakeholders did not perceive any significant issues with CDB’s financing instruments over the 2018–2022 CSP period, and as already discussed, the PBLs, which were significant investments at a critical time, were successful.^{lxxiii} In comparison to other IFIs, it was noted that the IDB and the Chinese government were able to support larger infrastructure projects, but that the CDB’s willingness and ability to finance smaller infrastructure projects, for example, on some of the less populated Family Islands, was seen as positive.

Box 2: CSP traction case study summary


2018–2022 CDB Country Strategy Evaluation for The Bahamas: Traction Case Study Summary

In the 2018–2022 CSP, several planned interventions did not proceed, namely:

- **CSP Outcome 1 (Improved Access to Quality Climate-Resilient Infrastructure):** Glass Window Bridge; Family Islands Infrastructure Upgrade; Geomatics Capacity Enhancement Project; Capacity-building to access climate financing
- **CSP Outcome 2 (Increased EE and RE Options):** TA for capacity support – TDEP convening for elaboration of Family Islands Sustainable Energy Plan; TA to conduct energy audits and development of public sector EE programme; Family Island RE capital projects
- **CSP Outcome 3 (Enhanced Educational Outcomes):** Expanded access to competency-based, ICT-enabled skills training; Expanded access to quality ECD; Teacher effectiveness Project
- **CSP Outcome 5 (Increased Productivity, Competitiveness and Economic Diversification):** MSME sector training in key business skills, including procurement; TA to build BSO capacity

Several TAs integrated in infrastructure projects were also significantly delayed, including in key areas such as gender and the environment. Various causes that contributed to this limited traction were identified and mapped against six categories in the fishbone diagram below. The main causes, based primarily on feedback during KIIs, are highlighted in bold.

CSP traction figure: Fishbone diagram outlining causes of limited CSP traction



Main Causes of Limited Traction and Implications

The main causes of limited traction, namely *changing GOCB leadership and priorities*, *limited in-country capacity* and *insufficient CDB engagement*, are linked, with senior in-country stakeholders suggesting that there is a need for increased CDB engagement to become more aware of the GOCB's changing needs. Similarly, for the Bank to successfully address challenges with in-country capacity, it must engage more regularly with implementing agencies and other IDPs. Ultimately, while changing GOCB leadership and priorities may be the immediate cause of limited traction, insufficient CDB engagement will likely be a key root cause. Limited in-country capacity is a risk that the Bank identified but did not adequately mitigate. Thus, two causes of limited traction are ones that the CDB can and should directly address moving forward.

3.3.2 Coherence (EQ7)

***Finding 4:** While the 2018–2022 CSP highlighted the importance of coordination and collaboration with other IDPs, for the most part, this failed to materialise. There is, however, a clear will among IDPs to work with CDB, and mechanisms already exist to support this. The CDB appears to be the only IDP providing substantial support to the education sector. In other sectors, one or more other IDPs are also providing support, but this appears to be complementary rather than duplicative to date.*

The principal multilateral partner in The Bahamas, aside from the CDB, is the IDB. The IDB's 2018–2022 Country Strategy had a projected lending framework of US\$150 million, and by the end of 2021, loans worth \$615m had been approved (\$180m in 2021, \$355m in 2020, \$50m in 2019 and \$30m in 2018).^{lxxiv} The Government of China has invested US\$941K over the 2018-2023 period, primarily in the form of donations to support the response to Hurricane Dorian and COVID-19.^{lxxv} UN agencies, primarily the UNDP (out of the Jamaica regional office) and PAHO also provide primarily technical support in line with

GOCB requests. World Bank does not provide regular support to The Bahamas,¹⁷ and The Bahamas is not generally eligible for European Union (EU) and UKAID funding.¹⁸

The 2018–2022 CSP highlighted the importance of coordination with other IDPs, including identifying interventions where partnerships with other IDPs would support more successful implementation and more sustainable results. Despite this, minimal evidence was found of collaboration with other IDPs,¹⁹ and KIIs with other IDPs (specifically IDB, the US government, the Embassy of the People’s Republic of China and PAHO) indicated very little to no awareness of CDB’s activities in-country. While no government department is formally responsible for coordinating IDPs, the MoF currently takes on this role (especially the Project Implementation Unit within the MoF), as does the PMDU. There are also several examples of different IDPs providing support in the same sector, but this appears to be complementary rather than duplication of support. For example, the IDB had previously provided support to set up the PMDU, which ended in 2019 and was subsequently followed by CDB support from 2019 onwards. An overview of IDPs supporting different areas of the NDP V2040 is provided in Figure 8. More specific examples include the support for streetlight projects in various geographic areas by the CDB, the IDB, and the Chinese government, support for the restructuring of disaster management by the IDB and the CDB, and IDB support for infrastructure improvements in the water sector.^{lxxvi}




Both other IDPs and in-country counterparts felt that there was room for greater collaboration among IDPs, as there are many areas of overlap. For example, the IDB, the US government, and the UNDP have a strong gender focus, and several stakeholders have seen that working more with these other partners is a potential way of increasing buy-in on gender issues. While other IDPs were unfamiliar with the CDB’s activities, there was some coordination and collaboration among them. For example, the Chinese government has a strong focus on food security and is working with the UNDP on some agricultural interventions and is also in discussions with FAO on potential collaboration. As in other CDB BMCs, there are reportedly regular UN-led IDP coordination meetings in The Bahamas, convened by the UN Resident Coordinator, which currently includes the UN agencies, the World Bank, the IDB and the Chinese government, and this was referenced as a key avenue through which the CDB can start to engage more directly with other IDPs.

¹⁷ With the exception of a US\$100 million development policy loan that they provided in 2021 to support the COVID-19 response (see [World Bank Approves USD100 Million for The Bahamas’ COVID-19 Response and Recovery](#)).

¹⁸ Except via some regional level initiatives.

¹⁹ The only direct collaboration cited was with PAHO on the post Hurricane Dorian “Stronger Together” 2020 initiative. See <https://www.paho.org/en/stronger-together-2020> for further information on the campaign.

Figure 8: Mapping of IDP support against The Bahamas NDP V2040

CDB And Other Key Donor Support for the Bahamas National Development Plan Vision 2040			
NDP V2040 Pillar 1: Governance			
Goal 1: Modern, Open and Accountable Government			
Goal 2: Well-governed Public Institutions			
Goal 3: Respect For the Rule of Law			
Goal 4: Administration of Justice			
NDP V2040 Pillar 2: Human Capital			
Goal 5: Modern, Sustainable Universal Healthcare			Embassy of the People's Republic of China  THE WORLD BANK  Pan American Health Organization
Goal 6: Education			
Goal 7: Poverty and Discrimination			 Embassy of the People's Republic of China
NDP V2040 Pillar 3: The Environment (Built and Natural)			
Goal 8: Land Administration			
Goal 9: Modern Infrastructure			 Embassy of the People's Republic of China
Goal 10: Interconnected Transport			
Goal 11: Natural Environment			
NDP V2040 Pillar 4: The Economy			
Goal 12: Healthy Macro economy			
Goal 13: Competitive Business Environment			 THE WORLD BANK
Goal 14: Diversified Economy			
Goal 15: Fair and Flexible Labour Regime			

3.3.3 RMF Design (EQ8, 9)

***Finding 5:** The CSP RMF, as designed, was well aligned with NDP V2040 goals and CSP outcomes, but its utility was reduced as it was not updated in response to contextual changes. As a result, it could not effectively support ongoing monitoring or adaptive management (including identification of and response to new/emerging risks). More specifically, data against many RMF indicators and targets was not (publicly) available, which posed a challenge for assessing progress, and many RMF indicators were no longer relevant: many of the interventions expected to contribute to these indicators/targets did not proceed, while other interventions which did go ahead were not well captured by the indicators/targets as framed.²⁰ Integration of gender into RMF indicators was also limited.*

APPROPRIATENESS OF THE M&E STRATEGY AND SYSTEM

The CSP design includes a Results Monitoring Framework (RMF) to monitor and assess the achievement of results. The RMF was clearly aligned with the goals laid out in the NDP V2040 (Figure 7). Outcome indicators were defined against each CSP target outcome, along with indicative interventions, risks, and mitigations.^{lxxvii} Overall, CDB and country-level stakeholders felt that the RMF design was appropriate and high-level GOCB stakeholders showed strong buy-in to it. The RMF was seen to reflect national priorities adequately, and national stakeholders contributed to its design. A key strength was the jointness of the monitoring approach, which engaged both the CDB and the GOCB. Throughout the CSP period, monitoring was jointly conducted by CDB and GOCB stakeholders. The MoF reported having all the data required to report against the RMF and felt that reporting had progressed smoothly. This was also the case for the PBLs, which were jointly monitored. This monitoring approach ensured that the CDB could support the GOCB in responding to emerging challenges and helped to ensure that the GOCB was supported to meet the disbursement conditions for the PBLs.^{lxxviii}

Notably, while in-country stakeholders reported that data against CSP outcome indicators was available, the evaluation team could not acquire data for most CSP outcome indicators, either directly or indirectly, and it could not be located online. A review of the indicators in the CSP RMF also shows that many of them are not fully SMART. In particular, the relevance of many of them in capturing the CDB's contribution towards the overall outcome became limited due to many of the interventions outlined in the CSP not proceeding. For example, one education outcome indicator relates to pre-primary enrolment levels and another to secondary school graduation rates, but ultimately, the CDB did not support any interventions related to these indicators. Several others did not explicitly specify a timeframe or were not specific or easily measurable (e.g.,^{lxxix}).^[OBJ] Despite these emerging shortcomings, the CSP RMF was not updated to reflect the reality of the Bank's interventions, and overall, the evaluation found limited evidence as to whether the RMF was used for adaptive management. This lack of evidence is primarily due to poor understanding and limited use of the RMF at the project level. Beyond the RMF, the CDB conducted project supervision missions to assess project progress. However, these missions were not possible during the COVID-19 pandemic, and the CSP^{lxxx} planned for 2020^[OBJ] did not take place. Additionally, no Annual

²⁰ For example, under CSP Outcome 3 (Enhanced Educational Outcomes), RMF indicators related to increases in TVET graduation rates, net enrolment in pre-primary education, and secondary school graduation rates (see Annex D), but no projects proceeded in pre-primary or primary education, and the TVET project ultimately had a strong infrastructure focus which would not directly lead to increased TVET graduation rates.

Portfolio Review (which usually provides a high-level view of all projects in the portfolio or pipeline) was not conducted, until late 2022.

Project-level RMFs were also created, however, there was notably less national buy-in and understanding of the project level. This lack of buy-in was primarily attributed to the transition of governments in 2021, staff turnover, and poor handover of projects between administrations. Consequently, many national stakeholders interviewed were unaware of the RMF associated with their project and had not conducted monitoring or reporting against it. A key example of this is the BTVI project, in which project managers have submitted robust monthly progress reports that summarise activities and project changes.^{lxxxix} However, these are narrative assessments of progress completed and are not tied to the RMF. BTVI stakeholders stated that they did not have the correct data to report against the RMF indicators, but at the end of the project, they intend to conduct a review against the RMF to see if they have achieved results. This means the BTVI RMF has not been used to support adaptive management. In the case of the Water Supply Improvement Project, the extent to which the RMF was used is unclear. While national stakeholders reported that they had used the RMF to track progress and that the CDB had conducted annual check-ins on the project outputs, stakeholders reported that they had not explicitly discussed the project RMF. The CDB intends to address this for phase two of the project by co-designing the new RMF with the GOCB.

The integration of gender into the CSP-level RMF is weak, with only two sector outcomes and three outcome indicators that explicitly mention gender. Project-level RMFs generally included more robust sex-disaggregated indicators than at the CSP level, and CDB stakeholders stated that, in general, project-level reporting against gender was robust, particularly at the output level. However, reporting on gender is quantitative and the RMFs are not designed well enough to capture meaningful change at the outcome and impact level. Capturing such change would require a design incorporating more qualitative and participatory evidence-generation approaches to understand the projects' real-world impact on gender. A reliance on quantitative indicators at the output level makes it challenging to track and communicate stories of change.

IDENTIFICATION AND MITIGATION OF RISKS

The risks identified in the CSP RMF fall into four main categories, as shown in Table 9 below, summarising the CDB's planned mitigation responses, the actual risk outcomes and CDB's responses.^{lxxxix} Overall, the implementation capacity constraints were the risk that materialised and were most likely to affect the longer-term sustainability of the projects. It was suggested that more focused engagement at the beginning of the new election cycle may have improved the uptake of the CDB's mitigating measures. The IDB noted that it undertook a scoping exercise at the start of the election cycle to build long-term commitment with the new government to mitigate this risk. However, the two most significant challenges during the implementation period, Hurricane Dorian and the COVID-19 pandemic, were not anticipated, or at least not explicitly laid out as risks in the RMF. These events significantly affected the GOCB's economic stability and changed government priorities.

Consequently, risks materialised and caused delays to project implementation (discussed more under Efficiency). The evaluation found little evidence that the RMF was adapted or updated to reflect these risks or propose mitigations. While it may be the case that the CDB considers climate risks/hurricanes as standard across all activities, given the especially high risk of climate events in The Bahamas, this was a significant gap. It was also noted that several of the CDB's CRVAs were delayed despite the high risk of climate events in The Bahamas. The slow turnaround times for CDB risk assessments were mainly put down to limited

staffing. The Environmental Sustainability Unit (ESU) did signal that it can now carry out more independent risk monitoring, which is a positive step forward, given some of the delays experienced.

Table 9: Potential risks and mitigation measures identified in the CSP

Risk Identified	CDB's Planned Mitigation Response	Risk Outcome and CDB Response
Macroeconomic or other shock impairs GOCB's ability to meet its debt obligations and threaten implementation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support for fiscal sustainability • Implementation of EE projects • Reassessment of CSP during MTR 	<u>Risk partially materialised:</u> COVID-19 led to GDP decline and fiscal deficit/public debt growth. The CDB responded with a PBL loan series incorporating policy and institutional reform, which helped to stabilise the economy.
GOCB has insufficient liquidity to meet CDB debt obligations and provide counterpart funding	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Monitoring throughout CSP • Reassessment during MTR 	<u>Risk did not materialise:</u> The Bahamas met its debt service obligations throughout the CSP. However, the CSP MTR did not occur, reducing the CDB's ability to monitor it.
Implementation capacity constraints	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CDB engagement to offer training in project management, procurement, M&E • Regular meetings with GOCB to offer policy advice and identify challenges • Support to improve communication between ministries • Engagement of industry partners • Support to finalise pre-appraisal 	<u>Risk materialised:</u> stakeholders noted that limited GOCB capacity was likely to impact on the sustainability of projects and that limited capacity constrained implementation. CDB did offer the planned mitigations, but there was limited evidence that the GOCB took up this support in a meaningful way.
Climate change and weather-related natural disasters	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Renewed partnership with CCRIF SPC • Ongoing efforts to mainstream disaster risk and recovery • Mainstreaming of climate change resilience in all infrastructure projects • Support to reduce vulnerability to natural hazards/weather-related events • All interventions climate-screened 	<u>Risk materialised:</u> Hurricane Dorian caused massive damage in September 2019. The CDB provided an emergency relief grant in response and TA for the PMDU. However, the CSP and most of the projects were not adapted accordingly.

