CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

HAITI COUNTRY STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME EVALUATION
2007 – 2015
WITH MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

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OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT EVALUATION
MARCH 2019
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2007 – 2015

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE
RECOMMENDATION 1: CDB should review and update the results framework for its Haiti Country Strategy at an appropriate interval over the CS cycle. The review should emphasise focused and realistic outcome statements, indicators, risks and assumptions, so that the framework can be used to manage and report on the Bank’s overall engagement.

1.1 After discussions between Corporate Strategy and the Office of Independent Evaluation, and consultation with the Vice President - Operations, an approach to refining the Results Monitoring Framework (RMF) for the Haiti CSP was agreed. The intent was to make the RMF more evaluable. CDB then contracted a consultant, to assist members of the Haiti Country Strategy Team with revising the framework. The consultant prepared a report that assessed the RMF and recommended refinement, particularly with respect to modifying the indicators to make the RMF more evaluable. A workshop with the Haiti country team was conducted, as well as follow up with sector leads. Some of the planned sector interventions, and their expected results, are now being defined in more detail, and will be used to update the CSP RMF once complete.

RECOMMENDATION 2: CDB should ensure that its approach to project design, and level of effort in supervision, are commensurate with the challenges of programming in Haiti.

2.1 In a fragile context, project design must be supported by a robust theory of change that fully accounts for the complexities of the local and national context. CDB’s emerging experience in the TVET sector illustrates some of these complexities. To get regional centres built involved significant land suitability and engineering hurdles being overcome initially. Then there were questions of whether training to be delivered would be suited to the current labour market. Curriculum redesign in turn raised issues of how to appropriately equip classrooms. Links to the private sector, to both influence curriculum and place trainees were not strong. The policy and regulatory environment for the sector has taken time to put in place, and may not yet be achieving the desired effect. These challenges have carried over into problems of employability upon graduation. Some NGOs have found that without taking a multiple intervention approach with specific individuals, it is difficult to break the cycle of poverty and vulnerability. All this to say that cookie cutter designs that make unwarranted assumptions about enabling environments are unlikely to succeed in Haiti. As projects are now starting under the new CSP, it is a good time to closely examine their theories of change and make necessary refinements.

2.2 Management agrees with this finding and CDB’s approach to project design in Haiti, a fragile state, is evolving based on experiences and lessons learnt. This will be based on:

2.2.1 The adoption of a more holistic approach to project design which, in addition to proposing solutions to the main issues identified, will also take into account secondary considerations which are particular/unique to Haiti.

2.2.2 An analysis of the social and physical environment in Haiti to better understand the socioeconomic setting and processes (e.g. Situation analyses, data collection, trend analyses, analyses of governance procedures, emerging phenomena, etc.)

2.2.3 Support of design interventions that are better adapted to the local situation & environment, by working in close collaboration with development partners, sectoral groups, and other stakeholders in Haiti, to better understand the needs; and in so doing:
2.2.3.1 Make realistic assumptions about local conditions;

2.2.3.2 Capitalise on best practices, adapting them to the context of a fragile state;

2.2.3.3 Foster dialogue between Project Supervisors, Procurement Department and CDB-HCO, to facilitate smoother project implementation; and

2.2.3.4 Promote CDB-HCO support in the design / implementation / monitoring evaluation of projects.

2.3 With respect to project supervision, the evaluation team observed that to date it had been managed with relatively infrequent visits. While this is acceptable when other agencies (such as WB and IDB) have taken the lead in supervising a project and then relay to CDB any issues emerging during implementation, it is not likely to be adequate when CDB is implementing projects on its own. Supervision will be needed at a frequency that CDB has not previously experienced, perhaps even every quarter, to ensure that necessary corrective measures happen expeditiously. Consideration will also be needed of what role the country office will play in these efforts (see next).

2.4 Management concurs with this recommendation and has taken steps to scale up Implementation Support by:

2.4.1 Increasing the number of supervision missions by Project Supervisors for each project;

2.4.2 Providing HCO support during, and in-between, supervision missions to improve the quality and timeliness of project implementation. This is being done by facilitating meetings with, and between, HQ Project Supervisors, Project Units, and local stakeholders.

RECOMMENDATION 3: CDB should take full advantage of its new Haiti Country Office, by formally setting out its mandate, responsibilities, and authorities in a way that maximizes its contribution to in-country coordination (with other international partners and the GoH), and to achievement of expected development results.

3.1 CDB’s new Haiti country office has been universally welcomed by international and Haitian authorities. For the latter in particular, there is a view that as an institution of the region, CDB can achieve a special understanding and affinity with Haitian aspirations, including facilitating its greater integration in the Caribbean region.

3.2 Other multilateral and bilateral donors and major NGOs in Haiti have well staffed country offices that play a strong role in planning and managing their programmes, coordinating with others, and working with the GoH. There are various sector coordination structures in place that are intended to facilitate harmonisation, although it was reported to the evaluation team that not all of these have so far been effective in practice.

3.3 There is an opportunity for CDB’s country office to play a meaningful role within this architecture, and to actively develop and communicate the deep understanding of local context that will enable the success of Bank interventions. It will have to be clearly tasked and mandated to do so however, with specific expectations of its contribution to facilitation of Country Strategy objectives. This will involve careful delineation of its relationship with HQ teams, and of the extent to which it can speak with authority on project issues during in-country coordination processes.
3.4 The management of CDB agrees with this recommendation. Taking advantage of an in-country presence was the impetus for establishing the Haiti Country Office (HCO).

3.5 The following actions have been mandated by CDB management to HCO:

3.5.1 Participation in policy dialogue in Haiti;

3.5.2 Building / strengthening partnerships, developing closer relationships and facilitating information sharing with GOH, development partners and other stakeholders;

3.5.3 Improving communication with, and responsiveness to, various stakeholders;

3.5.4 Participating in working and discussion groups in the relevant national priority sectors.

Based on in-country intelligence gathered and extensive consultations with stakeholders, CDB is now finalising an Operations Manual for HCO. This is expected to be completed by Q2, 2019.
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE AUTHORISED

CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

HAITI COUNTRY STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME EVALUATION
2007 – 2015

EVALUATION REPORT
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation was undertaken in two phases. In 2016, Mr. Mark Clayton and Ms. Valerie from the Office of Independent Evaluation (OIE); together with Ms. Isabelle Fortin, Ms. Cécile Bérut, Ms. Nathalie Brisson-Lamaute, and Ms. Jeannie Claude-Zaugg undertook an in-country mission and prepared a draft findings report. Their efforts on a challenging assignment are acknowledged.

Building on this initial work, Ms. Marie-Hélène Adrien of Universalia Management and I undertook further in-country data gathering in October of 2018. Ms. Adrien collated and analysed the additional data into the findings reflected in this report, and we jointly prepared the summary, conclusions, and recommendations.

We would like to thank the numerous staff members who were interviewed and helped with data provision for this report, and especially those who participated in a workshop to review the results framework for the new CSP (2017-2021). Mrs. Denise Padmore of OIE assisted with document gathering and other arrangements.

The staff of the Caribbean Development Bank’s new Country Office in Port-au-Prince, made an exceptional effort to facilitate our mission, and to share their growing knowledge of local context and key interlocutors. Our thanks to Mr. Stephen Lawrence, Mr. Daniel Altine, and Ms. Alia Bricourt.

James Melanson
Head, Office of Independent Evaluation
### ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>BMC</td>
<td>Borrowing Member Country</td>
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<tr>
<td>BMPAD</td>
<td>Bureau de Monétisation des Projets de Développement (Office of Monetization of Development Aid Programmes)</td>
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<td>BOD</td>
<td>Board of Directors</td>
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<tr>
<td>CADEC</td>
<td>Conseil d’Appui au Développement Communautaire (Community Development Support Council)</td>
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<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community-Based Organization</td>
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<td>CCRIF</td>
<td>Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Fund</td>
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<td>CDB</td>
<td>Caribbean Development Bank</td>
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<td>CDD</td>
<td>Community-Driven Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CECI</td>
<td>Centre D’étude et de Coopération Internationale (Center for International Studies and Cooperation)</td>
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<td>CIDA</td>
<td>Canadian International Development Agency</td>
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<td>CSME</td>
<td>CARICOM Single Market and Economy</td>
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<td>CSP</td>
<td>Country Strategy Paper</td>
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<td>CSPE</td>
<td>Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation</td>
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<td>CTCS</td>
<td>Caribbean Technology Consultancy Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAEPP</td>
<td>Direction d'appui à l'enseignement privé et du partenariat (Support for Private Education and Partnerships)</td>
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<td>DDE</td>
<td>Directions départementales de l'éducation (Regional Departments of Education)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DNEPA</td>
<td>Direction Nationale de l’Eau Potable et de l’Assainissement (Haiti’s Water and Sanitation Directorate)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DRM</td>
<td>Disaster Risk Management</td>
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<td>DSNCRP</td>
<td>Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté (National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction Paper)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECD</td>
<td>Early Childhood Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>EDH</td>
<td>Électricité d’Haiti (Haiti’s National Electricity Company)</td>
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<td>EFA</td>
<td>Education for All</td>
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<tr>
<td>ENAF</td>
<td>École Nationale d’Administration Financière (National School of Financial Administration)</td>
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<td>EPA</td>
<td>EU-Caribbean Economic Partnership Agreement</td>
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<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GOH</td>
<td>Government of Haiti</td>
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<td>GPE</td>
<td>Global Partnership for Education</td>
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<td>HDI</td>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
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<td>ICR</td>
<td>Implementation Completion Report</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>Information and Communication Technologies</td>
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<td>IDB</td>
<td>Inter-American Development Bank</td>
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<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<td>INFP</td>
<td>Institut National de Formation Professionnelle (National Vocational Training Institute)</td>
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<td>MARNDR</td>
<td>Ministère de l’Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural (Haiti’s Agriculture Ministry)</td>
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<td>MDB</td>
<td>Multilateral Development Bank</td>
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<td>MEF</td>
<td>Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances (Haiti’s Finance Ministry)</td>
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<td>MENFP</td>
<td>Ministère de l’Éducation Nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle (Haiti’s Education Ministry)</td>
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<td>MICT</td>
<td>Ministère de l’Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales (Haiti’s Interior Ministry)</td>
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<td>MPCE</td>
<td>Ministère de la Planification et de la Coopération Externe (Haiti’s Planning Ministry)</td>
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<tr>
<td>MSME</td>
<td>Micro, Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises</td>
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<td>MSPP</td>
<td>Ministère de la Santé Publique et de la Population (Haiti’s Health Ministry)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ONAPE</td>
<td>Office National de Partenariat en Éducation (National Education Partnership Office)</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGOs</td>
<td>Non-Governmental Organizations</td>
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<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OIE</td>
<td>Office of Independent Evaluation</td>
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<td>PADF</td>
<td>Pan American Development Foundation</td>
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<td>PBG</td>
<td>Policy-Based Grant</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCR</td>
<td>Project Completion Report</td>
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<td>PCU</td>
<td>Project Coordination Unit</td>
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<td>PRGF</td>
<td>Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRODEP</td>
<td>Projet de Développement Participatif (Participatory Community Development Project)</td>
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<td>PRODEPUR</td>
<td>Projet national de développement communautaire participatif en milieu urbain (Community Participation Development Project in Urban Areas)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSDH</td>
<td>Plan Stratégique de Développement d’Haïti (Strategic Plan for the Development of Haiti)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSGU</td>
<td>Programme de Scolarisation Gratuite et Universelle (Free Universal Education Programme)</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSR</td>
<td>Project Supervision Report</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Special Development Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small and medium-sized enterprises</td>
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<td><strong>SOFIHDES</strong></td>
<td>Société Financière Haïtienne de Développement</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TA</strong></td>
<td>Technical Assistance</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>TVET</strong></td>
<td>Technical and Vocational Education and Training</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>USD</strong></td>
<td>United States dollar</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>WB</strong></td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction


The evaluation was conducted in two phases and by two distinct teams. The first phase (2015-2016) resulted in a draft findings report. The second phase (June to November 2018) built on the first through additional data collection to validate, triangulate, and complement. This was used for further analysis of performance during the review period, as well as a narrative update on results achieved after 2015 wherever data were available.

Methodology

The evaluation addresses CDB operations in Haiti under the Country Strategies for 2009-2012 and 2013-2016, reviewing the portfolio of projects operational during the period.

Data were collected using: extensive document review; interviews with 61 individuals representing CDB, the GOH, donor agencies and civil society representatives; and country visits to Haiti in March 2016 by a team of four experts, and in October 2018 by an independent evaluator and the Head of the Office of Independent Evaluation (OIE).

There were several limitations to the evaluation, including: the lack of clear alignment between indicators in the CSP results frameworks and indicators in project results frameworks; data gaps in project information provided by the GOH and CDB and some questions about the reliability of data; and high turnover in key stakeholders in Haiti’s Ministry of Education. Finally, the fact that this evaluation was conducted in two phases and with two teams was a limitation but also an opportunity, as the two-year gap between evaluation visits allowed the second team to follow-up on CDB activities that had not been completed in 2015.

Findings – Relevance

Overall, the strategic objectives and proposed interventions of the CSP 2009-2012 and CSP 2013-2016 were well aligned with the SDF 7 and SDF 8 themes and directions. Both of the CSPs supported the priorities developed by the GOH in 2007 and revisited after the 2010 earthquake.

Although its project areas in Haiti were highly impacted by the 2010 earthquake, CDB maintained its focus and demonstrated significant flexibility to adapt and reallocate funds as deemed necessary by GOH. In addition to the relevance of its programming, the recent presence of the CDB as a financial and technical partner in Haiti is seen by the GOH as highly relevant.

Findings – Effectiveness

CDB supported several components of the Education for All (EFA) project. The Primary Education Student and School Subsidies component is reported to have surpassed its originally planned outputs. However, questions arose concerning the targeting and administration of the subsidies. The Pre-Service Teacher Professional Development component aimed at increasing the number of teachers at the primary level. Despite training the targeted number of teachers, very few were actually placed in classrooms.

To improve the quality of education, CDB provided support for two EFA activities. The Student Nutrition and Health Programme, a school feeding programme, is reported to have reached a very large number of
children, but the validity of the data provided by MENFP remains problematic. The Literacy component reached its output targets, but no outcome results were available.

CDB provided capacity building support and equipment to MENFP as part of its attempt to improve the governance of the system, but there is no evidence of changes in the capacity of the MENFP, nor any evidence of improved governance.

In Technical and Vocational Education and Training, the Bank’s project design was modified following the earthquake to take into account the destruction of infrastructure in the sector and emerging needs and requests from GOH. Three TVET centres were completely rebuilt. CDB also financed studies on TVET centre prototype design and youth employability. CDB’s support in the TVET sector is seen as extremely important by GOH in light of the CARICOM Single Market and Economy (CSME) and the exit of other donors.

CDB invested in two Community-Driven Development (CDD) and Agriculture projects: PRODEP and PRODEPUR. In both projects, the Project Coordination Units underperformed. However, PRODEPUR surpassed its output targets and fostered synergies between communities, and the PRODEP project demonstrated good results in two of its components. There are nonetheless concerns about the quality and sustainability of outputs.

CDB supported technical assistance activities for public-sector capacity building and support to micro, small and medium-sized enterprises (MSME) through the Caribbean Technology Consultancy Services (CTCS). Available information suggests that the TA interventions were implemented with the appropriate target groups, were generally well received, and are leading to expected changes.

With respect to resilience, although CDB has paid Haiti’s insurance premiums to the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCRIF) since May 2013, CDB’s support for resilience remains otherwise hard to assess due to lack of evidence.

During the period 2007-2015, CDB’s overall portfolio was not managed through a gender lens, but there are recent indications of better support for gender equality initiatives.

Findings – Management and Efficiency

Given its lack of in-country presence over the review period, CDB’s decision to implement projects in collaboration with agencies that were on the ground in Haiti was a smart move that supported the efficiency of its programmes. CDB’s project management benefitted from the systems of other partners such as the WB and IDB. The Bank still manages by outputs rather than outcomes, and its monitoring and evaluation were weak for several reasons: lack of baseline data; data gaps due to the earthquake, and monitoring systems that were not always compatible.

Findings – Sustainability

While access to basic education in Haiti has improved significantly and has been sustained over the past decade, the quality of education remains a huge challenge and there is no sign of any sustainable improvement. In the TVET sector, the new prototype designs for vocational centres are being used and are considered sustainable.

Overall, CDD projects relied on the participation of local communities and grassroots community organizations, and therefore had an impact on local capacity building and autonomy. However, long-term
impact cannot be assured and is threatened by GOH’s lack of involvement and project dependency on the international community.

In capacity building and resilience, the sustainability of outcomes remains largely dependent on the willingness of the GOH to invest resources to support these results. Technical assistance and training attachments for MSMEs seem to be achieving sustainable results, although very often on a small scale.

**Conclusion, recommendations and corporate considerations**

CDB completed its first decade of work in Haiti in a high-risk environment exacerbated by a major natural disaster. Despite some delays, the Bank managed to deliver its projects with a smart choice of implementation approach. Results have been mixed - project outputs cannot always be traced through to sustainable outcomes.

The Bank is now embarking on a renewed Country Strategy for Haiti, with a new Country Office, intending to implement a number of initiatives on its own account rather than jointly with other MDBs. In light of the findings of this report, and bearing in mind accepted good practices for programming in fragile contexts, the evaluation offers three recommendations, and highlights two considerations that may influence the implementation approaches that the Bank takes over the coming CSP period.

- **Recommendation 1:** CDB should review and update the results framework for its Haiti Country Strategy at an appropriate interval over the CS cycle. The review should emphasise focused and realistic outcome statements, indicators, risks and assumptions, so that the framework can be used to manage and report on the Bank’s overall engagement.

  At the time of approval of the Haiti Country Strategy in December 2017, the expected programme details in some sectors were still evolving, and the results framework could not yet be fully developed. Advances in planning are however underway, and some revisiting of the results framework has already taken place. When judged appropriate, and in advance of the mid-term review, it would be opportune to revise and update the CSP results framework.

- **Recommendation 2:** CDB should ensure that its approach to project design, and level of effort in supervision, are commensurate with the challenges of programming in Haiti.

  Principles for international assistance in fragile contexts emphasise the need for a deep understanding of local context, so that programmes may be designed to address all likely constraints to outcome achievement. These factors can often be best described in a well-developed theory of change. Ongoing assessment of progress, and timely corrective action as needed, is also important. For Haiti, these can be expected to demand a greater level of effort from the Bank than for most of its other client contexts.

- **Recommendation 3:** CDB should take full advantage of its new Haiti Country Office, by formally setting out its mandate, responsibilities, and authorities in a way that maximizes its contribution to in-country coordination (with other international partners and the GoH), and to achievement of expected development results.

  The Bank recently opened a country office in Haiti and appointed a CDB Country Representative and Project Liaison Officer. This has been very well received by local and international partners. Haitian interlocutors in particular expressed affinity with CDB’s regional roots and the potential this offered for a well-informed role in the country as well as facilitating Haiti’s integration in the Caribbean region. In its early days, the Office is establishing relationships and becoming familiar with the Haitian context, challenges and opportunities. As it does so, the Bank has an opportunity to clearly define what role it wishes the Office to play.
The Office will need to be the channel for developing the deep understanding of issues, constraints, institutions, and actors necessary for successful planning and management of the Bank’s Country Strategy and investments. It will also need to actively engage in coordination mechanisms with other donors and the GoH (which have not always worked well to date). Setting out what is expected of the Office in these regards, and ensuring that it comes to be viewed as a proactive and empowered in-country partner by the GoH and international organisations will be key to its success. How other MDBs mandate and task their local offices would be a good starting point for thinking through Country Office – HQ arrangements.