3.4 Was CSP Implementation Efficient?

***High-Level Finding (Finding 6):** Efficiency in disbursement and adherence to planned project timelines was affected by changing GOCB priorities and the impact of Hurricane Dorian and COVID-19 and was relatively poor overall. Other key factors affecting efficiency included limited engagement by CDB at a strategic, cross-cutting level, constrained in-country capacity and limited in-country buy-in for TA, particularly related to gender, with implications for sustainability.*

3.4.1 Efficiency And Timeliness of Interventions (EQ10)

Disbursement of funds under the 2018–2022 CSP was moderately poor, with overall disbursement of 64% against sampled projects with available data (see Table 12). The strongest disbursement was in the Environmental Sustainability sector (100%) due to only one project being fully disbursed, the Hurricane Dorian Relief Grant, being fully disbursed. The Economic Cooperation sector also had very high (97%) disbursement, primarily due to the disbursement of the two approved PBLs. Several stakeholders noted that the smooth and timely disbursement of the PBLs was critical and positive compared to other CSP interventions.^{lxxxiii} There was relatively strong overall disbursement in the Economic Infrastructure sector due to good progress in the Water Supply Improvement Project (84% disbursed),²¹ which offset lower disbursement in other Economic Infrastructure projects. Specifically, disbursement was only 21% in the Streetlight Retrofitting Project (due to the decision by the GOCB to procure the LED lights themselves) and 19% in the Climate Resilience in the Water Sector project (due to a delayed start). There was especially low disbursement in the Social Sector (4%) due to delays and limited disbursement under both education projects, which reflects the low CDB contribution to related CSP sectors previously outlined.

Table 10: Planned, approved, and disbursed 2018–2022 CSP funds by CDB sector^{22, lxxxiv}

CDB Sector	Planned	Approved	Disbursed	%age Disbursement
Economic Infrastructure	\$91.5m	\$43.8m	\$27.1m	62%
Economic Cooperation	N/A	\$92.6m	\$90.3m	97%
Environmental Sustainability	\$0.0m	\$0.2m	\$0.2m	100%
Social Sector	N/A	\$49.8m	\$1.8m	4%
Private Sector Development	\$15.0m	\$0.4m	\$0.1m	28%
Technical Cooperation	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
TOTAL	\$106.5m	\$186.8m	\$119.5m	64%

Several contextual factors constrained the timely disbursement of the CSP funds, with Hurricane Dorian in 2019 and the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 as crucial factors, as they resulted in considerable changes to GOCB priorities. In response, numerous projects which were planned or already underway had to be adjusted in line with the new priorities. For example, under the TA aspects of the BTVI Enhancement Project, resources were reallocated to repair hurricane damage to the Grand Bahama campus, which led to rescoping and associated administrative requirements that had to be met. Meanwhile, the COVID-19 pandemic heavily impacted the tourist industry (and thus the overall economy), which led the GOCB to refocus CDB support towards restoring fiscal sustainability and supporting longer-term climate resilience.^{lxxxv} These emergency responses heightened the need for liquidity, and stakeholders from the current GOCB indicated a reluctance to pursue further borrowing through the originally approved CSP loans for areas that had ceased to be priorities. Instead, they favoured the PBLs, which provided them with

²¹ Although it should be noted that this project was originally approved under the previous CSP.

²² The table does not include Technical Cooperation sector, specifically the National Workshop in Improved Practices for the Construction of Houses, and the Creative Industries Support as these were regional projects with limited data. We have also not included the PPAM and PCAM training project for the same reason. Despite shared CBD Excel data showing a 0% disbursement level for the Hurricane Dorian relief grant, web data shows this to be fully dispersed (see [CDB allocates almost USD 1 million for immediate Bahamas relief | Caribbean Development Bank](#))

greater liquidity and flexibility in responding to Hurricane Dorian and COVID-19. The result of this re-prioritisation meant that several projects under the CSP were deprioritised and did not begin implementation, while significant government input was channelled into reforms supported by the PBLs.^{lxxxvi}

Table 11: Approved and disbursed 2018–2022 CSP funds in sampled projects^{23, lxxxvii}


Intervention	Approved	Disbursed	Percentage disbursed
Street Light Retrofitting Project	\$14.6m	\$3.1m	21%
Climate Resilience of The Water Sector in Bahamas	\$0.7m	\$0.1m	19%
Water Supply Improvement Project	\$28.5m	\$23.9m	84%
First Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL	\$50.0m	\$50.0m	100%
Second Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL	\$40.0m	\$40.0m	100%
Strengthening the PMDU To Support Reconstruction and Recovery	\$0.8m	\$0.3m	41%
Consultancy Services to Support Institutional Strengthening – PMDU	\$1.9m	N/A	N/A
Disaster Management Emergency Relief Grant - Hurricane Dorian	\$0.2m	\$0.2m	100%
Enhancing National Quality Infrastructure through Establishment of Metrology Lab	\$0.4m	\$0.1m	28%
Bahamas Education Sector Transformation (BEST) Project	\$45.1m	N/A	N/A
Bahamas Technical and Vocational Institute Enhancement Project	\$4.7m	\$1.8m	38%
TOTAL	186.8m	119.5m	64%

Performance in terms of duration between key project timelines varied significantly, with the projects under the Social Sector experiencing major delays of over three years from the time of original approval to agreement and another ten months from agreement to first disbursement (see Figure 9). The BTVI Enhancement Project was initially approved in 2014 and was due to be completed over 39 months. Due to staff turnover in both the CDB and the GOCB, it was not possible to ascertain why these projects were so heavily delayed during the previous strategic period. As noted, quick disbursement of the PBLs was seen as a strong positive, and timelines between the initial timelines under projects in the Economic Infrastructure sector was also seen to be adequate. However, as all the infrastructure projects are ongoing, this has not been reflected in delays since the first disbursement. For example, the Water Supply Improvement Project has experienced significant delays since it was approved under the previous CSP in 2015. It was intended to be completed over three years, but it is still not fully complete.^{lxxxviii} Despite some major projects approved under the previous CSP experiencing significant delays, both projects made significant progress between 2018–2022 despite the significant upheavals in the context.

As The Bahamas has recovered from the effects of COVID-19 and Hurricane Dorian, some projects have gained traction in late 2022 and 2023, including the Climate Resilience of the Water Sector in The Bahamas Project (co-funded by the GCF). While not a part of the original CSP, the BEST Project was approved in late 2022 following a request from the GOCB to support education needs in Grand Bahama. The BEST has experienced delays in meeting the loan's preconditions (establishing a project coordination unit), but stakeholders indicated the project is likely to move forward in 2024.

²³ As above.

Figure 9: Average duration between key project milestones by CDB sector²⁴



3.4.2 Appropriateness of CDB Engagement (EQ11)

The extent of ongoing engagement with CSP stakeholders is mixed and has varied from project to project. There was limited evidence about initial engagement with CSP stakeholders as key staff in both the CDB and the GOCB have rotated positions since 2017. Consequently, current postholders were unable to discuss the CSP's design phase. Since 2018, there have been some projects where engagement was strong, and the GOCB and implementing agency counterparts stated that they had a high-quality and responsive working relationship with their CDB focal point. This was particularly the case for those working on CTCS TA projects (Development of a Creative Industries Credit Product, National Workshop in Improved Practices for the Construction of Houses). Stakeholders not only cited a strong working relationship but also benefited from regional learning and exchange with other countries involved in CTCS programming.²⁵ Along with the strong engagement provided by the CDB, these projects have also provided an incentive for stakeholders in The Bahamas to engage. Stakeholders suggested that this is because these TA projects tend to be more ad hoc and driven by market demand. This characteristic created a strong incentive for engagement on both sides.

National stakeholders involved in day-to-day project management also stated that they were firmly engaged with the CDB, could access their focal point easily, and had open communication. However, engagement at a high level or more political level was more of a challenge. Engagement for the overall CSP was mainly through the MoF. While this was intended to provide a central coordination point, it meant that the CDB had limited engagement with other line ministries. As a result, stakeholders in other ministries were not well-sighted on design and felt they did not have a clear line of communication with the Bank. This challenge was further complicated by the change in government in 2021. Current civil servants were not provided with a detailed understanding of the loans and activities covered by the CDB. This communication

²⁴ Data not available for projects Environmental Sustainability or Technical Cooperation.

²⁵ It is notable that this was also found to be the case in the 2022 Jamaica CSP Evaluation.

issue was seen as a key area where the CDB could have provided additional support instead of relying on communication via the MoF.

Multiple national stakeholders, particularly those at a management level, stated that they found it difficult to engage with the CDB and that the Bank's processes were complex and challenging to understand.²⁶ In particular, national stakeholders found it challenging to adapt projects as required. Multiple stakeholders stated that long processes, particularly the time taken to approve changes, created a bottleneck that led to implementation delays. This is perhaps due more to a perception of complexity than the actual reality, as CDB processes are aligned to those of other MDBs and are, in fact, more flexible than those of the IDB. However, one factor that could cause the bottleneck is a lack of capacity at CDB. In addition to processes, multiple stakeholders stated that a significant reason that they found it hard to communicate with the CDB and obtain approvals was due to a single point of contact and thus, a single point of failure. For example, some national stakeholders indicated that if their focal point was unavailable, they were unable to obtain the approvals needed to proceed with implementation in a timely manner. This lag contributed to delays across several projects.

Amongst the stakeholders who found engagement with the CDB poor, the most cited challenge was that the Bank does not have an office in The Bahamas, unlike the IDB and other development partners. Senior stakeholders stated that engagement would be easier if a CDB representative were physically present as this would allow them to flexibly engage with partners, gain a deeper understanding of the political economy, and build working relationships with high-level government officials. From the CDB perspective, having a country presence would also help with real-time monitoring of projects and adaptations. It should be noted that this critique is not unique to The Bahamas and stems from the Bank's overarching business model. The CDB is aware of this challenge, but finding alternative measures to build more robust engagement with high-level stakeholders in and beyond the MoF going forward could be useful.

It is important to note that poor engagement is not solely due to the CDB. Establishing stable relationships with national stakeholders has been challenging due to changing governments and priorities resulting from contextual challenges such as Hurricane Dorian and the COVID-19 pandemic. It was widely recognised by all categories of stakeholders that the GOCB has limited capacity, and this has driven many of the critiques of CDB's engagement. For instance, a lack of GOCB capacity has contributed to challenges in meeting the preconditions of CDB loans, navigating procurement processes and limited capacity to engage with TA in areas such as gender and the environment.

There are indications that engagement between CDB and GOCB is improving. The current administration has shown greater willingness to engage with CDB support (such as the PBLs) and has been proactive in shaping the BEST Project. Greater political willingness can be partly attributed to increased engagement by the CDB. For example, in 2021, the CDB completed a mission to The Bahamas to engage the new government on previously agreed projects, and there was a high-level mission by the President of the Bank to meet with the President of The Bahamas in late 2021.^{lxxxix} In addition, the CDB has encouraged the GOCB to be more active in regional organisations such as CARICOM. However, increased engagement is more likely due to willingness by key individuals within the GOCB, particularly in the MoF, and demands driven by changes in the context whereby the GOCB needs to access financial support, such as the PBLs and the BEST project.

²⁶ Further discussed in the Adaptation section.

3.4.3 Operationalisation Of Cross-cutting Priorities, Including Gender and the Environment (EQ12)

Initial interviews with CDB stakeholders reflected optimism that The Bahamas was a success story in operationalising gender equity and the environment as cross-cutting priorities. However, the evaluation found little evidence that gender considerations were mainstreamed and operationalised.

GENDER

In practice, the evaluation found very little evidence that gender was successfully operationalised. Large-scale projects whose design integrated a stronger focus on gender did not proceed as planned. The BEST Project was not implemented within the 2018–2022 strategic period, meaning that potential gender-related benefits were not realised. BTVI underwent significant adaptation in response to changes in context and institutional priorities. Due to the reallocation of funding, the Gender Framework Consultancy did not begin until 2023, while stakeholders suggested that gender mainstreaming was not a priority within other BTVI interventions.

Overall, GOCB stakeholders showed little awareness of how and where gender was mainstreamed within their CDB-funded interventions or did not prioritise these elements within their projects. This deficiency was particularly evident for gender-related TA. Multiple stakeholders indicated that they considered gender-related TA a “tick box” exercise required to secure funding. Others suggested that to secure political and community buy-in to projects, tangible results must be prioritised. This observation was particularly relevant for large infrastructure projects where stakeholders reported that communities wanted to see concrete results, such as the construction of bridges or laying of water supplies and were less interested in the supporting gender or vulnerability analyses. There was a clear missed opportunity to engage the Ministry of Social Services and Urban Development’s Department of Gender and Family Affairs, which could help support GOCB ownership of gender-related TA but was unaware of any such assistance included in the CSP projects. Such engagement could have supported stakeholders in better understanding the value of completing TA activities and the benefits these could yield for communities.

The major reason that the operationalisation of gender equity was unsuccessful is due to sensitivities concerning gender. While some GOCB partners stated that gender is one of the government’s priorities, others indicated that gender is seen as a “buzzword” or a necessary consideration to secure funding from international actors, such as the CDB. Evidence from multiple partners in The Bahamas suggests that the GOCB (and Bahamian society more broadly) has a very different interpretation of gender than the CDB. Many stakeholders equated gender to either women’s rights or LGBTQ+ rights, the latter being a politically and socially sensitive issue in The Bahamas. Multiple stakeholders suggested that gender considerations were imposed by the CDB as a donor and not a priority within their contexts. As such, partners were less willing to engage with the gender-related aspects of interventions or did not see the value in addressing such issues.

There is an evident lack of alignment between CDB’s definitions and intentions concerning gender equity and those of the GOCB. There is a clear need for CDB to better communicate what is meant by gender, tailor its engagement in a manner that is sensitive to the Bahamas context, and to illustrate how gender mainstreaming could support development priorities in The Bahamas. For example, like many Caribbean countries, The Bahamas faces very real challenges with boys underperforming in schools compared with

their female counterparts, which in turn impacts employment potential. Stakeholders from several government ministries expressed a desire to focus more on supporting boys and men within their communities. As such, there is clear scope for CDB to reframe some gender considerations around this issue, which would help secure more substantial buy-in from national partners to advance gender equity.

There is limited and inconclusive evidence around to what extent integration of social inclusion and gender has supported sustainability, and at times, they may even be at odds. For example, social inclusion considerations in the Water Supply Improvement Project resulted in the WSC prioritising vulnerable rural communities. However, the financial sustainability of the provision of piped water to these areas is challenging, as the costs are reportedly higher than their perceived ability to pay, and WSC is reliant on government subsidising water tariffs in these areas.^{xc} The evaluation found little other evidence of where integration of gender and social inclusion had supported the sustainability of results.

ENVIRONMENT AND CLIMATE


Despite the evident willingness of both the Bank and the GOCB to engage with environmental and climate change issues, the evaluation found limited evidence on the operationalisation of environmental and climate considerations. Unlike the operationalisation of gender, this is not due to a negative perception of the environment but rather due to a lack of capacity to address these issues. The Ministry of the Environment is responsible for supporting all environmental assessments for infrastructure development in The Bahamas and is aware of all environment-related TA activities included in the CSP projects. Essential/compulsory components such as environmental impact assessments and/or CRVAs do proceed, but as the ministry has extremely limited capacity to engage with these exercises and other environment-focused TA, they are often delayed. Other national partners reported that, similarly to gender, TA activities related to the environment have been deprioritised because of limited capacity and a desire to focus on visible components of projects, such as ‘hard’ infrastructure development, which has immediate and tangible benefits for end users.

Box 3: Integration of gender and the environment and implications

Both gender and the environment were relatively well integrated into CDB interventions at the design stage, but integration dropped off during implementation, resulting in limited traction and delays and ultimately constraining the likely sustainability of key CDB infrastructure projects.

However, the reasons for the robust integration at the design stage and more limited integration during implementation are different, as summarised below:

Figure 10: Reasons for and implications of limited integration of gender and the environment



It is important for the CDB to recognise these key differences when identifying how to best to respond. More generally, the evaluation finding that in The Bahamas, infrastructure projects are seen as more of a priority than less tangible TA support indicates a need for greater engagement with key stakeholders in both the GOCB and more widely.

There were several strong examples where planning with integrated environmental support had improved sustainability, such as where procurement was based on climate criteria. Examples include procuring energy-efficient LEDs (which are more durable and reduce energy demands) under the Streetlights Retrofitting Project (although the evaluation notes that the CDB did not procure the streetlights directly).^{xc} Another example was the workshops on climate-resilient building construction, which should contribute to improved building practices in The Bahamas.^{xcii} Outside of these examples, evidence of integration of the environment supporting sustainability was mixed. For example, in one of the major infrastructure investments, the Water Supply Improvement Project, the delayed CRVA and lack of mitigation of environmental impacts have reduced climate resilience.^{xciii}

3.4.4 Other Factors Affecting CSP Management and Implementation (EQ13)

In addition to Hurricane Dorian and COVID-19, the change in government itself constrained the latter phase of CSP implementation. Some GOCB stakeholders were unaware of many of the activities included under the CSP due to the limited handover of CSP activities when the government changed and were thus often unable to explain why certain projects had not gone ahead. Another factor that affected implementation was in-country stakeholders' experiences with/perceptions of CDB processes. Many national stakeholders expressed frustration with the Bank's processes, despite their similarities to those of the IDB (see Section 3.4.2), with a clear perception that CDB processes are complex and longwinded. Several stakeholders felt this was compounded by having a single CDB focal point for each project, leading to implementation delays due to the time taken to obtain approvals. Limited GOCB and CDB capacity was also highlighted as a challenge for both CDB and GOCB. Multiple stakeholders indicated that the lack of GOCB capacity was a constraint in efficiently implementing the CSP, both in terms of economic and financial competencies and

human resources, to manage implementation in a timely manner. This deficiency has impacted procurement and the operationalisation of key TA activities, such as environmental impact assessments.

There was limited evidence of enabling factors supporting efficient CSP implementation, but some aspects of positive learning exist. Projects which were part of regional initiatives proceeded well, such as the National Workshop in Improved Practices for the Construction of Houses. This success was perceived to be due to it being part of a regional initiative with tightly defined timelines and opportunities to learn from other BMCs. The design and development of the PBLs also highlight enabling factors for efficient implementation. The PBLs' programmatic approach to policy-based operations design^{xciv} and the dedication of the Director of Economic Planning as coordinator of the PBLs ensured good quality management and coordination between the GOCB and the Bank, meaning that implementation progressed efficiently.^{xcv} This result indicates the critical importance of co-designing interventions that directly respond to Bahamian needs.

FACTORS AFFECTING OPERATIONALISATION OF TA

The operationalisation of technical assistance across the CSP portfolios was weak, particularly when TA was included as part of wider projects as opposed to a standalone intervention, such as the National Workshop in Improved Practices for the Construction of Houses. Where TA was included as part of wider projects, it also suffered because of the various constraining factors outlined above. For example, in the case of the BTVI Enhancement Project, funds were reallocated from TA components to support the rehabilitation of the campus on Grand Bahama following Hurricane Dorian. The change in government reportedly undermined the support and progress of TA, as TA activities agreed to with the previous administration did not always align with their own priorities. For example, under the BTVI Enhancement Project and the Water Supply Improvement Project, TA was not implemented until late in the implementation period, with negative repercussions for sustainability as previously outlined.













There are specific constraining factors that relate to TA as a modality. Multiple stakeholders indicated that both politicians and communities are primarily interested in seeing the tangible results of large infrastructure projects, and thus, TA is often deprioritised or treated as a “tick box” exercise. In two projects, the host organisations were unhappy with the responsiveness of consultants and the quality of the deliverables produced. There is a strong preference amongst stakeholders for TA to be tailored to the local context, to draw on Bahamian expertise, and for national stakeholders to have greater input into the types of TA activities included in projects so that they are aligned with current needs and priorities. There is a clear need for further engagement to ensure that national stakeholders understand the value and long-term impacts of TA and for more robust management to ensure that such assistance is produced to a high standard and is useful. If this is not addressed, there is a risk that willingness to engage in TA could be further damaged.

4 Conclusions and Recommendations

The conclusions below pull out the main overarching strengths and weaknesses that have emerged from the findings and are mapped against the evaluation criteria. Each conclusion is presented with the corresponding recommendation, with provisional responsibilities and timeframes assigned and suggested ways to implement each recommendation.

Key to evaluation criteria mapping:


Effectiveness		Sustainability		Relevance	
Coherence		Efficiency		RMF	

Conclusion 1						
The overall effectiveness of the CSP is mixed, with key positives in economic cooperation but more limited results in other areas. Making a robust judgement of CSP effectiveness was challenging, as was assessment of CDB's contribution within an environment where multiple IDPs are supporting the same sectors. Due to limited publicly available development data on The Bahamas, this will always be a challenge, but it was made more difficult as the RMF was not revised despite significant changes to CDB interventions. As a result, many RMF indicators were ultimately irrelevant to the support the CDB provided. For the CDB to be able to better judge its performance at a strategic level, there is a need to review the framing and awareness of both the CSP and the linked RMF.						
Conclusion 2						
The Bahamian context was particularly challenging over the CSP period and was affected by two changes of government, a major hurricane, and the COVID-19 pandemic. The CDB was able to adapt to evolving GOCB priorities in the wake of these changes to some extent, for example, via the successful PBLs, which is to be commended. Looking forward, limited in-country buy-in for the National Development Plan raises key strategic questions about how CDB should frame the next CES and its RMF to be more adaptable and better able to navigate a dynamic and politically charged context.						
Recommendation 1: Formulate a more flexible CES that is more focused at the outcome level and avoid including specific costed interventions/projects under outcomes unless these are already underway. Support the CES with a utilisation-focused Results Monitoring Framework (RMF) that allows better monitoring of progress, adaptive management, and ultimately improved strategy-level performance.						

Suggestions for implementation:

- Ensure the CES is aligned with the National Development Plan, but given the dynamic political context in The Bahamas, ensure it is also well aligned with the SDGs as a broader development framework.
- Align RMF outcome indicators with readily available, relevant and regularly updated development indicators/data. These should, for example, speak to broad areas of educational access (e.g., school enrolment) and quality (e.g., the proportion of trained teachers) and thus be relevant to any specific interventions in these areas.
- Ensure that project-level RMFs explicitly feed into these RMF outcome indicators.
- Ensure MTRs proceed (utilising the RMF), and subsequently update the CES and RMF to ensure their ongoing relevance and utility even when contextual changes take place.
- Consider integrating CSP and project-level monitoring within a live M&E dashboard, which helps to visualise the links between specific CSP interventions and the overall CSP outcomes and reduces the ongoing reporting burden.

Conclusion 3



There is a need for the CDB to improve and increase on-the-ground visibility and engagement with in-country stakeholders to improve overall traction and, thus, relevance and sustainability of specific interventions and the overall country strategy. There is an opportunity for the CDB to better leverage its perceived comparative advantage in regional knowledge and expertise while working with other IDPs to improve the complementarity and coherence of support in line with IDP expertise.


Recommendation 2: Take practical steps to enhance and maintain the CDB's on-the-ground visibility of and engagement with the government, other implementing agencies, and IDPs.

Suggestions for implementation:

- As an interim arrangement, organise (more regular) CES missions at specific, strategic intervals, e.g., after changes in government or key ministry leadership positions or after other shifts.
- Ensure ongoing engagement with a broader range of in-country stakeholders across different sectors so that CSP awareness is maximised, and adaptation is better supported. This engagement could be facilitated via Annual Portfolio Reviews led by the Director of Projects.
- Building on discussions within the CDB to date, explore whether having a Resident Implementation Officer (ROI) based in The Bahamas is a potential option.
- In the interim, ensure there is a clear CDB focal point for overall CES engagement and monitoring, and ensure they have the availability/ capacity to carry out the role effectively.
- Ensure that other IDPs are engaged directly during the formulation of the CES so that the CDB has a comprehensive picture of ongoing and planned support from other actors.
- Reach out to the Resident UN Coordinator and arrange to join regular UN-led IDP coordination meetings as an avenue to share each other's work, progress and challenges.
- Through this, identify where the CDB can work with other partners to support mutual cross-cutting priorities such as gender, the environment and climate change.

- Identify where the CDB can fill gaps left by other IDPs either in a particular sector or, for example, by focusing on smaller infrastructure projects.
- Maximise use of CDB's other communication channels, including CDB's website and social media channels.

Conclusion 4




In the context of high brain drain and political change, there is a need for CDB to modify and better publicise existing and planned capacity-building/institutional strengthening initiatives so that the knowledge and skills of Bahamians are built and retained.

Recommendation 3: Develop and implement a clear strategy for capacity-building and institutional strengthening with the Bahamian government and ensure that TA support has the necessary country-level buy-in.

Suggestions for implementation:

- Review the role and structure of Project Execution Units which support CDB projects (in The Bahamas and, as appropriate, more broadly) to identify how longer-term, in-country capacity can be more sustainably developed, including greater use of native Bahamian consultants.
- Increase in-country stakeholder involvement in the design of TA support, ideally through a more collaborative co-creation process.

Conclusion 5









Perceptions of CDB processes, including procurement, disbursement and other approvals, are having a significant negative impact on overall perceptions of the CDB as a partner, even where its processes are not substantially different from (or more complex than) those of other IDPs. This perception indicates a need to improve understanding and awareness of processes among in-country stakeholders, and to ensure that the CDB communicates its requirements as coherently and efficiently as possible.

Recommendation 4: Increase engagement with in-country stakeholders to ensure that CDB processes are better understood (linking to Recommendation 2)

Suggestions for implementation:

- Increase/optimize the use of CDB's available roster of consultants to support engagement.
- Discuss the possibility of arranging further joint training on procurement and other key processes with the IDB.
- Consult with country-level counterparts when key processes are revised in the future so that processes and guidance are as clear and well-understood as possible.

Conclusion 6						
<p>For CDB’s cross-cutting priority of gender to be better integrated from design through to operationalisation and thus better support sustainability, there is a need for CDB to be more aware of and directly address in-country stakeholder misconceptions and sensitivities. In the environment, GOCB capacity is a key constraint, but there is still a need to build greater buy-in for technical support so that if/when capacity increases, support in these areas is more of a GOCB priority.</p>						
<p>Recommendation 5: Improve CDB understanding of and engagement on gender in The Bahamas so that gender is better integrated from design through to implementation in the next country strategy</p> <p>Suggestions for implementation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop a stronger relationship with the Ministry of Gender and Family Affairs and other key stakeholders (including civil society), seeking to establish a gender National Focal Point. • Related to Recommendation 4, work with other IDPs to establish whether a joint approach to improving awareness and understanding of gender may be appropriate. • Look to examples of good practice from other countries, for example, Belize, which could be used as case studies for key in-country stakeholders to better appreciate the value of mainstreaming cross-cutting areas such as gender. 						

5 Appendices

Appendix 1 – Management Response

Title:	The Bahamas Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation 2018-2022	
Entity that commissioned the Evaluation:	OIE	
Due date of Management Response:	June 2023	
Coordinator of Management Response:	Ronald James Beverly Lugay	Head of Evaluation: Roberto La Rovere
Management Response approved by SAT	Name	
Date	Presented to DEC 12 th March 2025	

<p>General comments on the evaluation</p>	<p>Management welcomes the Independent Evaluation (IE/the Evaluation) of the Country Strategy Paper (CSP/ the Strategy) 2018-2022 for The Bahamas. The IE findings align closely with the Bank’s self-assessment of the CSP, the Country Strategy Completion Report (CSCR)²⁷. The CSCR rated the overall CSP performance as “Marginally Unsatisfactory²⁸ reflecting limited implementation progress during the strategy period 2018 to 2022. Of the 5 intended outcomes of the CSP, 4 outcomes associated with improved access to quality climate resilient infrastructure; increased energy efficiency and renewable energy options; improved governance; and increased productivity, competitiveness and economic diversification were rated as partially achieved, reflecting some progress towards project/ programme completion. Programme implementation was significantly delayed due to the impacts of unprecedented external shocks, Hurricane Dorian (2019) and the COVID-19 pandemic, which spanned most of the strategy period and which necessitated shifts to the country’s strategic priorities, as GOCB transitioned to crisis response mode. This pivot to crisis management and recovery meant that the execution of the planned strategy could not proceed as intended, reflecting a pragmatic shift in priorities in the face of unprecedented challenges. In tandem, the Bank was highly responsive, deploying critical emergency and technical assistance support to the Government’s reconstruction and recovery efforts. Re-engagement with The Bahamas through a portfolio review post-crisis in 2022 has led to greater portfolio activity.</p> <p>The overall relevance of the CSP’s objectives and Strategy design was deemed highly satisfactory. However, key weaknesses were found in coordination with other development partners, uneven CDB engagement, and with less than adequate outcomes indicators within the Results Monitoring Framework. Insufficient in-country capacity also contributed to project delays.</p> <p>In the main, the Bank finds most of the recommendations given in the report to be relevant and consistent with Bank approaches and practices, re-affirming efforts that are already underway. The management generally agrees with the findings which are considered useful for developing the new CES for The Bahamas. Management responses are provided below.</p>
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²⁷ Completed in August.

²⁸ This rating is an aggregate measure of progress made toward achieving CS outcomes based on a four-step scale of Highly Satisfactory, Satisfactory, Marginally Unsatisfactory, and Unsatisfactory. A Marginally Unsatisfactory rating indicates that the CS programme did not make acceptable progress towards most of its major outcomes, and/or failed to address major constraints that undermined the effectiveness of country relations.