- **Corporate Consideration 1: What is the most appropriate delivery mechanism for stand-alone CDB interventions?** The Bank may wish to reflect on lessons from its own experience and that of other donors about which programme delivery mechanisms are most likely to be successful in the Haitian context. Different models exist: a Project Coordination Unit (PCU) with representatives from Ministries; a PCU with staff recruited externally; or an independent unit (such as the AFD is using). Each has its advantages and limitations.

- **Corporate Consideration 2: Where to target capacity building interventions?** Recognising the need to strengthen central government departments, but also the challenges of doing so and the long term nature of this undertaking, other donors are increasing their emphasis on building capacity at the Commune and Departmental levels. Their hypothesis is that strengthening entities closer to where projects are being implemented will increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their programming. These donors are also using non-state actors as partners.
1. **INTRODUCTION**

1. This document presents the final report on the evaluation of CDB’s Haiti Country Strategies and Programme over the period 2007-2015.

2. The evaluation was conducted in two phases by two distinct teams of evaluators. The first phase was carried out mainly in 2016, and resulted in draft findings but with insufficient evidence to develop into a full report. The second phase (June to November 2018) built on the work started in 2016. It validated, triangulated and complemented data collection and analysis, including with more recent information. As such, this report covers the original review period, but also adds a narrative update on results achieved after 2015 wherever data were available.

3. Following this introduction, the report is organized as follows:
   - Section 2 presents the Haitian context during the 2007-2015 period and introduces the CDB Country Strategy Papers (CSP) developed for 2009-2012 and 2013-2016
   - Section 3 outlines the methodology employed by the evaluation
   - Sections 4, 5, 6 and 7 present the findings of the evaluation organized according to the main areas of inquiry: relevance, effectiveness, management and efficiency, and sustainability
   - Section 8 presents the evaluation’s conclusion and insights for the future.

4. Appendices include: the Terms of Reference, the evaluation matrix, a list of documents consulted, and list of stakeholders interviewed.
2. HAITI CONTEXT AND CDB STRATEGIES

2.1 2007 – 2009

Haiti Context in 2007

5. Haiti formally became a member of the CDB in January 2007, setting the stage for full engagement by the Bank in support of the country’s economic and developmental challenges and its development agenda.

6. At the time, economic and social indicators placed Haiti at the extreme end of the poverty spectrum in Latin America and the Caribbean and among the poorest countries of the world. Due to slow progress in human and social development, Haiti was ranked 146th out of 178 countries\(^1\) on the Human Development Index (HDI) in 2008 and 163rd out of 178 countries in 2016.\(^2\)

7. Education and health indicators were extremely low. When Haiti joined the CDB more than half of the adult population was illiterate. Due to the rise of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and projects supported by international agencies, 90 per cent (%) of primary schools were non-public and operated by communities, religious organizations and/or NGOs. There was a significant difference in net enrolment in all schools (public and private) between children living in urban areas (70%) and rural areas (54%).\(^3\)

8. In 2007, only 28 percent of the population had access to health services and only 25% of the population had access to safe water and adequate sanitation. Healthcare spending was lowest per capita in the Western Hemisphere.\(^4\)

9. After 2005, the Haitian economy witnessed some improvement with growth rates of 1.8% (2005), 2.3% (2006) and 3.4% (2007)\(^5\) but experienced a downturn in 2008 (1.2%). It was able to achieve a level of macroeconomic stability with the support of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF). Nevertheless, in 2008/2009 Haiti was faced with the economic challenges of maintaining macroeconomic stability while addressing severe development challenges made difficult by resource constraints and large deficits in all sectors.

10. In 2007 the Government of Haiti (GOH), in collaboration with its financial and technical partners, developed a National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction Paper (DSNCRP)\(^6\) that addressed macroeconomic stability and growth and poverty reduction. It was organized around three pillars: (1) promotion of four growth sectors – agricultural and rural development, tourism infrastructure, and science and technology; (2) enhanced human development; (3) strengthened democratic governance.

CDB investment in Haiti prior to its first Country Strategy

11. The first project approved for Haiti by CDB in 2007 was a USD10 million (mn) grant to the Education for All (EFA) project, a multi donor trust fund (World Bank, the GOH, and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)). Subsequently, two other capital projects were approved: the USD5 mn Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) Project in May 2008, and the USD4 mn Urban

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\(^1\) 2007/08 Human Development Report, UNDP
\(^2\) 2015/16 Human Development Report, UNDP
\(^3\) Caribbean Development Bank Two Hundred and Thirty-Seventh Meeting of the Board of Directors held in Barbados July 21, 2009 Paper BD 50/09 – Country Strategy Paper-Haiti, p. ii
\(^4\) 2007/08 Human Development report, UNDP
\(^5\) Caribbean Development Bank Two Hundred and Thirty-Seventh Meeting of the Board of Directors held in Barbados July 21, 2009 Paper BD 50/09 – Country Strategy Paper-Haiti, p. iii
\(^6\) Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et pour la Réduction de la Pauvreté
and Community-Driven Development Project (PRODEPUR\(^7\)) in July 2008. All these were grant-financed and totalled USD19 mn.

12. A needs assessment indicated the need for project cycle training for public servants, which was undertaken at a cost of $1.2 mn. CDB also provided Haiti with emergency relief grants totalling USD 400,000 following a tropical storm and hurricanes in 2008. Finally, through the Interim Cooperation Framework (ICF) CDB contributed to the financing of the Enhancing Management Capacity in Small and Micro Enterprises project.

### CDB Country Strategy (2009-2012)

13. In 2009, following extensive consultation with the GOH, donor community, private sector and NGO community, the CDB developed a Country Strategy Paper (CSP) for Haiti\(^8\) covering the period 2009-2012.\(^9\)

14. The overall objective of the 2009-2012 CSP was to identify interventions and operational modalities that would maximize development effectiveness in Haiti. The CSP was informed by and supportive of the CDB’s Strategic Plan 2005-2009 and the Special Development Fund (SDF) 7. Under SDF 6, a grant of USD27 mn had been set aside for Haiti and projects already approved under SDF 6 were scaled up to USD46 mn under SDF 7. The resources provided to support the Haiti CSP 2009-2012 were for contribution cycles commencing January of 2009 and ending December 31, 2012.

15. The CSP 2009-2012 identified possible areas of CDB intervention in two pillars: Pillar 1 (Growth Vector) included initiatives with high growth and employment generation opportunities such as manufacturing and tourism, and ones addressing food insecurity and the high level of deforestation. A second pillar supported interventions addressing human development issues, mainly education. Finally, CBD proposed providing budget support for GOH macroeconomic stability.\(^10\)

### 2.2 2010 - 2016

### Haiti Context 2010-2015

16. Six months after the approval of the CSP 2009-2012, on 10 January 2010, Haiti was hit by a catastrophic earthquake that struck in the most populated area of the country, Port-au-Prince. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies estimated that as many as 3 million people had been affected by the quake. A conservative estimate was at least 90,000 deaths (and up to 230,000 deaths estimated by the GOH). Hospitals and schools were destroyed and in September 2010 there were over one million refugees living in tents, with the humanitarian situation characterized as still being in the emergency phase. In October, a cholera epidemic broke out and by the end of 2010 more than 3,333 had died.

17. Between January 2011 and 2015, during the very slow post-earthquake recovery period, Haiti experienced a painful period of environmental and health disasters. The cholera outbreaks continued, killing close to 10,000 Haitians by 2013. In 2012, Tropical Storm Isaac hit Haiti's southern peninsula and Hurricane Sandy killed 55 and left large portions of the country under water.

18. During this five-year period, Haiti’s economic and development challenges increased significantly. In education, the impact of the earthquake was severe. Close to 1,400 teachers perished, most school

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\(^7\) Projet national de développement communautaire participatif en milieu urbain
\(^8\) Paper BD 50/69 presented to and approved by the CDB Board of Directors in July 2009
infrastructure in Port-au-Prince was damaged, and migration of more than 500,000 people to other cities placed a huge burden on decentralized educational services.

19. Following the earthquake, the Haitian rural population increased while the quality of basic services offered in rural areas declined (e.g., access to water, road infrastructure, electricity). Agriculture which had been the main economic activity in rural areas was affected declined during the 2010-2015 period due to under-investments by the GOH in rural infrastructure and services and poor natural resources management.

20. The significant damage caused by the earthquake also diminished the human and institutional capacity to address the country’s vulnerability to disaster and support the mitigation of environmental risks.

21. Immediately following the earthquake, the GOH put forward a 10-year recovery plan (PARDH), followed in May 2012 by a strategic plan (PSDH). Both the PARDH and the PSDH were organized around four strategic pillars for the recovery of the country: territorial rebuilding, economic rebuilding, social rebuilding and institutional rebuilding.

CDB Country Strategy 2013-2016 Haiti

22. In March 2013, at the conclusion of negotiations for the eighth SDF cycle (SDF 8), CDB Contributors agreed to set aside an additional USD46 mn for Haiti.

23. In May 2013 the CDB Board of Directors approved the Country Strategy Paper for Haiti covering the period 2013-2016 aimed at supporting the country’s plan to turn the disaster of 2010 into an opportunity to transform the country into an emerging economy by the year 2030.

24. The 2013-2016 CSP was developed in close collaboration with the GOH and its financial and technical partners to reflect the post-earthquake priorities. It focused on two sectors: education and training; and community-driven development (CDD) and agriculture. It also included a limited set of interventions to support capacity building and strengthening of the country’s resilience to future hazards.

25. In education, CDB’s proposed interventions were to continue support to EFA with a particular emphasis on access, quality of primary education, literacy, and early childhood development (ECD). It also proposed to continue to support TVET through infrastructure rehabilitation and a series of regulatory initiatives.