Evaluation recommendation #1

Formulate a more flexible Country Engagement Strategy (CES) which is focused at outcome level and avoid including specific costed interventions/projects under outcomes unless these are already underway. Support the CES with a utilization-focused Results Monitoring Framework (RMF) which allows better monitoring of progress, adaptive management, and ultimately improved strategy-level performance.

Lead entity ('who' is responsible)

Participating boundary partners

- | |
|--|
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Country Strategy team Projects and Economics Departments • SAO • Project appraisal team/ Country Economist |
|--|

Overall management response	
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99	100

- ☐ Accepted

☒ Partially Accepted

The CES is a results-oriented, strategic tool. Built on the principles of Managing for Development Results (MfDR), CDB's CESs are focused at the outcomes level and include RMFs. The CES seeks to optimise the Bank's development impact by identifying and aligning with high-level outcomes consistent with client development goals, against which the programme is monitored and evaluated. Management agrees that there is scope for strengthening RMF design and monitoring and will enhance resources to better embed its results culture.

While the CES does incorporate a costed pipeline, this is identified as indicative, that can be modified during the strategy period, as agreed with the client. The indicative pipeline is not at the centre of the CES as outcomes are, and since 2023 this listing is included as Appendix in the report, in line with the Strategy's outcome orientation.

The pipeline emerges from an intensive in-country engagement process that is country-led, where the identified projects are mutually agreed, between CDB and Client, as priority interventions for Bank support. Management is of the view that there are substantial benefits derived to the Bank from identifying a pipeline of projects at CES inception, that can guide CDB's support to a member country, whether it is included or excluded from the actual CES report.

- ☐
- Rejected

The flexible nature of the CES, we believe is evident in The Bahamas CES where the pipeline, in responsive to the client's emerging needs in the immediate aftermath of a catastrophic hurricane in 2019, was modified to include a PBL that provided critical budget support. In 2020, the PBL series was supplemented with additional resources to assist with covid-19.

The Bank commenced preparation of CES mid-term reviews in 2024. It is expected that this will allow for improved monitoring and flexibility. Modifications and programme adjustments will be incorporated that will enhance the likely utilization of the RMF/ findings to inform decisions, strengthen decision making and improve performance.

Suggested lines of action			
Lines of action	Key actions to be implemented (for MR to articulate how to implement the recommendation)	Timeline	
		Start date	End date
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure the CES is aligned both with the National Development Plan (NDP), given the dynamic political context in The Bahamas, also ensure it is well aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) as a broader development framework. Align RMF outcome indicators with easily available, relevant, and regularly updated development indicators/data. These should, for example, speak to broad areas of educational access (e.g. school enrolment) and quality (e.g. proportion of trained teachers), and thus be relevant to any specific interventions in these areas. Ensure that project-level RMFs explicitly feed into these RMF outcome indicators. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Ensure that the RMF is focused on outcomes rather than outputs and institutional objectives, and RMF outcome indicators aligned with accessible, relevant, and regularly updated development indicators/data. Provide Bank-wide training to further embed results culture and to strengthen capacity for designing appropriate RMFs. Ensure alignment during project appraisal <p>The CS was relevant and strategically aligned with the NDP. Although not explicitly articulated, the outcomes were also aligned with the Sustainable Development Goals. This alignment is being made more explicit in more recently prepared CESs.</p> <p>The Bank strives to use indicators that are meaningful to its context, although data challenges often present hurdles that continue to hinder the preparation of RMFs</p>		H1: 2025 2025 Continuous

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure mid-term reviews proceed (utilizing the RMF), and subsequently update the CES and RMF to ensure their ongoing relevance and utility even when contextual changes take place. • Consider integrating CSP and project-level monitoring within a live M&E dashboard, which helps to visualize the links between specific CSP interventions and the overall CSP outcomes and reduces the ongoing reporting burden. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The Bank values relevance and importance of mid-term reviews and is committed to their preparation to ensure the utility of the RMF amidst contextual changes. • The Bank views this as aspirational and can consider working towards this in the future. The Bank does not currently have this built into OP365 or any other system. 		
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Evaluation recommendation #2 ('what')

Take practical steps to enhance and maintain on-the-ground visibility of and engagement by CDB with the government, other implementing agencies, and International Development Partners (IDPs).

Lead entity ('who' is responsible)

Directors of Projects office and Economics Department

Participating boundary partners ('who else')

- Various project implementing units/ divisions
- Projects and Economics Department
- Communications Department

Overall management response

- ☒ Accepted
- ☐ Partially Accepted
- ☐ Rejected

Accepted but Modified: Management supports this recommendation and accepts that engagement is important and should be strategic and appropriate for it to be meaningful and impactful. We note that broad stakeholder engagement and consultation with in-country partners is actively pursued in operational functions including at the country level (via surveillance and strategy missions) and at the project level during appraisal and portfolio missions. The Bank has made a substantial effort to enhance engagement and visibility post-covid-19, including through partnerships and working collaboratively with IDPs to improve programme implementation and impacts.

In 2023, the Bank collaborated closely with IDB in designing additional budget support for the Bahamas.

Suggested lines of action			
Lines of action	Key actions to be implemented (for MR to articulate how to implement the recommendation)	Timeline	
		Start date	End date
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> As an interim arrangement, organise (more regular) CES missions at specific, strategic intervals, e.g. after changes in government, key ministry leadership positions, or other shifts. Ensure ongoing engagement is with a broader range of in-country stakeholders across different sectors, so that CSP awareness is maximised, and adaptation is better supported. This could be facilitated via Annual Portfolio Reviews, led by the Director of Projects. Building on discussions within CDB to date, explore whether having a Resident Implementation Officer (ROI) based in The Bahamas is a potential option. In the interim, ensure there is a clear CDB focal point for overall CES engagement 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regularise portfolio reviews, including strategic missions when government or key Ministry leadership changes. CES/Portfolio or high-level missions are necessary at specific, strategic intervals for visibility, awareness and on-going engagement. Initiate and actively develop and monitor pipeline implementation plans working closely with coordinating and implementing agencies in Government. On-going engagement is a central element of pipeline management. Explore greater engagement, by participation in International Development Partners coordination meetings. To strengthen country-level collaboration and awareness, the Bank has received GOCB's approval to participate in IMF country missions. The Bank will keep this under consideration. In the interim, the Bank is also considering other approaches including staff rotations where assigned officers could spend more time in-country at specific points in time. The MOF is the Bank's focal point. However, CES programme implementation and monitoring is spread across several implementing agencies and unit within the Bank. 		Continuous

<p>and monitoring, and ensure they have the availability/ capacity to carry out the role effectively.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure that other IDPs are engaged directly during the formulation of the CES, so that CDB has a comprehensive picture of ongoing and planned support by other actors. • Reach out to the Resident UN Coordinator and arrange to join UN-led IDP coordination meetings, as an avenue to share each other's work, progress, and challenges. • Through this, identify where CDB can work with other partners to support mutual cross-cutting priorities such as gender, the environment, and climate change. • Identify where CDB can fill gaps left by other IDPs either in a particular sector or for example by focusing on smaller infrastructure projects. 	<p>This conforms with Bank requirements during the preparation of a CES.</p> <p>The Bank will discuss with MOF focal point.</p> <p>Management accepts that given limited resources, the Bank can work more effectively to leverage other development partners' resources to increase the impact and scale of interventions to tackle urgent development challenges. In the formulation of the CES, extensive and broad-based consultation and dialogue are undertaken with other MBDs to pursue avenues for collaboration.</p> <p>Engagement with country CES stakeholders - a very specific audience of implementing agencies - requires more direct channels, a targeted stakeholder communications strategy would be more appropriate to ensure that the relevant audiences are kept abreast of CES implementation matters throughout.</p>		
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<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maximise use of CDB's other communication channels, including CDB's website and social media channels. 	For wide-scale awareness, the Bank issues a news release upon Board approval of a CES and can consider building on this by adopting a more structured approach through an official in-country launch of CESs.		
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Evaluation recommendation #3 ('what')			
Develop and implement a clear strategy for capacity building and institutional strengthening with the government of Bahamas, and ensure that Technical Assistance (TA) support has the necessary country-level buy-in.			
Lead entity ('who' is responsible)		Participating boundary partners ('who else')	
Not specified			
Overall management response			
<div><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Accepted</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> Rejected</div>	<div>Accepted but Modified</div> <div>Management accepts the importance of capacity building in client countries to support the achievement of development outcomes. The Bank recognises that capacity building is long-term, context-specific and requires a systemic approach, as such, capacity development activities are included in project interventions and through stand-alone TA operations to support project outcomes.</div>		
Suggested lines of action			
Lines of action	Key actions to be implemented (for MR to articulate how to implement the recommendation)	Timeline	
		Start date	End date
<div><div>•</div>Review the role and structure of Project Execution Units which support CDB projects (in The Bahamas and, as appropriate, more broadly) to identify how longer-term, in-country capacity can be more sustainably developed including greater use of</div>	None specified		Not specified

native Bahamian consultants. • Increase in-country stakeholder involvement in the design of TA support, ideally through a more collaborative co-creation process.			
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Evaluation recommendation #4 (‘what’)			
Increase engagement with in-country stakeholders to ensure that CDB processes are better understood (linking to Recommendation 2).			
Lead entity (‘who’ is responsible)		Participating boundary partners (‘who else’)	
Procurement: 1) PPU/ relevant division/units 2) PPU 3) PPU/wider Projects divisions/unit PPU			
Overall management response			
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted <input type="checkbox"/> Rejected		Management accepts that engaging in-country stakeholders effectively is crucial for ensuring that processes are well understood and supported and is willing to pursue strategies to increase engagement. Establishing consistent and effective communication channels and supervision oversight are critical element of the Bank’s approach to helping stakeholders understand the processes and their importance.	
Suggested lines of action			
Lines of action	Key actions to be implemented (for MR to articulate how to implement the recommendation)	Timeline	
		Start date	End date
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Increase/ optimize use of CDB’s available roster of consultants to support this.• Discuss with IDB a possibility of arranging further joint trainings on	Procurement: 1) Procurement roster to remain available to all projects and PPU to engage with divisions/units to consider possible use at appraisal stage. 2) CDB to continue providing procurement training at the start of all new projects. 3) Online procurement training courses to be disseminated through CDB supervising divisions/units to relevant executing agencies; and		1-3: Continuous 4: Decision to be

procurement and other key processes. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Consult with country-level counterparts when key processes are revised in the future so that processes and guidance are as clear and well-understood as possible. 	4) Option for joint procurement agency training with IDB to be explored where we share executing agencies. However, should be noted that Bahamas is not eligible for grant resources to support use of consultants by CDB, which given limited admin budget, likely to be mean any in-country operations would not be possible this year.		reached in Q3 with actions in Q1/Q2 of 2025
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Evaluation recommendation #5 (‘what’)			
Improve CDB’s understanding of and engagement on gender in The Bahamas so that gender is better integrated from design through to implementation in the next country strategy.			
Lead entity (‘who’ is responsible)		Participating boundary partners (‘who else’)	
SSD (Gender)			
Overall management response			
<div><input type="checkbox"/> Accepted</div> <div><input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Partially Accepted</div> <div><input type="checkbox"/> Rejected</div>		<div>Accepted but Modified :</div> <div>CDB has deepened its relationship with the Department of Gender and Family Affairs in supporting the Department with the updating of the National Gender Equality and Equity Policy over the course of 2023. Throughout this process it became clear that despite CDB’s financial and technical support the ownership and buy-in for such interventions is to be strengthened to carry the policy to its approval.</div> <div>In the process CDB collaborated with UN Women.</div>	
Suggested lines of action			
Lines of action	Key actions to be implemented (for MR to articulate how to implement the recommendation)	Timeline	
		Start date	End date
<div>• Develop stronger relationship with Ministry of Gender and Family Affairs and other key stakeholders (including civil society), seeking to</div>	<div>• CDB could encourage the Department of Gender Affairs to establish and identify as a good practice gender focal points in Ministries to assist with gender mainstreaming in the respective sectors.</div> <div>The suggestion for implementation to establish a National Focal Point is unclear. The de facto national Gender Focal Point is the Department of Gender Affairs.</div>		Continuous

<p>establish gender National Focal Point.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Related to Recommendation 4, work with other IDPs to establish whether a joint approach to improving awareness and understanding of gender may be appropriate. • Look to examples of good practice from other countries, for example Belize, which could be used as case studies for in-country stakeholders to better appreciate the value of mainstreaming cross-cutting areas such as gender. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Suggestion to work with IDPs is also taken and can be investigated for the new CES. • Suggestion to look at the examples of Belize and transfer them to the case of the Bahamas is not taken on-board as the culture is different to the one in the Bahamas. <p>The recommendation on good practice examples is not clear. While CDB mainstreams gender equality in the CES and future projects, cultural shifts for a better appreciation of gender equality take time and need ownership from the Country and cannot be imposed.</p>		
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Annexes

Annex A – List of Persons Interviewed

INCEPTION PHASE

- Andreea Gill – Barbados Water Authority CDB
- Ronald James – Country Economist CDB
- Beverly Lugay – Country Economist CDB
- Christopher Straughn – Sustainable Energy Specialist CDB
- Sarah Jade Govia – Water and Environmental Specialist CDB
- Hopeton Peterson – Water and Environmental Specialist CDB
- Michel Thomas – Operations Officer CDB
- Elbert Ellis – Social Analyst CDB
- Kemberley Gittens – Social Analyst CDB

MAIN PHASE

CDB Staff

- Douglas Fraser – Head of Procurement CDB
- Christine Mohammed – Procurement Officer CDB
- Andreea Gill – Barbados Water Authority CDB
- Darren Carter – Gender Equality Professional
- Mary Zeigler – Gender Specialists CDB
- Paul Murphy – Education Specialist CDB
- Ronald James – Country Economist CDB
- Beverly Lugay – Country Economist CDB

GOCB Staff

- Mr Simon Wilson – Financial Secretary, Ministry of Finance
- Ms Christine Thompson – Deputy Director, Ministry of Finance
- Gabriella Fraser – Project Officer, BTVI Enhancement Project
- Linda Davis – Interim President, Bahamas Technical and Vocational Institute
- Elvin Taylor – Chairman, Bahamas Technical and Vocational Institute
- Cristopher Farrington – Director
- Lionel Sands – Director
- Charlene Hilton – Chief Financial Officer
- Ann Rolle – Director for Exuma island, Bahamas Technical and Vocational Institute
- Kevin Baston, Former Chairperson, Bahamas Technical and Vocational Institute

- Marco Rolle – Programme Coordinator, Project Execution Unit, Ministry of Finance
- Alden Austin – Electrical Engineer Specialist, Project Execution Unit, Ministry of Finance
- Edward Darville, Government Energy Sector Advisor
- Allison Collie – Chief Operating Officer, Office of the Prime Minister
- Rebecca Seymour– Senior Manager, PMDU
- Fiorella Ormeno – Project Lead, PMDU
- Mr Luther Smith – Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Works and Utilities
- Mr Damien Francis – Deputy Director of Public Works
- Craig G. Delancy, Buildings Control Officer, Ministry of Public Works
- Ms Melvelyn Symonette, First Assistant Secretary, Department of Gender & Family Affairs
- Bishop Chadwick James, Men’s Desk Coordinator, Department of Gender & Family Affairs

Other Stakeholders

- Sumayyah Cargill – Manager Strategic Development, BDB
- Regina Smith – Manager Strategic Development, BDB
- Captain Stephen Russell – Director of NEMA, The National Emergency Management Agency
- Mervyn Farroe, Stephanie Mikulasek, et al. – United States Embassy and USAID
- Jonathon Hudson, Acting Director of Utilities and Energy URCA
- Dai Qingli – Ambassador of China to The Baham, Chinese Embassy
- Peng Jing – Chief of Economic and Commercial Affairs, Chinese Embassy
- Ms. Raquel Smith – Executive Assistant, PAHO
- Brittney Jones – Non-Communicable Disease and Mental Health Technical Advisor, PAHO
- Robert Deal – General Manager, Water Corporation
- Ayla Issacs – Project Manager, Water Corporation
- Mr Stubbs – General Manager, Water Corporation
- José Luis Saboin – Economist, IDB
- Shevonn Cambridge – Chief Executive BPL
- Ian Pratt – Chief Operating Officer BPL

Annex B – List of Documents Reviewed

CROSS-CUTTING CDB DOCUMENTS

Title	Year
CSP 2018–2022 – Bahamas	2018
CSP 2013–2017 – Bahamas	2013
LOANS, GRANTS, CTCS, BNTF, UKCIF Approved by Country in USD January 25, 2018, to April 25, 2023	2023
Validation of Implementation Completion Report on Exogenous Shock Response PBL	2023
President’s recommendation – First Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building Exogenous Shock Response PBL	2019

PROJECT-SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS

Project	Documents
First Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CDB, 2019, Corrigendum – First Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building Exogenous Shock Response PBL - CDB, 2019, President’s recommendation – First Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building Exogenous Shock Response PBL - CDB, 2023, Validation of Implementation Completion Report on Exogenous Shock Response PBL - CDB, 2022, Implementation Completion Report Policy-Based Operation PBL
Second Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL with Supplementary Financing for COVID-19	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CDB, 2020, President’s recommendation – Second Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building Policy-based Loan with Supplementary Financing for the COVID-19 Pandemic
Strengthening the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit to Support Reconstruction & Recovery	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CDB, 2020, President’s recommendation – Technical Assistance to Strengthen the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit in Support of Reconstruction and Recovery - 2023, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – January - GOCB, 2023, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – January - GOCB, 2023, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – February - GOCB, 2023, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – March - GOCB, 2023, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – April - GOCB, 2023, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – May - GOCB, 2023, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – June - GOCB, 2023, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – July - GOCB, 2023, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – August - GOCB, 2023, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – September - GOCB, 2023, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – October - GOCB, 2023, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – November - GOCB, 2022, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – April - GOCB, 2022, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – May - GOCB, 2022, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – June - GOCB, 2022, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – July - GOCB, 2022, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – August - GOCB, 2022, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – September - GOCB, 2022, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – October - GOCB, 2022, Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit Monthly Update – November - GOCB, 2019, PMDU 2018-2019 Annual Report
TA – Consultancy Services to Support Institutional Strengthening – Delivery Unit	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - GOCB, 2019, PMDU 2018-2019 Annual Report

Streetlight Retrofitting Project	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CDB, 2018, President's recommendation – Streetlight Retrofitting Project - BPL, 2023, CDB QUARTERLY REPORT ON INVESTMENT COST OF PROJECT – SLRP January to March 2023 CDB - BPL, 2023, Results monitoring plan March 2023 - BPL, 2023, SLRP – PROJECT PROGRESS REPORT – January 1 to March 31, 2023 - BPL, 2023, Streetlight Retrofitting New Providence – Schedule - BPL, 2023, Streetlight Retrofitting New Providence – Schedule - BPL, 2023, CDB QUARTERLY REPORT ON INVESTMENT COST OF PROJECT – SLRP April to June 2022_KWB - BPL, 2023, Results monitoring plan June 2023 - 63. BPL, 2023, SLRP – PROJECT PROGRESS REPORT – April 1 to June 30, 2023 - BPL, 2023, Streetlight Retrofitting New Providence – Schedule - BPL, 2023, Streetlight Retrofitting New Providence – Schedule - BPL, 2023, CDB QUARTERLY REPORT ON INVESTMENT COST OF PROJECT – SLRP July to September 2023 - BPL, 2023, Results monitoring plan September 2023 - BPL, 2023, SLRP – PROJECT PROGRESS REPORT – July 1 to September 30, 2023 - BPL, 2023, Streetlight Retrofitting New Providence – Schedule - BPL, 2023, BPL – HATCH SLRP July Monthly Report - BPL, 2023, BPL – HATCH SLRP Monthly Report for April 2023 - BPL, 2023, BPL – HATCH SLRP November 2023 Monthly Report - BPL, 2023, BPL CEAC January 2023 Monthly Report - BPL, 2023, BPL CEAC March 2023 Monthly Report# - BPL, 2023, BPL CEAC May Monthly Report 20230608 - BPL, 2023, BPL SLRP Monthly Report for January 2023 - BPL, 2023, BPL SLRP monthly report for October 2023 - BPL, 2023, BPL SLRP September 2023 Monthly Report - BPL, 2023, BPL-HATCH SLRP August 2023 Monthly Report - BPL, 2023, BPL-HATCH SLRP Monthly Report for March 2023 - BPL, 2023, CDB Reallocation of loan funds request letter - BPL, 2022, CEAC BPL November 2022 Monthly Report - BPL, 2022, SLRP – Progress Status Report Q3 – 2022 - BPL, 2022, SLRP – Project status report Q2 – 2022 - BPL, 2023, SLRP BPL HATCH Monthly Report June 2023 - BPL, 2022, SLRP BPL-Hatch Monthly Report for December 2022 - BPL, 2023, SLRP CEAC BPL June Monthly Report 2023 - BPL, 2022, SLRP Hatch Monthly Report for November (1)
Climate Resilience of The Water Sector	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - GWP Consultants, 2023, Green Climate Fund Funding Proposal for Climate Resilience of the Water Sector in The Baham Inception Report - GCF, 2020, Approved Project Preparation Funding Application – Climate Resilience of the Water Sector in The Bahamas
Water Supply Improvement Project	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CDB, 2022, Project Supervision Report – Water Supply Improvement Project - CDB, 2015, Approval of Water Supply Improvement Project
Disaster Management Emergency Relief Grant – Hurricane Dorian (2019)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CDB, 2019, President's recommendation – Disaster Management Emergency Relief Grant: Hurricane Dorian (2019)
Enhancing National Quality Infrastructure through Establishment of the Metrology Laboratory	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CDB, 2022, BBSQ Fact Sheet
Bahamas Education Sector Transformation Project (BEST)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CDB, 2022, President's recommendation – Bahamas Education Sector Transformation Project

Bahamas Technical and Vocational Institute (BTVI) Enhancement Project	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CDB, 2014, Approval of Bahamas Technical and Vocational Institute (BTVI) Enhancement Project - BTVI Project Unit (2019), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (November 2019) - BTVI Project Unit (2020), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (January 2020) - BTVI Project Unit (2020), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (February 2020) - BTVI Project Unit (2020), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (March 2020) - BTVI Project Unit (2020), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (April 2020) - BTVI Project Unit (2020), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (May 2020) - BTVI Project Unit (2020), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (June 2020) - BTVI Project Unit (2020), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (July 2020) - BTVI Project Unit (2020), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (August 2020) - BTVI Project Unit (2020), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (September 2020) - BTVI Project Unit (2020), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (October 2020) - BTVI Project Unit (2020), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (November 2020) - BTVI Project Unit (2020), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (December 2020) - BTVI Project Unit (2021), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (January 2021) - BTVI Project Unit (2021), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (February 2021) - BTVI Project Unit (2021), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (March 2021) - BTVI Project Unit (2021), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (April 2021) - BTVI Project Unit (2021), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (May 2021) - BTVI Project Unit (2021), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (June 2021) - BTVI Project Unit (2021), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (July 2021) - BTVI Project Unit (2021), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (August 2021) - BTVI Project Unit (2021), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (September 2021) - BTVI Project Unit (2021), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (October 2021) - BTVI Project Unit (2021), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (November 2021) - BTVI Project Unit (2021), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (December 2021) - BTVI Project Unit (2022), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (January 2022) - BTVI Project Unit (2022), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (February 2022) - BTVI Project Unit (2022), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (March 2022) - BTVI Project Unit (2022), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (April 2022) - BTVI Project Unit (2022), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (May 2022) - BTVI Project Unit (2022), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (June 2022) - BTVI Project Unit (2022), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (July 2022) - BTVI Project Unit (2022), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (August 2022) - BTVI Project Unit (2022), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (September 2022) - BTVI Project Unit (2022), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (October 2022) - BTVI Project Unit (2022), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (November 2022) - BTVI Project Unit (2022), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (December 2022) - BTVI Project Unit (2023), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (January 2023) - BTVI Project Unit (2023), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (February 2023) - BTVI Project Unit (2023), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (March 2023) - BTVI Project Unit (2023), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (April 2023) - BTVI Project Unit (2023), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (May 2023) - BTVI Project Unit (2023), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (June 2023) - BTVI Project Unit (2023), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (July 2023) - BTVI Project Unit (2023), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (August 2023) - BTVI Project Unit (2023), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (September 2023) - BTVI Project Unit (2023), BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Note (October 2023)
PPAM and PCAM Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CDB, 2020, PPAM-PCM Booklet - CDB, 2019, PPAM and PCM Training Programme 2016-2018

National Workshop in Improved Practices for the Construction of Houses	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - CDB, 2022, CTCS Direct Technical Assistance Completion Report - CDB, 2019, National Workshop in Improved Practices for the Construction of Houses CTCS Workshop Completion Report - CDB, 2019, National Workshop in Improved Practices for the Construction of Houses CTCS Workshop Contract
Creative Industries support (Orange Loan)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Bahamas Development Bank, 2022, Bahamas Development Bank Orange Loan – CICA BAH Situation Analysis - Bahamas Development Bank, 2022, Bahamas Development Bank Orange Loan – Orange Financing Manual - CDB, 2022, Bahamas Development Bank Orange Loan – Contractor ToR - 2022, Bahamas Development Bank Orange Loan – CTCS – Direct Assistance Completion-Report-Consultant

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The Pacific Disaster Centre (2021), The Bahamas National Disaster Preparedness Baseline Assessment Executive Summary Report 2021

CREEE (2023), The Bahamas is developing an IRRP with help from the CCREEE – CCREEE. Accessed 24th January 2024 from: <https://www.ccreee.org/news/bahamas-developing-irrp-with-help-from-ccreee/#:~:text=The%20Caribbean%20Centre%20for%20Renewable,capitalise%20on%20renewable%20energy%20sources>

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CDB (2016), PPAM and PCM Training Programme 2016-2018: Accessed 24th January from <https://www.caribank.org/our-work/programmes/public-policy-analysis-and-management-and-project-cycle-management>

CDB (2022), BBSQ Fact Sheet. Accessed 24th January from: <https://www.caribank.org/sites/default/files/publication-resources/BBSQ%20FactSheet.pdf>

CDB (2019), Procurement Policy for Projects Financed by CDB from <https://www.caribank.org/sites/default/files/publication-resources/Procurement%20Policy%20for%20Projects-final.pdf>

GOCB (2019), PMDU 2018-2019 Annual Report. Accessed 22 Jan 2024
<https://www.bahamas.gov.bs/wps/wcm/connect/1cf927f9-db2b-47db-8fbf-dbac062a6255/PMDU+Annual+Report+Final.pdf?MOD=AJPERES>

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IMF (2023), The Bahamas 2022 Article IV Consultation—Press Release; Staff Report; and Statement by The Executive Director for The Bahamas

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Annex C – Evaluation Matrix

High-level Question	Criteria	Revised Evaluation Questions and Indicative Sub-Questions <i>(EQs linked to CSP traction case study in purple; EQs linked to gender, social inclusion and the environment in green)</i>	Indicators	Methodologies	Data Sources
Did the CSP achieve the intended results?	Effectiveness	<p>EQ1: To what extent did the Bank's interventions make progress towards the outputs, outcomes and strategic objectives set out in the CSP?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1.1 What is the status of delivery of the outputs and outcomes of the interventions? 1.2 How effective was progress towards the achievement of the CSP strategic objectives? 1.3 Have the Bank's operations and interventions had unintended results (beyond those proposed)? 	<p>Degree of achievement of outcomes, outputs and strategic objectives as defined in CSP RMF</p> <p>Degree of plausible CDB contribution to longer-term outcomes/ objectives</p> <p>Where outcomes were not achieved, the perceptions of the principal explanatory factors will be identified and examined further under "Right Design" and "Right Operationalisation"</p>	<p>Data collection:</p> <p>Document review</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews</p> <p>KIIs/FGDs</p> <p>Analysis:</p> <p>Thematic analysis (coding/ structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews)</p> <p>Assessment of extent to which outputs and outcomes as framed within CSP RMF were achieved</p> <p>Documentation of results beyond those in the RMF</p> <p>'Plausibility' assessment of results chain as outlined in the RMF, including assessment of how traction of CSP planned/actual interventions affected overall effectiveness</p>	<p>Document review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDB project data, appraisal documents, PSRs, PCRs <p>Primary data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> KIIs with programme leads and GOCB counterparts, private sector and civil society key informants. FGDs with final beneficiaries (e.g., schools, MSMEs etc.)
	Sustainability	<p>EQ2: What is the likelihood that the results which have been achieved will be sustainable?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 2.1 To what extent did the programme support the strengthening of national systems? 2.2 To what extent did integration of cross-cutting priorities such as gender, social inclusion and the environment support sustainability of results? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extent to which output and outcome-level results are expected to be sustained in the medium to long term Extent to which CDB interventions supported GOCB and private-sector organisation capacity strengthening, including financial management and procurement systems Extent to which integration of gender, social inclusion and the environment supported sustainability of results 	<p>Data collection:</p> <p>Document review/</p> <p>Semi-structured interviews</p> <p>Analysis:</p> <p>Thematic analysis (coding/ structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews)</p>	<p>Document review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Existing evaluations, reviews and case studies of CDB-supported interventions in The Bahamas, PCRs, PSRs Project design, monitoring and completion reports <p>Primary data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> KIIs with CDB programme leads and GOCB counterparts, private sector and civil society key informants. FGDs with final beneficiaries (e.g., schools, MSMEs etc.)