26. In the CDD and agriculture sector, programmes to enhance the capacity of poor rural and urban communities to improve their own economic well-being were envisaged.

27. Finally, to address public sector capacity and disaster resilience needs, planned interventions included: (a) regional integration and public-sector capacity building; (b) micro, small and medium-size enterprise development; and (c) assistance to pay its Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Fund (CCRIF) premiums.

28. The total indicative resource envelope for the 2013-2016 CSP was USD42 mn, allocated as follows: USD23 mn for basic education and technical and vocational education and training; USD10 mn for CDD and agriculture; USD9 mn for capacity building and resilience.

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11 Plan d’Action pour le Relèvement et le Développement d’Haiti
12 Plan Stratégique de Développement d’Haiti
3. EVALUATION METHODOLOGY

29. Based on the TOR (see Appendix I) for the second phase of the evaluation, an evaluation matrix (presented in Appendix II) provides evaluation questions, sub-questions, indicators and sources of data.

Scope, approach and data collection methods

30. The evaluation reviewed the portfolio of projects funded by CDB over the two CSP periods. As the unit of analysis for monitoring and reporting at CDB remains the project, the evaluation assessed the effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of the CSPs by examining individual projects undertaken during the two CSP periods. Project results frameworks were used as the basis for this assessment. The evaluators also examined the extent to which the CDB portfolio of projects supported (thematically) the CSP objectives and GOH country priorities.

31. Data for the evaluation were collected using:

- Document review: documents from CDB and other donors – the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in particular; as well as from the GOH (Appendix III).
- Interviews: 61 individuals representing the CDB, the GOH, donor agencies and civil society representatives (Appendix IV).
- Country visits: Two country visits, the first in March 2016 by a team of four experts, the second in October 2018 by the Director of OIE and an evaluation consultant.

Limitations to the evaluation

32. There were five limitations to this evaluation.

- The lack of clear alignment between indicators in the CSP results frameworks and indicators in project results frameworks. To address this limitation, the evaluation commented on the thematic alignment of projects with the CSPs, but focused on evaluating the performance of individual projects rather than the performance of the CSPs.
- Data gaps in project information provided by the GOH. Data collection challenges increased following the earthquake, and the GOH was often unable to provide complete information on projects that spanned the pre-and post-earthquake period. This was described in EFA Global Monitoring Report (2015):

  “Haiti is one of the countries in which progress toward EFA since 2000 could not be reflected in the 2015 Education for All Global Monitoring Report (GMR) due to lack of enrolment data. The instability of the Haitian political and educational system, aggravated by the earthquake of 2010, has made the reporting of education data irregular and inconsistent.”

  There were also questions about the reliability of data provided by several GOH ministries. For example, there were significant discrepancies between data self-reported by GOH on children benefitting from school feeding programmes and the data obtained from other sources, signaling the possibility that children may have been counted twice.
- Data gaps in project information provided by CDB. In most cases, project documentation provided by CDB was limited to project supervision reports (PSR). Although these are useful to

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understand the context of implementation, they provide no information on outcome results. A few Project Completion Reports (PCR) helped to fill in the gaps on project achievements, but the PCRs were often incomplete, in particular those for the CDD and agriculture sector and the capacity building and resilience sector. As a result, while the evaluation can provide insights into output achievements, it provides very few (or at best anecdotal) insights on project outcome results. To address this limitation the evaluation team used (with caution) secondary sources of data, for instance IDB or World Bank reports containing results of projects jointly funded with the CDB.

- **High stakeholder turnover in Haiti.** As an example, Haiti has had 35 Ministers of education in 35 years. It has been difficult to trace and interview stakeholders who were in place during the interventions financed by CDB. To mitigate this, the team reached out through SKYPE calls, telephone calls and emails to staff who were no longer in their positions, many of whom had left Haiti.

- **Finally, the fact that this evaluation was conducted in two phases and with two teams was both a limitation and an opportunity.** It required the writers of this final report to build on data collected and analyzed by a previous team. On the other hand, the two-year gap between evaluation visits allowed the second team to follow-up on CDB activities that had not been completed in 2015.
4. RELEVANCE

33. In assessing relevance we review the extent to which projects were aligned thematically with GoH priorities; SDF 7 and 8 and priorities; and CSP objectives.

Finding 1: Overall, the strategic objectives and proposed interventions of the 2009-2012 and 2013-2016 CSPs were well aligned with the SDF 7 and SDF 8 themes and directions.

34. Due to Haiti’s high level of poverty, CDB’s assistance was funded by grants. CDB started to plan SDF operations in Haiti in 2004, three years before Haiti officially joined the Bank. As noted in section 2.1, under SDF 6, USD27 mn in grants was set aside for Haiti; under SDF 7 this was increased to USD49 mn.

35. The strategic objectives of CSP 2009-2012, which were to promote broad-based economic growth and foster inclusive social development, were closely aligned with SDF 7 thematic areas and the CSP 2013-2016 was aligned with the Strategic Directions of SDF 8 (see sidebar).

36. CDB’s proposed interventions (i.e., project areas) also reflected these themes and included:
   - Area 1 – Basic Education and Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET)
   - Area 2 – Community-Driven Development (CDD) and Agriculture
   - Area 3 – Capacity Building and Country’s Resilience to future natural hazards.

Finding 2: Both of the CSPs covering the period 2009-2016 supported the priorities developed by the GOH in 2007 and revisited after the 2010 earthquake.

37. In 2007, GOH developed a National Strategy for Growth and Poverty Reduction (DSNCRP) based on three pillars. The first pillar was intended to prioritize the promotion of growth sectors. GOH considered agriculture a critical sector, including the environment and land tenure, rural infrastructure, agro-processing, marketing, land management institution building, rural finance and fisheries and aquaculture. Tourism was also targeted. Three other areas of growth were identified, including infrastructure modernization; science, technology and innovation; and manufacturing.

38. Pillar 2, human development, included improvement in education, health, access to water and sanitation, and greater consideration for gender disparities.

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16 Sources: CDB SDF 8/4 – NM – 2. The Strategic Focus of SDF 8: Building our Resilience – Revised and Final 2012
18 CDB CSP -Haiti 2009-2012
39. Pillar 3 focused on good governance. GOH targeted three major areas for improved democratic governance: the justice system, security, and modernization of the state.

40. In close collaboration with GOH and its financial and technical partners, CDB developed the 2009-2012 CSP. As shown in Table 4.1 the strategic objectives and proposed interventions are closely aligned with the DSNCRP.

### Table 4.1 Alignment between the CSP 2009-2012 and the DSNCRP

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pillar 1</strong>: Promotion of five growth sectors: agricultural and rural development; tourism; infrastructure modernization; science, technology and innovation; and manufacturing,</td>
<td>Promoting Broad-Based Economic Growth</td>
<td>Improving Growth performance and Job creation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Strengthening Economic Growth Prospects through Technical Assistance (TA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Supporting Agricultural Growth and Increased Food Security</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pillar 2</strong>: Enhanced Human Development</td>
<td>Fostering Inclusive Social Development</td>
<td>Supporting Human Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Ensuring Environmental Sustainability</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


41. The GOH Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti (PARDN), developed in the aftermath of the earthquake in 2010, reordered Haiti’s development priorities around four pillars. The CSP 2013-2016 supports the GOH priority pillars 2, 3 and 4, as shown in Table 4.2.

### Table 4.2 Alignment between GOH Action Plan for National Recovery and Development of Haiti and CSP 2013-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pillar 2</strong>: Economic rebuilding</td>
<td>Promote Broad Based Economic Growth</td>
<td>Community-Driven Development and Agriculture interventions</td>
<td>PRODEP – Rural CDD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>PRODEPUR – Urban CDD</td>
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<thead>
<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pillar 3 Social Rebuilding</td>
<td>Promote Inclusive Social Development</td>
<td>Basic Education and Technical and Vocational Education and Training interventions</td>
<td>EFA TVET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Fostering Regional Cooperation and Integration</td>
<td>Capacity Building and Resilience interventions</td>
<td>Regional integration activities (responsive to needs expressed by GOH)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


42. Overall, the entire CDB portfolio over the course of the period under review is aligned generally and specifically with the priorities defined by GOH. Agriculture and rural development are described as drivers of growth\(^{20}\) and education and training as essential elements for human development.\(^{21}\) As shown in Table 4.3, CDB’s areas of intervention fully respond to GOH key strategic documents.

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\(^{20}\) GOH, Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et la Réduction de la Pauvreté (DSNCRP), Nov. 2007, p.16.

\(^{21}\) GOH, Document de Stratégie Nationale pour la Croissance et la Réduction de la Pauvreté (DSNCRP), Nov. 2007, p.17.
Table 4.3  **Alignment of GOH policies and CDB project areas in Haiti**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GOH DOCUMENTS</th>
<th>1. EDUCATION AND TVET</th>
<th>2. CDD AND AGRICULTURE</th>
<th>3. CAPACITY BUILDING AND RESILIENCE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MENFP, <em>Politique et Stratégie de la Formation Professionnelle en Haïti</em> (Vocational Training Policy and Strategy in Haiti), final version December 2013</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministry of Environment, <em>Contribution Prévue Déterminée au Niveau National (CPDN)</em> (Planned Contribution Determined at a National Level)</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARNDR and Ministry of Environment, <em>Projet Territoires Productifs Résilients (TPR), Cadre de Gestion Environnementale et Sociale (CGES)</em> (Productive and Resilient Territories Project, Environmental and Social Management Framework), November 2017</td>
<td></td>
<td>✔</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
43. **In education (Area 1)**, the Bank coordinated with many international organizations and NGOs present in Haiti, and more specifically supported GOH’s “Sou Ban Lekol” programme intended to provide free education to every child in Haiti. Additional grants were provided to the EFA and TVET Phase I projects.