High-level Question	Criteria	Revised Evaluation Questions and Indicative Sub-Questions <i>(EQs linked to CSP traction case study in purple; EQs linked to gender, social inclusion and the environment in green)</i>	Indicators	Methodologies	Data Sources
Was the design of the CSP 87 appropriate?	Relevance	<p>EQ3: To what extent did the CSP and CDB's support over the 2018–2022 period align with the country's development needs and strategies?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 3.1 To what extent were CSP planned and actual interventions over the 2018–2022 period aligned with National Development Plan, Vision 2040? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Degree of alignment of CSP planned and actual interventions with needs identified within the GOCB planning framework outlined in Vision 2040 Stakeholder perceptions on the likelihood of key changes to overall GOCB objectives/priority areas 	<p>Data collection:</p> <p>Document review</p> <p>Primary data collection (KIIs and group interviews) with CDB staff and GOCB counterparts</p> <p>Analysis:</p> <p>Thematic analysis (coding/ structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews)</p> <p>Mapping of CSPs against GOCB current plans/strategies to establish degree of alignment</p> <p>Identification of where CSP will need to integrate new/different priorities</p>	<p>Document review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDB Bahamas CSP papers GOCB Vision 2040 National Development Plan <p>Primary data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDB staff GOCB counterparts IDB local office Other development partners (UN etc.)
		<p>EQ4: To what extent were planned and actual CSP interventions aligned with CDB's corporate strategies and priorities?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 4.1 To what extent were energy efficiency (EE), Regional Cooperation and Integration (RCI), energy security and environmental considerations mainstreamed in the design of the CDB's interventions? 4.2 Were gender equity (GE) and relevant gender patterns and potential safeguarding issues in the fields of intervention adequately identified, accounted for and 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Degree of alignment of CSPs planned and actual interventions with CDB corporate strategies Degree of self-reported integration of gender and environment at the design stage of interventions and the existence of rationale for any instances of limited integration 	<p>CASE STUDY FOCUS</p> <p>Data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review Semi-structured interviews <p>Analysis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Red-Amber-Green (RAG) rating of CDB gender marker analysis scores and Environmental and Social Categorisation scores at the time of project appraisal, comparing across sectors as far as possible Thematic analysis (coding/ structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews) 	<p>Document review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSP papers CDB corporate Gender, regional cooperation strategies, etc <p>Primary data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDB staff GOCB counterparts Other implementing agencies

High-level Question	Criteria	Revised Evaluation Questions and Indicative Sub-Questions <i>(EQs linked to CSP traction case study in purple; EQs linked to gender, social inclusion and the environment in green)</i>	Indicators	Methodologies	Data Sources
		mainstreamed in the design of interventions?			
		EQ5: Were the programme and individual operations designed in a manner consistent with the government's institutional capacity for implementation?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Existence of capacity assessments which have been carried out and/or reviewed Degree to which the interventions reflected capacity-building limitations in design 	<p>Data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review Semi-structured interviews <p>Analysis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Thematic analysis (coding/structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews) 	<p>Document review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSP papers, including risk assessments Project proposals External reports on GOCB project management infrastructure <p>Primary data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> GOCB counterparts Project consultants and CDB staff Other partners: IDB, UN agencies
		<p>EQ6: What were the reasons for limited GOCB traction with CSP interventions as originally planned?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 6.1 To what extent did the CSP plans leverage CDB's perceived and/or actual comparative advantage(s) in The Bahamas context? 6.2 Were CDB's financing instruments attractive and competitive for the country context? 6.3 Was the focus and design of Technical Assistance (TA) aligned with government needs and priorities? 6.4 What were other perceived 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stakeholder perceptions of what CDB's comparative advantage(s) are perceived to be and examples of where the support offered succeeded/failed to leverage this Examples of specific interventions (including TA)/ sectors where the CDB achieved traction with GOCB despite similar support offered by other partners Stakeholder perceptions of reasons why CDB's financial instruments were not considered attractive compared to alternative offerings Examples of other reasons (Bahamas specific and more general) behind limited traction 	<p>CASE STUDY FOCUS</p> <p>Data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review Semi-structured interviews <p>Analysis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Comparison of original CSP plans versus those that proceeded Qualitative mapping of perceived comparative advantage (as by GOCB and other in-country stakeholders) of CDB versus IDB against GOCB priorities Comparison of types/sizes and uptake of financial instruments offered by CDB (where possible, comparing this to those offered by 	<p>Document review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSP papers, project proposals, reports IDB strategy papers, reports and evaluations IDB project data (from https://www.iadb.org/en/projects), Bahamas over 2018–2022 period <p>Primary data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> GOCB and other implementing agencies Project consultants and CDB staff Other partners: IDB, UN agencies

High-level Question	Criteria	Revised Evaluation Questions and Indicative Sub-Questions <i>(EQs linked to CSP traction case study in purple; EQs linked to gender, social inclusion and the environment in green)</i>	Indicators	Methodologies	Data Sources
		reasons/root causes behind limited traction with proposed CDB/CSP interventions?		IDB) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Comparison of types and uptake of TA offered by CDB (where possible, comparing this to those offered by IDB) Thematic analysis (coding/structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews) 	
	Coherence	EQ7: How and to what extent was the Bank's CSP for The Bahamas and operational programmes harmonised, coordinated or complementary with other actors' interventions? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 7.1 To what extent did the CSP/CDB's support over the period 2018–2022 complement/fill gaps in the support offered by IDB and other actors? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extent of CDB participation in GOCB/cross-partner coordination mechanisms Other examples of formal/informal CDB coordination with other development partners No examples of duplication of effort between CDB and other partners 	Data collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review/ Semi-structured interviews Analysis: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Thematic analysis (coding/structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews) Mapping of CSPs against other actors' interventions Mapping of coordination mechanisms/dialogue platforms, participation and roles 	Document review: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSP papers Project proposals, PSR and PCRs Other actors' project appraisal documents, evaluations, etc., especially IDB Primary data collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDB staff and development partners (IDB, UN agencies) GOCB and other implementing agencies
	RMF Design	EQ8: To what extent was an appropriate M&E strategy and system, including Results Monitoring Framework (RMF), included in the design of the CSP? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 8.1 Did the RMF integrate development indicators/targets and was data available for measurement? 8.2 Were RMF outputs and 	RMF exists for overall CSP and each intervention, with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Outputs and outcomes clearly articulated and linked SMART indicators for outputs and outcomes Key underlying risks/assumptions around the achievement of outputs and outcomes clearly articulated 	Data collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review/ Semi-structured interviews Analysis: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Red–Amber–Green (RAG) assessment of RMF targets for 	Document review: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSP papers (including RMFs within) CSP M&E Strategy/reports CSP completion report Project Appraisal/design documents (with RMFs within) Project Completion Reports

High-level Question	Criteria	Revised Evaluation Questions and Indicative Sub-Questions <i>(EQs linked to CSP traction case study in purple; EQs linked to gender, social inclusion and the environment in green)</i>	Indicators	Methodologies	Data Sources
		<p>outcomes consistent with the CSP and indicators and targets designed according to the SMART approach?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 8.3 Did the RMF adequately capture gender and any other key disaggregation of data? 8.4 Did the RMF support adaptive management? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Existence of realistic indicator targets with baselines Alignment between CSP–RMFs and project-level RMFs Existence of data available against RMF indicators Existence of gender-disaggregated indicators/targets where appropriate Existence of periodic performance reviews (formal and/or informal) against the CSP RMF, and this being used to inform adaptations to the RMF 	<p>existence/availability of baseline and endline data</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Red–Amber–Green (RAG) assessment of SMART-ness of RMF indicators Red–Amber–Green (RAG) assessment of the level of RMF data disaggregation Review of alignment between RMF outputs, outcomes and objectives Thematic analysis (coding/structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Any other documents that underlie the RMFs <p>Primary data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDB staff
		EQ9: To what extent did the risks identified in the CSP Results Monitoring Framework adequately identify and mitigate against operational design elements and risks to longer-term sustainability?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Risks associated with GOCB capacity identified and mitigations outlined Risks associated with implementation by other partners identified and mitigations outlined Degree to which risks that materialised were (a) identified in advance, (b) successfully mitigated 	<p>Data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review/ Semi-structured interviews <p>Analysis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Thematic analysis (coding/structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews) Mapping of identified risks, mitigations and risk outcomes 	<p>Document review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Appraisal documents, PSRs, PCRs, evaluations <p>Primary data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDB programme leads and Risk department; GOCB counterparts; other donor partners Private-sector representatives
Was CSP implementation efficient?	Efficiency	<p>EQ10: Did planned and actual CSP interventions proceed in a timely and efficient manner?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 10.1 Did the indicative financial envelope disburse according to the CSP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Extent of funds' disbursement Extent to which expected intervention timelines were achieved 	<p>Data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review Semi-structured interviews <p>Analysis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Quantitative assessment of project 	<p>Document review:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Financial and project data <p>Primary data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CDB staff, especially Country Economist

High-level Question	Criteria	Revised Evaluation Questions and Indicative Sub-Questions <i>(EQs linked to CSP traction case study in purple; EQs linked to gender, social inclusion and the environment in green)</i>	Indicators	Methodologies	Data Sources
		<p>predictions?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 10.2 Were key timelines of sampled interventions met? 		<p>and sector disbursement levels</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Qualitative assessment of reasons for variations in disbursement levels Mapping of expected versus actual approval and implementation timelines (in terms of board approval, first disbursement, project completion date and any other timeline data available) Thematic analysis (coding/structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> GOCB and other implementing agencies
		<p>EQ11: Was there sufficient and effective initial and ongoing engagement with CSP stakeholders (particularly GOCB counterparts and implementing agencies) to support implementation?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 11.1 How/to what extent did engagement mitigate bottlenecks/ delays during inception/design stages of interventions? 11.2 How/to what extent did increased/improved engagement support increased lending uptake at the end of the CSP period? 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Evidence of ongoing communication between CDB officers and GOCB and executing agencies Evidence of mechanisms to identify and escalate GOCB and executing agency concerns to CDB and vice versa in a timely and effective manner 	<p>CASE STUDY FOCUS</p> <p>Data collection:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review/ Semi-structured interviews <p>Analysis:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Thematic analysis (coding/structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews) Mapping of coordination mechanisms, including frequency of engagement Timeline mapping of mission visits and other intense engagement periods against key project milestones 	


High-level Question	Criteria	Revised Evaluation Questions and Indicative Sub-Questions <i>(EQs linked to CSP traction case study in purple; EQs linked to gender, social inclusion and the environment in green)</i>	Indicators	Methodologies	Data Sources
		EQ12: To what extent were CDB cross-cutting priorities, particularly gender equity and the environment/climate, successfully operationalised, and what key factors enabled/constrained operationalisation?	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Degree of integration of cross-cutting priorities from design to implementation Existence of justification/reasons cited for any enablers/ constraints to integration Examples of key factors/perceived root causes behind any differences across sectors and/or changes over time 	CASE STUDY FOCUS Data collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review Semi-structured interviews Analysis: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Qualitative comparison, including possible Red–Amber–Green (RAG) rating of degree of integration of each priority at time of design (see EQ4), and during implementation Cross CDB sector comparison of degree of integration Timeline mapping of degree of integration against project approval dates and contextual changes (to help identify any changes in degree of integration after specific events, e.g., change of government) Thematic analysis (coding/ structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews) 	Document review: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> CSP papers, project proposals and reports Primary data collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> GOCB and other implementing agencies Project consultants and CDB staff, especially those assigned to the environment and social sectors
		EQ13: What other principal factors enabled or constrained CSP management and implementation and the achievement of the intended outputs and outcomes? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 13.1 How and to what extent did these various factors affect overall management, 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Examples of and relative degree of impact of various factors on management and implementation of interventions 	Data collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Document review/ Semi-structured interviews Analysis: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Thematic analysis (coding/ structured qualitative analysis of 	Document review: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Appraisal documents, PSRs, PCRs, evaluations Primary data collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Country Economist Programme leads and GOCB counterparts and other donors (for

High-level Question	Criteria	Revised Evaluation Questions and Indicative Sub-Questions <i>(EQs linked to CSP traction case study in purple; EQs linked to gender, social inclusion and the environment in green)</i>	Indicators	Methodologies	Data Sources
		implementation, and achievement against planned timelines? <ul style="list-style-type: none">13.2 How/to what extent did these factors affect the operationalisation of TA?		documents and interviews) <ul style="list-style-type: none">Mapping of expected versus actual approval and implementation timelinesMapping of coordination mechanisms, including frequency of coordination	comparative experiences)
		EQ14: To what extent was CSP implementation able to adapt as necessary? <ul style="list-style-type: none">14.1 To what extent was programme implementation able to adapt to evolving national systems?14.2 To what extent was programme implementation able to adapt to key contextual shifts, including Hurricane Dorian, the COVID-19 pandemic and change of government?	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Examples of adaptation to evolving national systems, including (but not limited to) changes in systems related following the election/change in administrationExamples of adaptation to other contextual shifts (Hurricane Dorian, COVID-19, others identified from KIIs and document review)Degree to which adaptations identified above were perceived to be successful	Data collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none">Document reviewSemi-structured interviewsFGDs Analysis: <ul style="list-style-type: none">Thematic analysis (coding/structured qualitative analysis of documents and interviews)	Document review: <ul style="list-style-type: none">CDB appraisal documents, financial and project data Primary data collection: <ul style="list-style-type: none">CDB programme leads, GOGB counterparts, other donor partnersPrivate-sector and non-government beneficiaries

Annex D – Co-Creation of Recommendations Workshop Miro Whiteboard Snapshots

Navigating the Miro Board


Hiding participants cursors



Navigation


There is a toolbar in the leftmost part of your screen. The only tool that matters to you in that is the cursor icon at the very top, the **select/ hand** one.

Trackpad: use 2 fingers to move around.
Mouse: click and drag to move around. (right click)



Zooming in and out

Trackpad/tablet Mouse wheel



Using sticky notes

This is a sticky note

Press CTRL+C (or ⌘ + C) to copy it
then CTRL+V (or ⌘ + V) to paste it

Resize the sticky note by clicking on its bottom right corner.
Click on the sticky note and drag it to position it.