44. **In CDD (Area 2)**, the Centre for International Studies and Cooperation (CECI) and its Haitian partners launched two important projects jointly funded by CDB and WB. The Participatory Development Project (PRODEP) started in 2006 and involved 31 of Haiti’s poorest rural municipalities. In 2008 the Urban Community-Driven Development Project (PRODEPUR) was developed with grassroots organizations and local authorities from the three cities. Both initiatives ended in 2013. Haitian local communities played a direct role in identifying and implementing these two development projects which generated jobs and income, thereby contributing to poverty reduction and social stability, reducing neighbourhood violence and promoting governance. The CDD approach was designed to promote transparency and ensure that resource utilization was consistently adapted to local demands and needs. One of the priorities for both PRODEPUR and PRODEP projects was to invest in capacity building of local governance structures to strengthen the decentralization of the governance system.

45. **Capacity Building and Country’s Resilience to future natural hazards (Area 3)** was a natural choice for CDB as a third area of intervention. For decades, Haiti has faced serious natural disasters, major floods and damaging hurricanes (Tropical Storm Fay, Hurricanes Gustav, Hanna and Ike in 2008, Hurricane Tomas in 2010, Hurricane Irene in 2011, and Hurricanes Isaac and Sandy in 2012). Haiti’s vulnerability to these events is a direct consequence of severe environmental issues (poor management of natural resources, especially forests and water, leading to soil erosion and coastal zone degradation). Through various small grants, CDB supported GOH efforts on the path to good governance and resilience. The Bank contributed to Haiti’s integration into CARICOM and helped the country undertake capacity-building initiatives with a focus on women’s empowerment and gender equality.

**Finding 3:** Although its project areas in Haiti were highly impacted by the 2010 earthquake, CDB maintained its focus and demonstrated significant flexibility to adapt and reallocate funds as deemed necessary by GOH.

46. Before the 2010 earthquake, the budgetary support provided by CDB to GOH under the Policy-Based Grant (PBG) was entirely on a responsive basis, and reflected CDB’s responsiveness in helping authorities through stressful financial times. In January 2010, the CDB’s three project areas were highly impacted by the earthquake: human and material losses affected both education and CDD areas, and the GOH lacked the institutional capacities to face the disaster.

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22 CDB, CSP 2013-2016 Haiti, May 2013, p.6
23 Centre d’Études et de Coopération Internationale
24 CDB, Position Paper SDF 8, 2012, p.10
25 Projet de Développement Communautaire Particpatif
29 CDB, Position Paper SDF 8, 2012, p.10
31 Current operations were guided by the intervention strategy for Haiti which covers the period 2009-2012, as outlined in CDB Board Paper – BD 50/09 and amended to reflect the reordered priorities after the 2010 earthquake. These operations included a policy-based grant (PBG) which was disbursed in 2009 to support macroeconomic adjustments and enable GOH to continue to provide basic services and implement critical infrastructure under the DSNCRP. This PBG was provided in parallel to similar support advanced by IDB and WB, CDB CSP Haiti, 2013-16, p. 11.
47. The design of CDD projects is highly flexible, as demonstrated by the fact that sub-projects were approved and implemented within weeks of the January 2010 earthquake: an additional amount of USD5 mn and an extension of operations to two additional towns (St. Marc and Gonaïves) were approved by CDB Board of Directors in December 2010. The response to the cholera outbreak was equally impressive: additional PRODEPUR financing and extension of the geographical areas of operations assisted the GOH in improving basic infrastructure and services in areas settled by persons displaced by the 2010 earthquake, and to assist persons impacted by the October 2010 cholera outbreak and by hurricane Tomas in November 2010.32

48. Interviews with representatives from the GOH during the 2016 mission indicated that the flexibility adopted by the CDB was highly appreciated by these stakeholders (see sidebar).

Finding 4: In addition to the relevance of its programming, the recent presence of the CDB as a financial and technical partner in Haiti is seen by the GOH as highly relevant.

49. Until September 2018, in the absence of an office and a designated country representative in Haiti, CDB’s visibility in Haiti was limited and the Bank was not widely known amongst key Haitian stakeholders. When Haiti joined CDB in 2007, the Bank was aware of its lack of experience in the country, limited knowledge of national stakeholders and dynamics, and the potential difficulties arising from language barriers between English, Creole and French.

50. To better understand the country and the social, political, economic and cultural challenges it faced, CDB adopted a strategy of jointly funding existing projects with other regional and multilateral development banks (MDBs). This strategic choice was the result of urgent requests from the GOH and other BMCs to intervene as quickly as possible in Haiti. Overall, this decision was considered appropriate as it facilitated negotiation of programmes with national sector heads and signing agreements with the Government. Meanwhile, in the context of its first experience in Haiti, the partnership developed with WB allowed CDB to better understand both the rural and urban realities of the country, as well as the importance of a community-based approach and funding to support local initiatives.

32 CDB, Position Paper SDF 8, 2012, p.10
51. However, during the mission conducted by the evaluators in 2016 the aid coordination unit of the Ministry of the Economy and Finance (MEF) reported that this strategy did not allow sufficient visibility of CDB’s actions or identify specific areas in which it could capitalise on its perceived comparative advantage. As CDB has not directly implemented its own programmes in Haiti, its visibility in the country has been limited.

52. The absence of a clearly designated CDB spokesperson for Haiti (with or without a representation office in Haiti) was considered problematic by GOH officials, partners and funding agencies as it limited the Bank’s participation in meetings on aid coordination, policy dialogue, strategic debates on policies and alignment. It also constrained CDB’s ability to monitor programmes and track outcomes and impacts, and limited the visibility of CDB’s interventions in Haiti in partnership with IDB and WB.

53. On 27 February 2018, GOH’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, His Excellency Antonio Rodrigue and the CDB’s Vice-President (Operations), Ms. Monica La Bennett, signed an agreement to establish CDB’s first country office in Haiti.\(^3\) The office was officially opened on 21 September 2018.

54. During the evaluation mission to Haiti in October 2018, there was an overwhelmingly warm appreciation of CDB’s newly established presence by all stakeholders, and particularly by the GOH. Financial and technical partners were also happy to have a CDB presence in Haiti. From their perspective it will allow CDB to include its voice in sectoral discussions and strategic reviews conducted by the GOH and its technical and financial partners. L’Agence française de développement (AFD),\(^4\) which heads the sectoral group on TVET, was eager to engage with CDB since the Bank has considerable interest in TVET. AFD noted that being able to discuss face to face improved coordination and led to decisions that would be more relevant to the GOH. Representatives of IDB had a similar reaction and saw the arrival of the CDB as a positive development for the TVET sector.

55. CDB’s presence in Haiti was particularly appreciated by GOH representatives for two reasons: First, CDB is a Caribbean organization and its geographic proximity to Haiti is a big plus. It is also perceived as being culturally closer to Haiti than other donors. One resounding word that a few GOH stakeholders used in describing the CDB was “soul” (âme).

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\(^4\) French Cooperation Agency
5. EFFECTIVENESS

5.1 Education For all

56. While it is true that access to education had improved significantly in Haiti since the early 2000s, thanks to high demand from families and a proliferation of low-cost private schools, challenges still existed with late entry, progression, cost burden to families, and the relatively low quality of education.

57. This situation was further complicated by the fact that 80% of primary schools were private with too few places in free public schools. Tuition, even in the lowest-cost private schools, was very expensive for poor families, especially those living in rural areas with poverty rates of 82% (77% living in extreme poverty).

58. In 2006, the Education for All (EFA) project was launched by GOH and its technical and financial partners as part of GOH’s efforts to achieve the second of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs): “Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary schooling”.35 The EFA project was financed by multiple donors, including the World Bank as the main investor, the CDB, the GOH and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).36

59. The EFA project objectives were to improve access to primary education to an increased number of Haitians pupils, improve quality of education and strengthen the governance of education systems. As shown in Table 5.1, CDB contributed to five components of the EFA project.

Table 5.1 Overview of CDB grants supporting the EFA project (2007-2015)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>COMPONENT OF THE EFA PROJECT FUNDED BY CDB</th>
<th>OTHER STAKEHOLDERS / DONORS SUPPORTING THE COMPONENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Improving Access</td>
<td>Primary Education Student and School Subsidies</td>
<td>GOH, World Bank, CIDA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pre-Service Teacher Professional Development</td>
<td>GOH, the World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving Quality</td>
<td>Student Nutrition and Health Programme</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Student Literacy Skills Programme</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strengthening Governance</td>
<td>Capacity Building of Central MENFP</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

36 Presently called Global Affairs Canada.
Improving Access

Finding 5: The Primary Education Student and School Subsidies component of the EFA project is reported to have been successful because it surpassed the targets established at the outset. However, it is not always clear how the most appropriate targets were identified for subsidies.

60. Both CDB and World Bank data suggest that the primary education student and school subsidies component yielded substantial results from inception through 2015, with over 430,000 tuition waivers financed by 2015, and 1,212 schools benefitting from subsidies.

Table 5.2 Primary Education Student and School Subsidies Component

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGETS</th>
<th>CHILDREN AND SCHOOLS BENEFITTING FROM THE SUBSIDIES COMPONENT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>135,000/180,000 students benefitting</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>500/1,100 accredited non-public schools benefitting</td>
<td>1,247</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: CDB Project Supervision Reports, World Bank EFA website

61. CDB project supervision reports (PSR) indicate that school subsidies have had generally positive effects on school attendance and most schools have used the subsidies to provide learning materials and to upgrade their facilities. $^{39}$

62. Haitian families typically spend over 45% of their annual income on sending their children to school, and there is anecdotal evidence that the subsidies have lessened the financial burden of education for the families. It is not possible to confirm outcomes due to insufficient data and the absence of project baselines.