Exercise

- For your assigned Finding, think of at least one possible recommendation(s), using the strategic questions to prompt your thinking
- Write your thoughts on one of the sticky notes on the board, or if you prefer just be ready to share your thoughts verbally
- If time allows, add in who you think would be responsible, timeframe, and a priority sticker. You can also look at the other findings
- We will then come back together, each person will present their finding and proposed recommendation(s) in turn, followed by a brief group discussion

- Finding 1 (Ronald): <https://miro.com/app/board/uXjVNBhy9os=/?moveToWidget=3458764573423996585&cot=14>
- Finding 2 (Christopher): <https://miro.com/app/board/uXjVNBhy9os=/?moveToWidget=3458764573425239411&cot=14>
- Finding 3 (Beverly): <https://miro.com/app/board/uXjVNBhy9os=/?moveToWidget=3458764573425310497&cot=14>
- Finding 4 (Paul): <https://miro.com/app/board/uXjVNBhy9os=/?moveToWidget=3458764573492134935&cot=14>
- Finding 5 (Andrea): <https://miro.com/app/board/uXjVNBhy9os=/?moveToWidget=3458764573492934858&cot=14>
- Finding 6 (Douglas): <https://miro.com/app/board/uXjVNBhy9os=/?moveToWidget=3458764573493028942&cot=14>
- Finding 7 (Maria): <https://miro.com/app/board/uXjVNBhy9os=/?moveToWidget=3458764573495050257&cot=14>
- Finding 8 (All): <https://miro.com/app/board/uXjVNBhy9os=/?moveToWidget=3458764573495345095&cot=14>

Finding 1 (Ronald)

The CSP as drafted aligned with V2040/the NDP, however V2040 was not actively used by the government Jul 17-Nov 21. Many interventions outlined in the original CSP did not go ahead due to major contextual changes and shifting priorities, but new interventions such as the PBLs were agreed and seen as highly relevant. Ultimately relevance was broadly maintained via alignment with government priorities as outlined in budget documents, individual sector strategies and/or high-level discussions with the government

Strategic Questions/Prompts	Recommendation Brainstorming			Criteria
	What can be done to address this finding?	Who is responsible?	Timeframe?	
How can the new CES be formulated to be more flexible/adaptable to changes in context and priorities?	Formulate a more flexible CES focusing more on outcomes and excluding specific costed interventions	CDB Management (Provide guidance)	Next quarter	Specific
In the Bahamas' political context, does it make sense outlining and costing specific interventions?	Whenever possible, align CES with political cycles.	CES team (CES design)	Next 2 quarters	Owned
Would mapping CES pillars and objectives to a broader framing (SDGs?) in addition to/instead of the NDP help to maintain relevance?	A combination of both SDGs and country development plan, however articulated, is optimal.			Realistic
				Timebound
	Priority:	H M L		

Finding 2 (Christopher)

Overall traction and sustainability of interventions is heavily reliant on strong ongoing engagement with in-country stakeholders. Most see CDB as having a comparative advantage over IDB and others in regional expertise, but this has not been well leveraged due to limited engagement. A lack of country presence is seen as a significant disadvantage over IDB which contributed to limited traction, including in cross-cutting areas such as gender.

Strategic Questions/Prompts	Recommendation Brainstorming			Criteria
	What can be done to address this finding?	Who is responsible?	Timeframe?	
How can CDB improve/increase engagement and thus better leverage its regional expertise advantage?	There has been consideration for the engagement and deployment of RIOs in certain country's. This could be something explored further for Bahamas	VPO	Q1 2024	Specific
Is having permanent presence a realistic option for CDB at this time, or is a pragmatic interim solution needed?	An interim solution could include a dedicated focal point within the Bank, including an agreed schedule for visits/updates/engagement.	Econ	Annually	Owned
Does engagement need to be ramped up/the CES actively reviewed at specific times, e.g. in response to change of government?	Yes, periodic CES 'missions', could be used to improve engagement at specific intervals. This should also be complemented by a communications plan to ensure all relevant stakeholders are informed/consulted on CES.			Realistic
				Timebound
	Priority:	H M L		

Finding 3 (Beverly)

There has been limited engagement by CDB with other donors, despite both CDB and IDB strategies outlining a need/will to engage. There is some overlap in donor support to specific sectors (e.g. governance, DRM, energy/streetlights) though this appears to be complementary rather than duplicative to date. Some sectors are currently only supported by one major donor (e.g. CDB in education; IDB in citizen security). UN-led donor engagement mechanisms do exist, with UN, IDB and Chinese government, (but so far no CDB) participation.

Strategic Questions/Prompts	Recommendation Brainstorming			Criteria
<p>Could CDB focus on any particular "niche" areas which currently receive less support and where CDB would be well suited support, in terms of sector, or in terms of type/size/location of support?</p> <p>In general, how can CDB better engage with other donors and so improve CSP relevance, coherence and thus traction?</p>	<p>What can be done to address this finding?</p> <p>There are niche sectors consistent with CDB's strategic objectives such as education, private sector development, infrastructure, renewable energy and climate resilience. These are also areas that other partners are working on.</p> <p>Engage them during the formulation of the CES and during implementation, through meetings, updates (via email) and launch of projects</p>	<p>Who is responsible?</p> <p>Economics and Projects Department</p> <p>Economics and projects department</p>	<p>Timeframe?</p> <p>3-6 months</p> <p>Ongoing over CES period, 3-5 years</p>	<p>Specific</p> <p>Owned</p> <p>Realistic</p> <p>Timebound</p>

Finding 4 (Paul)

Achievement against results as defined in the original CSP outcomes is limited, but this is largely due to poor alignment with the interventions that were ultimately supported in response to changing context and priorities. At a higher level, the interventions that did proceed can be seen to have made an important contribution to the CSP pillars of Improved Governance & Productivity; and Environmental Protection & Infrastructure Enhancement. The Inclusive Social Development pillar relied on education interventions, but delays to the BTVI project meant that CDB contribution to this pillar was minimal.

Strategic Questions/Prompts	Recommendation Brainstorming			Criteria
<p>How often should the overall Strategy and target outcomes be reviewed to ensure that they reflect changing needs/priorities?</p> <p>What kinds of mechanisms need to be put in place/improved to ensure that all CDB and in-country stakeholders are aware of and take ownership of the Strategy and its intended results, including any changes?</p>	<p>What can be done to address this finding?</p> <p>Reviewed in line with election cycles and after large contextual shifts e.g. natural disasters?</p> <p>Use the Results framework to provide updates on progress,</p> <p>Engage with government opposition as well to get their views and buy-in.</p>	<p>Who is responsible?</p>	<p>Timeframe?</p>	<p>Specific</p> <p>Owned</p> <p>Realistic</p> <p>Timebound</p>

Finding 5 (Andrea)

Overall sustainability of results is mixed. There are some positive examples of infrastructure projects being well designed to maximize longevity, but limited traction of TA has limited the likely sustainability of some interventions. Overall a need to build/support in-country capacity is seen as key, with in-country stakeholders particularly keen on ensuring that Bahamians are provided with the necessary support/capacity building to engage in, learn from and/or manage/implement CDB projects.

Strategic Questions/Prompts	Recommendation Brainstorming			Criteria
<p>In a context of high brain drain and political change, how can CDB modify and better publicize existing/planned capacity building/ institutional strengthening initiatives so that knowledge and skills of Bahamians are built and retained?</p>	<p>What can be done to address this finding?</p> <p>Scoping exercise at the beginning of election cycles.</p> <p>Type something</p>	<p>Who is responsible?</p>	<p>Timeframe?</p>	<p>Specific</p> <p>Owned</p> <p>Realistic</p> <p>Timebound</p>
	<p>Priority:</p> <p>H M L</p>			

Finding 6 (Douglas)

Some in-country stakeholders have a positive relationship with CDB counterparts, but many others expressed frustration with CDB processes and/or communication of processes. Many stakeholders felt these issues had contributed to significant delays and/or increased costs, and some stakeholders perceived CDB processes to be "worse" than IDB processes, despite close similarities in reality. From CDB /other donor perspective, limited in-country capacity and understanding of CDB/donor processes, plus political influence, contributes to these perceptions and delays.

Strategic Questions/Prompts	Recommendation Brainstorming			Criteria
<p>How can CDB ensure better in-country understanding of existing processes – is there opportunity to work with IDB in this area, given the similarities?</p> <p>Is there any scope for increased capacity within CDB to speed up response times/reduce bottlenecks where they do exist?</p> <p>What additional training/sensitization etc. is needed to ensure the new Bahamas procurement act is successfully operationalized?</p>	<p>What can be done to address this finding?</p> <p>If sufficient volume of projects consider a RIO.</p> <p>Regular portfolio reviews, better use of roster of consultants and joint training with IDB (as done in other countries)</p>	<p>Who is responsible?</p> <p>PD</p> <p>PD and Divisions/Units supervising projects, and PPU</p>	<p>Timeframe?</p> <p>Too early to establish</p> <p>2024 for PRs and design phase of</p>	<p>Specific</p> <p>Owned</p> <p>Realistic</p> <p>Timebound</p>
	<p>Priority:</p> <p>H M L</p>			

Annex E – Detailed Results Matrix for CSP Outcomes

The discussion on the achievement of RMF indicators below is based on data from the 2017–2021 CSP Completion Report, complemented with other data sources detailed in footnotes) sourced by the evaluation team. Where data could not be sourced for the specific RMF indicator or where the indicator was deemed not to reflect the outcome being assessed, other relevant data is considered to provide an assessment of progress.

Overall Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status January 2024
Pillar 1: Environmental Protection and Infrastructure				
CSP Outcome 1: Improved Access to Quality Climate-Resilient Infrastructure	2018–2022: Improved access for male and female-headed households to quality climate-resilient infrastructure	CSP 2013–2017: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 100% of investment projects using appropriate tools to effectively address environment, CC, EE, and DRMe o appropriate tools to effectively address environment, CC, EE, and DRM. o <i>Partially achieved – Evidence from CDB-supported projects, environment, CC, EE, and DRM considerations are generally part of project design and (to a more limited extent) implementation. However, monitoring systems still need to be fine-tuned</i> CSP 2018–2022: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 50% increased access to pipe-borne water o 2019 figures show that 98.89% of the population has access to clean drinking water^{xvii} o Mortality rate attributed to unsafe water, unsafe sanitation and lack of hygiene (per 100,000 population) was 2.6^{xviii} 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2013–2017 Water Supply Improvement Project <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - delayed but in progress • Climate Resilience of The Water Sector (GCF) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - delayed but in progress • National Workshop in Improved Practices for the Construction of Houses <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Complete • Glass Window Bridge Project (North Eleuthera) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not implemented³⁰ • Family Islands Infrastructure (Roads and Bridges) Upgrade <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not implemented • Geomatics Capacity Enhancement Project 	Partially Achieved Given the available indicators, it is likely that the overall outcome has been achieved to a certain extent. While the impact of Hurricane Dorian was felt, it reinforced the importance of building back better and the need for more resilient infrastructure and capacity. Unfortunately, due to COVID-19 and the hurricane, progress has occurred at a slower rate than expected CDB Contribution, some Both water projects contributed significantly to bringing reliable access to water, especially in rural areas. The national workshop for improved housing construction helped develop the adoption of sustainable
	2018–2022: Strengthened environmental management			
	2018–2022: Environmentally sustainable infrastructure			

³⁰ Although KIIs indicated it is now starting to get some traction.

Overall Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status January 2024
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 30% increased access to climate-resilient road infrastructure. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o While this figure has not been directly measured, there have been several sustainable road infrastructure projects (totalling over 30 million USD) which have been completed, such as the Abaco Bridge, the sea wall at Bayshore Road, the Fishing Hole Road Bridge, and the repair and new construction of Seawalls in Grand Bahama^{xviii} - Improved geospatial planning capabilities for all projects <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Indicator not measured. KII data highlights cases with recorded efforts from project leads to roll out projects in an equitable manner,^{xcix} such as streetlights being installed in areas of different affluence, and water improvement projects focusing on who needs it the most (rural areas) - Number of successful project proposals developed for submission to GCF (Baseline, 2017: 0. Target, 2021: 2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Indicator not measured/available - Percentage of persons certified in physical planning and DRM training (Baseline, 2017: 2%. Target, 2021: 80%) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Data not available. ough, 2021 National Disaster Preparedness Baseline Assessment found that DRM lacks capacity development plans and strategies, limited training and education programs and facilities, no formal certification program, and no capacity monitoring and evaluation process/system currently in place.²⁹ 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not implemented • Support for capacity-building to access climate financing <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not implemented • Implementation of geomatics capacity enhancement for physical planning and DRM <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not implemented • Support for assessing water resources, developing a water resources master plan, a water tariff study, and building resilience of water infrastructure <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Not implemented 	building codes into practice. However, several infrastructure projects were not implemented, and TA on the environmental side was, in some cases, tokenistic

Appears to be missing text

Overall Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status January 2024
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Percentage of water-related projects developed according to the Water Master Plan (Baseline, 2017: 0. Target, 2021: 50%) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Indicator not measured/available - Percentage of water-related projects using key recommendations from the Water Tariff Study (Baseline, 2017: 0. Target, 2021: 1) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Indicator not measured/available 		
CSP Outcome 2: Increased EE and RE Options	2018–2022: Strengthened capacity and improved communication within GOCB for implementing RE and EE projects	CSP 2018–2022 KPIs: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - EE programmes developed for the public and private sectors. (Baseline (2018): 0, Target (2022): 2) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o The Caribbean Centre for Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency (CCREEE) signed an agreement with the Government of The Bahamas on August 22, 2023, to develop an integrated resource and resilience plan (IRRP) that will help improve the country's national energy policy and capitalise on renewable energy sources throughout the island^c - Contribution of RE to energy supply mix (Baseline (2018): 1%, Target (2022): > 5%) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o <i>Improvement, but target likely not achieved- – RE contribution of approximately 1.3% of energy within The Bahamas in 2021^{ci}</i> o <i>KII responses also highlighted that 100% of main electricity grid is still powered by fossil fuel</i> - Reduction in energy intensity in public sector (Baseline (2018): 0%, Target (2022): >5%) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o No available data. However, streetlights project data in 2023 indicates 15,005 MWh annual savings in 2023, 12746 tonnes of Carbon dioxide emissions reduced - Plan for implementation of EE and RE in the Family Islands (Baseline (2018): 0., Target (2022): 1) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Streetlights Programme (New Providence) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>In progress but mostly complete. Looking to reallocate funds for installation in Family Islands</i> • TA for capacity support – convening of TDEP for elaboration of the Sustainable Energy Plan for the Family Island – with a focus on increased resilience <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Not implemented</i> • TA for capacity support in conducting energy audits/RE assessments and development of a public sector EE programme <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Not implemented</i> • Capital projects for RE and supporting micro-/mini grids in the Family Island, and strengthening the grid <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Not implemented</i> 	<p>Partly achieved: when assessed against the RMF, it is apparent that they have not been met. There has been more progress in improving energy efficiency, but a more diversified energy mix is still required. There has been progress in the overall objectives to a certain extent.</p> <p>CDB contribution: Some</p> <p>Overall, there is clear evidence of CDB contributing to improved EE on New Providence, although the contribution from the streetlights project was less than planned as, ultimately, CDB funds were not used to procure the actual LEDs. Other donor partners (Chinese government) have also contributed to EE through the installation of solar LED streetlights on some Family Islands</p>
	2018–2022: Increased contribution of RE to electricity supply mix			
	2018–2022: Improved EE in public- and private-sector facilities			
	2018–2022: Strengthened and improved resilience of the grid in selected Family Islands			

Overall Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status January 2024
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> An Initiative to Develop Solar Energy Microgrids Across the Family Islands Launched, but this was in December 2023^{cii} 		
PBL Outcome: Improved Frameworks, Enhanced Risk Identification and Increased Access to Disaster Recovery Financing	2018–2022 PBL 1 and PBL 2 Pillar 2: Enhanced natural disaster resilience	<p>PBL 1 and PBL 2 Outcome 2: Improving institutional coordination and planning:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved institutional coordination of the actions of DRM agencies (PBL 1 & 2 Prior Action 4: MDPMR established, staffed) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Completed (New ministry established 2019)</i> Strengthened legislative environment for disaster recovery (PBL 1 Prior Action 5: Enactment of the Disaster Preparedness and Response (Amendments) Act, 2019) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Completed (Enacted Nov 2019)</i> Improved technical capacity and service delivery at NEMA (PBL 2 Prior Action 5: Plan of action established for institutional reforms towards a more responsive and effective NEMA) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Completed (NEMA restructured, plan of action established)</i> Improved environmental policy framework (PBL 2 Prior Action 6: EPPA, 2019, passed in Parliament to allow for better integration of environmental considerations in the development planning process and maintain the protective functions of coastal and marine ecosystems) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Completed</i> <p>PBL 1 and PBL 2 Outcome 3: Building physical resilience to coastal hazards:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Improved DRM Planning (PBL 1 Prior Action 6: CDRMP approved by Cabinet) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Completed (CDRMP approved by Cabinet in June 2018)</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> First Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Complete</i> Second Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL with Supplementary Financing for COVID-19 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Complete</i> Disaster Management Emergency Relief Grant – Hurricane Dorian (2019) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <i>Complete</i> 	<p>Achieved</p> <p>Results against the RMF show that all the proposed indicators were met. The Bahamas has made good progress in improving the resilience of disaster preparedness through institution reform and policy development</p> <p>Contribution: Significant Contribution</p> <p>Both BPLs were instrumental in the development of policy and the institutional reform that has taken place. Moreover, the relief grant was also useful for immediate relief after Hurricane Dorian. The contribution, however, has come not only from CDB but also from other actors. The IDB, for example, has been working closely with the GOCB and has recently approved a US\$160 million loan to The Bahamas for policy reforms to improve its natural disaster risk governance^{ciii}</p>

Overall Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status January 2024
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improved scientific measurement and risk identification (PBL 1 Prior Action 7: Draft Disaster Risk Profile completed) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Completed</i> (Draft Disaster Risk Profile completed in November 2019 and scheduled to be approved by Cabinet in January 2020) - Improved coastal management practices (PBL 2 Prior Action 7: Cabinet approval of The Bahamas Climate-Resilient Coastal Infrastructure Management Programme (CRCIMP) Annual Operating Plan (AOP), outlining improvements in coastal protection and institutional capacity for coastal management) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o <i>Completed</i> - Improved coastal management practices (PBL 2 Prior Action 8: Cabinet approval of the Disaster Risk Profile for improved planning and evidence-based decision-making) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o <i>Completed</i> <p><i>PBL 1 and PBL 2 Outcome 4: Increasing access to finance for natural disaster recovery:</i></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Improved coastal management practices (PBL 1 Prior Action 8: Preliminary draft of Disaster Relief and Resilience Fund Bill completed) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Completed</i> - Improved coastal management practices (PBL 1 Prior Action 9: Parliament approval of a contingent credit facility for high-impact natural disaster events) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Completed</i> (Contingent Credit Facility approved by Parliament in June 2018, with subsequent post-Hurricane Dorian disbursement of US\$25 mn in October 2019) - Improved insurance coverage for high-impact natural disasters (PBL 1 Prior Action 10: Renewal of CCRIF SPC insurance facility for FY 2019/20) 		

Overall Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status January 2024
		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Completed (CCRIF SPC insurance policy renewed for FY 2019/20)</i> - Increased access to immediate financial resources for post-recovery needs (PBL 2 Prior Action 9: The necessary steps taken by GOCB to renew coverage under the CCRIF SPC Insurance facility and make premium payments for FY 2020/21) - <i>Completed</i> 		
Pillar 2: Inclusive Social Development				
CSP Outcome 3: Enhanced Educational Outcomes	2013–2017: Enhanced access to quality and demand-driven post-secondary and tertiary education	CSP 2017–2021: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 5% increase in students writing at least one TVET subject at either CSEC or Caribbean Vocational Qualification by 2021 – No data available - Degree student enrolment (full-time equivalent) at the College of The Bahamas (COB) increased by at least 10% relative to the 2012 baseline enrolment of 3,106 - 80% increase in the number of trainees completing post-secondary career technical education (CTE) programmes annually, relative to the baseline average of 800 in 2011 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2017–2021: Bahamas Technical and Vocational Institute (BTVI) Enhancement Project <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Delayed but in progress</i> • Bahamas Education Sector Transformation Project (BEST) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Delayed, only recently started</i> • Project to expand access to competency-based/industry-approved and ICT-enabled skills training for industry practitioners, uncertified workers, graduates of secondary schools, and out-of-school youth and adults <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Not implemented</i> • Project to support expanded access to quality ECD provision and appropriate early stimulation, including improved monitoring of ECD standards and training of service providers 	Not achieved: Review of (limited) available evidence against RMF indicators and other available public data, it appears there has been limited progress in enhancement of educational quality and that expected results have not been achieved, given the impact of COVID-19 lockdowns that The Bahamas has likely suffered. ^{cv} CDB contribution: Limited – Due to delays in implementing both projects, there has been minimal to no contribution from CDB.
	2018–2022: An expanded supply of certified, skilled and employable male and female labour	CSP 2018–2022: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 80% of male and female TVET participants graduated – reportedly 63% in 2021 - 80% of employers satisfied with the quality of male and female graduates of skills development programmes – no data 		
	2018–2022: Increased share of children receiving high-quality early childhood education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Net enrolment rate in pre-primary increased (Baseline (2017): 35%, Target (2023): 50%) – no data - Graduation rate for secondary school male and female students increased (Baseline (2016): 50%, Target (2023): 65%) – Reportedly 60% in 2019^{civ} 		

Overall Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status January 2024
			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Not implemented</i> • Project to support teacher effectiveness with emphasis on maximising technology integration, professional development, and an enhanced accountability framework for teaching and learning - <i>Not implemented</i> 	
PBL Outcome: A more responsive public policy to the global pandemic	2018–2022 PBL 2 Pillar 3 – Strengthened Immediate Response in the Health and Micro, Small and Medium-sized Enterprise sectors related to the COVID-19 pandemic	<p>PBL 2 Outcome: A more responsive public policy to the global pandemic</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Increased allocation of resources for COVID-19 health response, which better prepared the health system to respond to the ongoing crisis (PBL 2 Prior Action 10: Increased spending for COVID-19 health-related expenditure for FY 2020/2021) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>Completed</i> - Improved liquidity to sustain small businesses in the short term (PBL 2 Prior Action 11: Grant tax relief (a combination of value-added tax (VAT) and Business Licence tax credit) and tax deferral to provide operational liquidity support for small businesses and encourage continuation of employment) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ <i>Completed</i> - Increased access to temporary financial assistance for unemployed and poor households due to disruptions caused by COVID-19 (PBL 2 Prior Action 12: Increase social spending to provide unemployment) and social assistance to unemployed workers and poor households in response to the COVID-19 pandemic <p><i>Completed</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Complete</i> • Second Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL with Supplementary Financing for COVID-19 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Complete</i> 	<p>Achieved:</p> <p>Overall, the loan met its objective, helping boost liquidity and support social protection to mitigate the adverse effects of the pandemic. This enabled the GOCB to deal better with the impacts of a drop in tourism and employ stronger fiscal measures to support the MSME sector.</p> <p>CDB Contribution: Significant.</p> <p>Responses from KII reinforced the importance and utility of the PBL, giving the GOCB the necessary funds to better deal with the impact of both Hurricane Dorian and the pandemic. The development of the pandemic response was also supplemented by other actors, such as the World Bank, which approved US\$100 million for The Bahamas' COVID-19 Response and Recovery^{evi}</p>
Pillar 3: Improved Governance and Productivity				

Overall Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status January 2024
CSP Outcome 4: Improved governance	<p>2018–2022: Improved technical capacity to develop national policies, improved procurement regulations and procurement capacity, and improved technical skills regarding project management and implementation</p>	<p>CSP 2017–2021. Percentage increase in programmes and projects applying PPAM and PCM by 2021</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Not measured/no data</i> <p>CSP 2018–2022: 30% of national and/or sector policies developed with M&E systems in place</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>No data/not measured</i> <p>While no specific data against the RMF indicators was available for the evaluation, there is evidence that attendees considered PPAM and PCM training valuable.^{cvi} Furthermore, there is evidence that procurement regulations have been improved/developed and that there have been increased efforts to monitor PMDU priority areas via annual reporting. The enactment of various pieces of legislation, such as the FRA and the DRA Act, also indicate progress in this area</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • PPAM and PCAM Training <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Complete</i> • Strengthening the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit to Support Reconstruction & Recovery <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>In progress</i> • TA – Consultancy Services to Support Institutional Strengthening – Delivery Unit <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>In progress</i> • First Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Complete</i> • Second Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL with Supplementary Financing for COVID-19 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Complete</i> 	<p>Partially achieved</p> <p>Although the lack of RMF data makes assessment of progress challenging, overall, it is plausible that there have been some improvements in public sector governance</p> <p>CDB Contribution: Significant</p> <p>PBLs and the PPAM/PCAM support were valuable for developing a more robust public and private procurement legislation and disaster preparedness strategy. PMDU support was seen as something of benefit and helped to develop more robust strategic planning. Important to note that other actors, such as the IDB, were also working in this area and providing significant contributions^{cix}</p>
CSP Outcome 5: Increased Productivity, Competitiveness and Economic Diversification.	<p>2018–2022: Enhanced capacity of BDB to deliver services to targeted MSMEs</p>	<p>CSP 2018–2022: Increased BDB capacity to address MSME financing issue</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>No RMF indicator. Evidence from KIIs supports the utility of work with BDB. Work has resulted in new partnerships (Trinidadian Equity Group), while training on strategy has helped develop a more robust strategic plan, so BDB capacity appears to have increased^{cx}</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Creative Industries Support (Orange Loan) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Complete</i> 	<p>Partly achieved: While BDB capacity appears to have increased, no evidence was made available/could be found on the overall availability of services to MSMEs; hence, it is rated as partially achieved. It is also unclear to what extent the creative industry has benefited in real terms.</p> <p>CDB Contribution: Some – Support for BDB has helped them to connect with an equity provider in Trinidad and Tobago and, thus, ultimately, to set up a creative</p>
	<p>2018–2022: Improved capacity</p>	<p>CSP 2018–2022: Increased number of</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enhancing the National Quality Infrastructure of The Bahamas 	

Overall Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status January 2024
	of BSOs to deliver services to MSMEs	MSMEs receiving TA from BSOs. <i>Baseline (2016): 0%. Target (2021): 20% No data available/not measured</i>	through Establishment of the Metrology Laboratory (<i>In progress</i>)	industries loan scheme. ^{exi} The quality of the materials provided under the Orange Loan support was lower than expected/hoped, and there was a perception that it should have been more tailored to The Bahamas context. Nevertheless, the support was still seen as valuable, and the overall relationship with CDB was seen as highly beneficial
PBL Outcome: Strengthened Fiscal Management	2018–2022 PBL 1 and PBL 2 – Pillar 1: Restored fiscal sustainability and responsibility	<p>PBL 1 & 2 Outcome 1: Strengthening fiscal management:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Strengthened Fiscal Legislative framework to improve fiscal discipline (PBL1 Prior action 1: Enactment of FRA, 2018) – achieved - Enhanced Accountability of Public Finances (PBL 1 Prior action 2: The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is established and staffed according to the requirements of FRA) – achieved - Improved Fiscal transparency and reporting (PBL 1 Prior action 3: Cabinet approval of post-hurricane FAP) – achieved - Improved Fiscal Governance (PBL 2 Prior action 1: New PFM Bill, 2020, drafted and approved by Cabinet aimed at promoting transparency and accountability regarding the allocation and use of public funds) – achieved - Improved management of public debt and guarantees (PBL 2 Prior Action 2: PDM Bill, 2020, drafted and approved by Cabinet geared towards modernising and guiding GOCB's borrowing policies and debt management operations) – achieved - Strengthened procurement system (PBL 2 Prior Action 3: Draft Procurement Bill, 2020, approved by Cabinet to ensure that the Government procurement process is transparent, equitable, competitive, and cost-effective) – achieved - The Bahamas' debt-to-GDP ratio was 60.3% in 2019 (prior to COVID-19 and Hurricane Dorian). Rose to a high of 100% in 2021 after Hurricane Dorian and COVID-19, but since then, it 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • First Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Complete</i> • Second Programmatic Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building PBL with Supplementary Financing for COVID-19 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Complete</i> • PPAM and PCAM training <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - <i>Complete</i> 	<p>Achieved</p> <p>While debt levels have increased since the start of the CSP, this is due to the impact of Hurricane Dorian and COVID-19. Debt levels were on a downward trajectory before these impacts and have started to decline again since 2021. This, plus specific actions achieved under the PBL (and by other IDPs), indicates that fiscal management in The Bahamas has indeed been strengthened since 2018.</p> <p>CDB Contribution: Significant Parts of both PBLs played an important role in stabilising debt and providing extra capacity after Hurricane Dorian and COVID-19. CDB support was instrumental in developing The Bahamas Public Procurement Act and is looking to work more with GOCB to develop training, portals and policy around procurement. It is also important to note, however, significant contributions from other actors, including \$100m from the IDB^{exiii} and UNDP support^{exiv}</p>

Overall Outcome	Sector Outcome	RMF Indicators	CSP Programming	Status January 2024
		has fallen to 84.2% in 2023 and is expected to fall to 83.7% in 2024 ^{exii}		



Complete/
Fully achieved



Ongoing/
Partly
achieved




Very limited
or no
achievement/
progress



Did not
proceed/ not
assessed

Annex F – Detailed CSP Traction Timeline

CDB CSP 2018-22 planned support mapped against evolving government priorities 2016 - 2022



Annex G – Endnote Bibliography

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* Indicates that this outcome was also reflected to some extent in the 2014–16 CSP

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^{lxi} Caribbean Development Bank (2022) Implementation Completion Report Policy-Based Operation; Caribbean Development Bank (2020) Staff Report: Second Fiscal Stability and Resilience Building Policy-Based Loan with Supplemental Financing for the Coronavirus Disease 2019 The Commonwealth of The Bahamas

^{lxii} Budget communications over the period make no reference to the NDP, and several key informants confirmed it was not actively used as a framework by the government over this period

^{lxiii} Government of The Bahamas (2018), 2018/19 Budget Communication; Government of The Bahamas (2019), 2019/20 Budget Communication; Government of The Bahamas (2020), Hurricane Dorian Supplementary Budget; Government of The Bahamas (2021), 2021/22 Budget Communication; Progressive Liberal Party (2021), Manifesto for Change

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^{lxix} GCF, 2020, ‘Climate Resilience of the Water Sector in The Bahamas – Project Preparation Funding Application’. Bahamas Technical and Vocational Training Institute (November 2019 to October 2023) BTVI Enhancement Project Briefing Notes

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