63. The World Bank confirmed an increase in enrolment rates of children ages six and older over the course of the EFA subsidies component, up to the year that subsidies were stopped in 2015. It also confirmed that schooling had been provided to more than 6,500 children in poor, rural Haitian communities that were previously underserved. These children were also provided with textbooks and pedagogical materials. Unfortunately, the study was unable to confirm that this increase was related to the project $^{40}$ or to the adoption by GOH in 2011 of its programme for free and universal education (PSGU) $^{41}$ Since the implementation of the PSGU, GOH has increased its funding for education. The PSGU has allowed more Haitian children to attend school, and has integrated children into the system who would otherwise not be able to attend school due to economic constraints.

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$^{38}$ Excludes 100 schools damaged by the earthquake.
$^{40}$ WB. « De l’évidence empirique à la formulation de politiques », Strategic Impact Evaluation Fund, February 2015.
$^{41}$ Programme de Scolarisation Gratuite et Universelle
64. However, disparities remain and the programme has not positively affected children from more disadvantaged communities. In providing financial support to non-public schools, GOH did not focus on the geographic distribution of schools or on the profoundly unequal quality among schools.

65. The WB report “Better Spending, Better Services” (2016) explains that, despite GOH’s efforts and its programme to achieve free and universal education, the education system in Haiti remains deeply unequal in terms of access and quality, depending on children’s social origins and their parents’ financial means.42

Finding 6: The Pre-Service Teacher Professional Development component of the EFA project aimed at increasing the number of teachers at the primary level. Despite training the targeted number of teachers, very few trained teachers were actually placed in classrooms.

66. Over the past decade, and even more so after the earthquake, Haiti has suffered from a lack of qualified teachers. World Bank data suggest that an estimated 8,000-10,000 primary teachers are needed to absorb out-of-school students.43

67. The CDB supported the Pre-service Teacher Professional Development component of the EFA project. As shown in Table 5.3, 3,066 teachers (against a target of 3,600) completed pre-service training between 2010 and 2013. This corresponds to an 85% success rate in terms of numbers of teachers trained. Interviews conducted with a sample of teachers during the 2016 mission suggest that those who attended were satisfied with the content of the training. Unfortunately, the target of 3,600 teachers was not reached by the end of the CSP in 2016. The gap was largely due to late payment of trainee stipends by the GOH (its counterpart funding). This issue is symptomatic of the wider issue of insufficient government resources.

Table 5.3 Pre-Service Teacher Professional Development component

<table>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3,600 teachers complete pre-service training</td>
<td>2,750</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>3,054 in 12 participating institutions</td>
<td>3,066</td>
<td>3,066</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: EFA Project Supervision Reports

68. Although one could feel encouraged that 85% of the target was reached, the real issue and where it creates a problem in Haiti is the fact that, based on GOH data and interviews with MENFP representatives in 2018, a very low number of trained teachers were actually assigned to a classroom after their training. In 2013, only 400 had been assigned. Interviews conducted with three former Ministers of Education of Haiti who were in place during the period 2010-2017 suggest that this is a recurrent problem that GOH has yet to resolve. They mentioned various factors to explain this limitation, including: the reluctance and/or inability of non-public schools to pay the salaries required for trained teachers; the reluctance of currently assigned individuals to take advantage of training given the fear of not being reassigned after training; and the unwillingness of some to accept positions in rural areas in need of teachers. This issue clearly affected the project outcome of improving the quality of instruction.

69. In addition to factors mentioned in the CDB PSR, a secondary source of data (the WB report “Better Spending, Better Services”) suggests that while trainees may have appreciated the training offered, the extent to which they actually learned was questionable. The report indicates that when teachers were tested after the training only a few were able to pass the test: “in French language and math assessments of primary school teachers in the Central Plateau, where the questions were drawn from teacher training institute exams, only 10% (French) and 22% (math) of teachers were able to answer at least half of the questions correctly (MENFP and World Vision, 2013)”.

Despite several initiatives to enhance teacher development, positive effects are not yet apparent.

**Improving quality**

**Finding 7:** CDB provided support for two EFA activities to improve the quality of education. The Student Nutrition and Health Programme, a school feeding programme, reached a very large number of children but the validity of the data provided by MENFP remains problematic.

70. Being able to eat a meal during the school day is important for many Haitian students who do not have their basic food needs met due to family economic constraints. Under the EFA and in collaboration with other partners (World Bank, Global Partnership for Education [GPE], GOH, CIDA), the CDB supported a school feeding programme that provided children with one hot meal a day, a snack, as well as a dose of vitamin A and de-worming treatments if required. The programme also included basic hygiene training for cooks. Moreover, several local NGOs were involved in the school feeding programme thereby building local capacity and increasing ownership of EFA project outcomes.

71. Data obtained from the GPE and from CDB project supervision reports signal that the programme has been a success. CDB’s target was to expand the number of students benefitting from the programme from 25,000 to 35,000 students. The 2013 CDB supervision report is incomplete but indicates that the number of students benefitting increased to 73,000, as shown in Table 5.4. Other sources of data confirm the achievement of programme’s objectives. For example, World Bank data indicate that, as of 2016, 370,000 students had benefitted from the school feeding programme across 430 schools.

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Table 5.4 Student Nutrition and Health Programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OBJECTIVE</th>
<th>TARGET (UPDATED 2010)</th>
<th>2009</th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>b. Student Nutrition and Health</td>
<td>25,000 to 35,000 students</td>
<td>45,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>73,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

72. Stakeholders interviewed during the 2018 mission to Haiti have mixed opinions on the school feeding programme. All respondents acknowledged that offering a school feeding programme increases the chances of children attending school and this is consistent with the education literature. Indeed, a systematic review of the literature\(^{46}\) on school feeding programmes demonstrates a positive correlation between such programmes and school attendance, particularly of girls, but is inconclusive as to the effects on learning outcomes. Many respondents, including those from NGOs administering the school feeding programmes, had some reservations, in particular regarding the reliability of self-reported data from the MENFP. They were concerned that the actual number of beneficiaries might be lower than what MENFP provided. They were also concerned that the list of schools benefiting from the school feeding programme might not be the ones originally planned (i.e., schools in the most vulnerable areas). Their concern is echoed by schools at the decentralized level that, in multiple instances, claimed that they had been promised to be part of the programme, but were not benefitting from it. Working through central government to deliver project activities is discussed in section 8.

Finding 8: The literacy component supported by CDB as part of the EFA project surpassed its output targets, but no outcome results were available in 2014 at the end of phase 3.

73. Haitian children are reading well below the level expected in Grade 2 and in order to address this problem, CDB supported the Student Literacy Skills Programme as part of the EFA project since early 2008. Activities included establishing a baseline for early grade reading levels using an Early Grade Reading Assessment instrument. The baseline developed in Phase 1 was supposed to be used to assess literacy competencies at the end of Grade 2 in phases 2 (2011) and 3 (2014) of the EFA programme. In addition, it aimed to train teachers in reading and writing techniques using appropriate literacy material.

74. The programme surpassed its output targets. In 2009 and 2010, 100 schools (target 80) and 245 teachers (target 200) were identified to be part of the literacy programme in urban and rural areas. During 2010 and 2011, teachers were trained in new pedagogical approaches to teaching reading and writing. The programme also provided reading material and pedagogical material to the teachers and to 300 school libraries in the programme. In 2012 an additional cohort of 150 teachers were trained in the literacy methods.

75. At the beginning of school year 2012, teachers who had been trained started teaching literacy to more than 3,000 students using the new approaches in 84 of the 100 schools included in the baseline.\(^{47}\)

76. Testing of children (grade 2) began in 2014, three years later than planned. The high cost of implementing the programme and capacity constraints within MNEP have resulted in fewer EFA-subsidized and non-subsidized schools participating in the programme than expected, and phase 3 of the


\(^{47}\) Several schools were destroyed during the earthquake
programme was not completed. To date, no additional information is available to determine if this component of the EFA led to its expected outcomes.

**Improving Governance of the MENFP**

**Finding 9:** The CDB provided capacity building support and equipment to MENFP as part of its attempt to improve the governance of the system at the central and decentralized levels. To date, there is no evidence of changes in the capacity of the MENFP, nor any evidence of improved governance.

77. As part of its attempt to support the governance of Haiti’s Ministry of Education (MENFP), the EFA project invested in equipment and capacity building of MENFP civil servants, with the aim of supporting central and decentralized units of the system, improving reporting, and improving the efficiency of the whole education system. This component of the EFA project contemplated developing a local area network linking MENFP and its departmental units (Direction Départementales) and also envisaged supporting the planning function and the collection of education data at MENFP. Equipment and furniture were to be provided at both central and departmental levels to increase the effectiveness and efficiency of operations.

78. Between 2010 and 2014, significant support was provided by CDB and other donors and agencies to the MENFP, including technical assistance (TA) for the development of a human resources database, development of financial management systems, completion of a school census, and furniture and equipment for MENFP at both central and departmental levels.

79. In 2011, 48 MENFP officers received computers and other equipment, 100 School Inspectors received motorcycles to assist with their school supervision responsibilities, and eleven 4-wheel drive vehicles were distributed to MENFP Directors. In 2012, financial management software was procured and the MENFP began transferring existing data into the new software.

80. Another objective of capacity building was to establish a National Education Partnership Office (ONAPE) whose mission would be to develop and implement education development policies and programmes in Haiti and to participate in the development of policy and the definition of objectives of a partnership between the two sectors (private and public). Although a law was promulgated in 2007, ONAPE was launched only eight years later in 2015 because there were delays in reaching agreement on its institutional arrangements. However, since 2015, stakeholders do not report any major achievements by ONAPE and attribute this to constant rotation of leadership in the sector.

81. After close to five years of effort and investments in building the capacities of the MENFP, there is no tangible improvement in the effectiveness or efficiency of the MENFP. It is described by stakeholders (including Ministers of Education) as *highly dysfunctional*.

82. Interviews conducted in 2018 confirm that all governance issues identified a decade ago still persist, due in part to the turbulence in the system and the high rotation of Ministers, staff and leadership in the Ministry. We observed general skepticism among donors, some of whom have been operating in Haiti for several decades. Donors such as the World Bank and IDB are revisiting their approaches to supporting the education sector through the central level government and are moving towards capacity building at the departmental level.

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48 Ministère de l’Éducation Nationale et de la Formation Professionnelle
49 Office National de Partenariat en Éducation
5.2 Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET)

83. Skills development continues to be critical for the economic and social transformation of Haiti. The country is dependent on foreign skilled workers while at the same time there is high unemployment and under-employment, particularly among out-of-school youth between the ages of 15 and 24. This situation is detrimental to economic development and also a potential danger to social stability.

84. In this context, interest in technical and vocational education and training (TVET) is high, but the GOH has consistently underinvested in this sector, resulting in a sector where facilities and equipment are outdated, and curricula and technologies obsolete. More importantly, there was a mismatch between training available and labour market needs, leading to significant skills gaps.

85. In February 2008, GOH requested assistance from CDB in financing the rehabilitation of three vocational schools that had not been sufficiently updated for over seven decades. During the 2007-2015 period, consistent with its objectives of fostering inclusive social development by improving quality and access to education and training, CDB provided GOH a USD13 mn grant\(^\text{50}\) for the implementation of a TVET project. The CDB TVET project, approved in May 2008, was an integral component of an IDB-funded Vocational and Training Program (VTP) aimed at improving the human resources base in Haiti and enhancing the employability of youth.

Finding 10: The CDB TVET project design was modified following the earthquake to take into account the destruction of infrastructure in the sector and emerging needs and requests from GOH.

86. The CDB TVET project was intended to finance seven components, as shown in the sidebar.

87. However, the 2010 earthquake rendered inoperable almost 70% of the vocational schools (also known as TVET centres) in Haiti. The earthquake also affected the management capacities of the TVET centres as several hundred teachers and TVET managers perished during the disaster. As a result, substantial redesign of civil works of the three vocational schools included in the TVET project was necessary to take into account the devastation of the educational infrastructure and the revised para-seismic standards. Consequently, the scope of work for the three vocational schools was extended to total reconstruction rather than rehabilitation as was originally planned.

TVET Project Components

1. Building and civil works
2. Construction supervision
3. Design of prototypes for vocational schools
4. Furniture and equipment
5. Institutional strengthening, including:
   (a) framework for enhancing youth employability and (b) framework for the training of TVET teachers
6. M&E and Audit
7. Project Management

\(^{50}\) Two separate grants. A first USD9 mn grant in 2008 and a USD4 mn grant in 2012 to meet the increased costs and expanded scope of the TVET project.
Finding 11: The chaotic post-earthquake context in Haiti and security concerns led to delays in building and civil works and construction supervision for the three TVET centres. Two of the centres (Cap-Haïtien and Jeremie) were completed during the CSP period. The third Centre was inaugurated in 2018.

88. The GOH had high hopes for the rebuilding of TVET centres in three cities. Despite GOH willingness to commence work, construction was subject to multiple delays due to various factors. Given the massive destruction of schools after the earthquake, the MENFP gave priority to rebuilding elementary schools and the TVET project was put on hold until 2011. More problematic was the security issue on some construction sites. In Cap-Haïtien, although construction work commenced in 2011 the contractor had to stop for more than nine months because of security problems caused by armed gangs. Construction was completed in 2013, more than a year behind schedule.

89. The rehabilitation of the Jeremie TVET Centre began in 2011 and was completed by 2013. Both Jeremie and Cap-Haïtien TVET Centres have been operational since 2014. Data suggest that the centres have functioned well. For the 2015-2016 academic year, approximately 680 students benefited from the new facilities at Cap-Haïtien (target was 495 per year) and 197 students benefited from the new facilities in Jeremie (target was 150 per year). No attendance data were available beyond 2015 but interviews with the National Vocational Training Institute (INFP) suggest that attendance has been slightly on the rise in the two subsequent years, with a particular effort made by INFP to attract female trainees into vocational streams typically occupied by men (plumbing, mechanics).

90. Several factors stopped the construction of the Jacmel TVET Center. Like the other two centres, construction was meant to begin in 2011, but was stopped due to concerns about soil bearing capacities and land ownership. These issues were not resolved until December 2015. Construction began in December 2015 and was completed in early 2017. The Jacmel Center was recently inaugurated in June 2018.

Finding 12: Through the institutional strengthening and prototype design components of its TVET project, CDB financed two studies to strengthen the sector. Both were completed by 2015 and are reported to be insightful documents to support the sector. The degree to which they are used is mixed.

91. As part of the TVET project, CDB financed two studies: a Conceptual Framework for Vocational School Facilities and Prototype Design, and a Framework for Enhancing Employability of Young Trainees. Both studies were completed by the end of 2015.

92. The Conceptual Framework for Vocational School Facilities and Prototype Designs produced designs for small, medium and large vocational centres adapted to the needs of the region. Interviews with representatives from the INFP indicate that these prototypes are very useful and were used in planning the reconstruction of the Jacmel TVET Centre.

93. The Framework for Enhancing the Employability of Young Trainees was well received by the GOH and interviewed INFP representatives suggested that it provides a good conceptual approach to determine barriers to employment and options to consider in addressing these barriers. However, consulted TVET stakeholders and donors commented that the Framework may not have captured the systemic nature of the problems that block youth employability and therefore its utility remains modest. In Haiti, many factors limit the employability of young trainees: first, the reputation of government-funded vocational centres is problematic and private sector employers often have biased (negative) views about trainees from these centres. A few private vocational schools with solid reputations continue to be the choice of employers when they select young trainees. This is a vicious circle because government-funded schools do not always

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51  CDB PSR 2016
52  Institut National de Formation Professionnelle
have proper equipment and machines and their graduates are not trained with the most modern technology and as a result they do not get hired. A second problem is that the concept of apprenticeship is not well-established in Haiti. Very few companies (micro, small or large) are inclined to bring on board young trainees as apprentices, either during their training programme or when these young people transition to the workplace. Consequently, once they graduate, they have limited practical experience and no established network with the work environment.

Finding 13: TVET project management and M&E and audit components were carried out as planned and were satisfactory.

94. TVET project management was successful, with the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) and IDB providing sustained capacity for the implementation of the project. All supervision reports were submitted as requested, including progress reports and quarterly reports on investment costs. Based on interviews with CDB and IDB, both organizations were satisfied with the supervision exercised by the IDB throughout the project.

95. The M&E component had five objectives, all of which were met or respected:

- Overall execution of the project by the MENFP through INFP: This was done, but during the period under review there were many changes made to the functions of the MENFP and the roles and responsibilities of the INFP. In March 2017, a new Director General of INFP was nominated by the MENFP. Based on interviews held in Haiti with stakeholders in the TVET sector, there is hope that she and her team will be able to maintain the adequate management of investments.
- A Programme Advisory Group (PAG) to oversee the programme and promote its goals and objectives: This group was constituted with wide representation53 and operated as planned.
- A Project Coordination Unit (PCU) was established within the office of the Director General of INFP and interviews with IDB and CDB stakeholders indicate that they were generally satisfied with the performance of the PCU.
- An Acquisitions Committee was set up to provide administrative oversight for procurement.
- A Manual of Operations that outlines operating regulations for programme execution was produced.

96. Finally, annual financial audits by independent auditors were carried out.

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53 The PAG membership comprises the General Director of INFP; two members of MENFP; the GC of the PCU; four representatives of the main institutions representing the private sector; three representatives of the training schools public, non-public and subsidised; and one representative each from the other ministries operating vocational training schools i.e. the Ministries of: Agriculture; Social Affairs; Public Works and Commerce (Tourism Secretariat).
97. Overall the support provided by the CDB TVET project in Haiti is seen as extremely valuable by GOH, for a number of reasons. First, this is a sector where traditionally not many donors have wanted to invest, because it is expensive (in terms of materials and equipment costs). Second, the TVET project has yielded good results and, despite some delays, the three TVET centres are seen as a great achievement that benefit Haiti’s youth, a group that is typically hard to reach (15-24). The GOH also has expressed strong hopes that CDB will help it understand and translate the TVET regional strategy (see sidebar) into action for Haiti.

98. Due to language barriers, its size and socio-economic differences with other members of CARICOM, Haiti has been modestly involved in regional activities to date. Yet Haiti is a member state of CARICOM and participates in the CSME, which facilitates, amongst other things, economic integration and free movement of labour. Haiti hopes to have skilled TVET trainees that could circulate in the region. It sees the potential to benefit considerably from what other countries, such as Jamaica or Dominica, have to offer with respect to their experience with vocational qualifications, and they see CDB as a potential convener of member states to help build regional cooperation.

99. Recognizing the importance of the TVET sector for employability, CDB has continued to invest in the sector. In 2016 GOH received USD12.5 mn in financing from CDB to support a TVET Project II (see sidebar).

100. However, as CDB continues its support for TVET with GOH, it will have to do it alone without the IDB, which had invested heavily in the sector. Interviews with IDB representatives in Haiti in 2018 confirmed that upon completion of their current country programme, IDB will remove itself from the TVET sector completely, preferring to invest in other sectors in education, notably Early Childhood Education. This presents a new context for the CDB which will have to operate directly with GOH as opposed to through a co-financed project with IDB.

5.3 Community-Driven Development & Agriculture

101. During the period 2008-2015, CDB invested in two Community-Driven Development (CDD) and Agriculture projects: PRODEP and PRODEPUR. This section discusses their effectiveness.
**PRODEPUR**

102. In 2008 the World Bank approved the USD46.7 mn Urban Community-Driven Development project (PRODEPUR) to assist GOH in addressing poverty in urban communities. The objective was to improve access to and satisfaction with: (i) basic and social infrastructure and services, including housing repair, reconstruction and community infrastructure improvement needed as a result of the emergency; and (ii) income-generating opportunities for residents of selected disadvantaged urban areas.

103. To complement the World Bank investment, CDB approved a USD4 mn grant for PRODEPUR in 2008. CDB’s PRODEPUR components were implemented in 13 of the 17 GOH priority zones and were designed to maximize participation by urban slum residents and their institutions in all stages of the project cycle.

104. In December 2010, the CDB Board of Governors (BOG) approved an additional USD5 mn to PRODEPUR as a direct response to the 2010 earthquake which had resulted in the movement of a huge number of persons from Port-au-Prince to neighbouring towns and communities. This put additional pressure on already fragile infrastructures and services. In response to requests from GOH, the CDB financed activities extended beyond the towns of Port-au-Prince and Cap-Haïtien (which had been proposed under the original project) to Saint-Marc and Gonaïves.

105. The CDB PRODEPUR project comprised thee components: (1) community subproject funding management and support, (2) capacity building and technical assistance, and (3) project administration, supervision, monitoring and evaluation.

**Finding 15:** Notwithstanding the poor performance of the Project Coordination Unit, PRODEPUR’s results were satisfactory, surpassing its target and fostering synergies between communities.

106. The implementation of the original grant (USD4 mn) and the additional grant (USD5 mn) of PRODUPUR were completed in March 2014, six months later than planned in the appraisal. The main reason for the delay was the later than anticipated engagement of the two NGOs implementing PRODEPUR: the Centre d’Étude pour la Coopération Internationale (CECI) and the Pan American Development Fund (PADF).

107. Overall, the PRODEPUR project was successful. As shown in Table 5.5, it exceeded many of its targets and qualitative feedback obtained from community actors during supervision missions by CDB as well as during a project exit workshop indicated that the project provided a lot of goodwill and constructive collaboration between rival groups in the poorest and most deprived urban areas of Haiti.

**Quotes from PADF post-training survey**

*This project has helped residents of our community buy quality cement blocks at a better price and within their neighborhood without having to travel too far. (A cement block factory owner describing how the small road constructed by the PRODEPUR sub-project affected the quality of life of his community)*

*Part of our small dispensary was destroyed by the earthquake and we are grateful that the PRODEPUR project allowed us to rebuild it. (A male participant at the Project Exit Workshop)*

*The computer literacy training that I received through PRODEPUT gave me more independence and allowed me to stay current with technology and facilitated my job search. (A female trainee after a training session offered by PRODEPUR)*
Table 5.5 PRODEPUR targets and outputs at project completion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NATIONAL URBAN COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (PRODEPUR)</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component 1 – Community Sub-Project Funding, Management and Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Original Grant Target: 487 sub-projects implemented (203 infrastructure, 167 social, and 117 productive/income-generating)</td>
<td>The number of sub-projects funded exceeded by 40% the target set at project appraisal due to the high demand from urban communities after the earthquake.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Additional Grant Target: 162 sub-projects (110 infrastructure, 50 social and 2 productive/income-generating)</td>
<td>More than 700,000 people benefitted from 649 sub-projects (313 infrastructure projects, 217 social projects and 119 productive/income-generating projects).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component 2 – Capacity-Building and Technical Assistance</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New project management competencies in the targeted communities</td>
<td>580 training sessions for 9,844 people (45% women), covering topics ranging from CBO management, sub-project cycle management, business management, and disaster management.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component 3 – Project Administration, Supervision, M&amp;E</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management Information System (MIS), technical and financial audits, and impact evaluation studies</td>
<td>Both CDB and WB experienced difficulty in obtaining timely reports from Bureau de Monétisation des Programmes d’Aide au Développement (BMPAD). However, BMPAD closely managed procurement, financial management and auditing. Meanwhile, over the life of the project the contracted service providers (CECI and PADF) consistently provided detailed reports, on components 1 and 2, in a timely manner. As a result, the ability of CDB and WB to keep track of the project was not compromised.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

108. Qualitative data obtained during the 2016 mission through interviews with WB staff suggest that the PRODEP and PRODEPUR projects did not have explicit impact goals from the outset. Nonetheless, WB documentation suggests that these projects did have an impact on poverty reduction by creating jobs and improving rural and urban services, including schools, health centres, spaces for exchange and sharing, potable water, and electricity networks.54

109. As reported in PSRs, in terms of social effects, PRODEP and PRODEPUR initiatives promoted greater autonomy and capacity in local organisations, built local capacity, and created exchanges between organizations and ties with elected officials. However, the two projects did not develop methods for measuring these impacts, either by establishing initial baselines (identification of a few criteria) or in conducting impact assessments.

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PRODEP

110. In 2004 GOH, with the support of the World Bank, implemented the Rural Community Driven Development Project (PRODEP) in 59 of 140 municipalities in all Departments of Haiti.

111. Beginning in 2012, CDB invested USD10 mn to complement the ongoing World Bank PRODEP projects, to support rural investments and capacity building of community-based organizations in 31 municipalities in five Departments identified by Haiti’s 2008 poverty map as the poorest in the country. Most were located away from major urban centres, had limited access to markets because of poor road and market infrastructure, and suffered considerable damage from storms and hurricanes. Project activities were implemented by two international NGOs: CECI and the PADF.

112. The objectives of the PRODEP project were to: (1) Improve access by poor communities to basic social and economic infrastructure; (2) provide income-generating opportunities; and (3) improve community governance and build social capital at the local level. The project had three components:

- Component 1: Community sub-project financing (small scale), proposed, implemented and managed by community-based organizations (CBO) and municipal councils
- Component 2: Capacity-building and technical assistance to strengthen Community Development Councils (CADEC)\(^{55}\) in all areas of project management
- Component 3: Management and M&E through financing the costs of the Project Coordination Unit (PCU) in the BMPAD.\(^{56}\)

Finding 16: The PRODEP project demonstrated good results in two of its components. The third component was not successful as the PCU underperformed.

113. As shown in Table 5.6, and as reported in the PRODEP Completion Report (PCR), most of the activities of PRODEP were fully implemented and targets were mostly achieved. Components 1 and 2 were considered successful. Component 3 was not successful and the performance of the PCU was poor.

114. Interviews conducted with GOH representatives and donors in 2018 and the 2013 World Bank report\(^{57}\) suggest that PRODEP remains a good mechanism for building social inclusion and social capital, community participation, transparency, trust and public/private partnerships at the local level. While PCRs and supervision reports note some positive achievements for PRODEP, stakeholders report concern about the PRODEP unit of change (CADEC), which by their nature are not always groups that are constant. Their membership can change over time, and their sustainability beyond the period of project funding is not yet proven.

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\(^{55}\) Conseil d’Appui au Développement Économique et Communautaire

\(^{56}\) Office of Monetisation of Development Aid Programs

\(^{57}\) WB Implementation Completion and Results Report, PRODEP -Haiti, 2013
### Table 5.6 PRODEP Targets and Outputs as of 2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (PRODEP)</th>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL BUDGET OF USD19 MN, 47% FUNDED BY CDB, 44% BY WB, 9% BY GOH</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
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</table>

**Component 1 – Community Sub-Project Funds, Management and Support**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>180 CBOs and Municipality sub-projects financed and implemented</td>
<td>185 sub-projects implemented (exceeding the planned number), selected by the target communities in a participatory process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>An estimated 353,000 people benefitted from at least one investment in an infrastructure, social or income-generating sub-project:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 89 infrastructure sub-projects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 61 social sub-projects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• 35 productive sub-projects</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The PCR rated component 1 very successful because project targets had been surpassed and women’s participation in CBO and CADEC executive roles were exceeded. The validation of the PCR conducted by IEO in 2017 confirms this.</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Component 2 – Capacity Building and Technical Assistance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>2014</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>59 CADECs receive training and TA in project cycle management, gender issues etc.</td>
<td>59 CADECs trained in project cycle management, gender-based approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>198 workshops on project management (7,387 CBO members of which 3,180 were women).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 CADECs supervise CBO/Municipal Council sub-project cycle</td>
<td>31 CADECs received training and implemented project-monitoring procedures. All of the projects supported have a management plan. CADEC members supervised the projects underway.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The PCR indicates that all 31 CADECs in municipalities in the north (the project focal area) received training and TA. The planned capacity building interventions for CADECs in the south was not implemented, with no reason offered in the PCR. The 31 CADECs trained represent 52.5% of the planned number of CADECs to receive training.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 CADECs manage USD200,000 each for CBO sub-project implementation</td>
<td>The four CADECs managed a total of USD700,000 or about 88% of the expected target.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At least 10 CADECs obtain a total of USD1.2 mn additional funding for CBO sub-projects</td>
<td>Only 2 CADECs were able to obtain funding from other development programmes. They received USD200,000 (16%) of the USD1.2 mn planned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While the PCR shed no light on why this target was not achieved, interviews with stakeholders in Haiti experienced in working with community groups and Community Councils suggest that the PRODEP targets were very ambitious given the limited existing capacities of CADECs and communities in general in managing financial resources</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Component 3 – Post-Administration, Supervision, M&E**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TARGET</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Management Information System (MIS), technical and financial audits, and impact evaluation studies</td>
<td>The PCU conducted less than 10 supervisory visits (target was 62) during project implementation and did not submit project quarterly status reports. It is unclear why the PCU underperformed. To compensate for this and in consultation with CDB, BMPAD hired six Civil Engineers to supervise sub-project implementation. This was considered a major contributor to the relatively high quality of sub-projects.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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58 Information in this table was provided in the document from CDB OIE, “Validation of Project Completion Report on Rural CDD Project, Haiti”, September 2017.

59 Validation of Project Completion Report Paper 85/2017 -B4, October 2017
Finding 17: While PRODEPUR and PRODEP output targets were by and large either achieved or surpassed, there are concerns about the quality of these outputs and their sustainability.

115. Reaching and even surpassing planned output targets is always an encouraging sign, but questions remain as to whether these outputs were actually of good quality. While CDB documentation sheds no light on the quality of outputs achieved by either PRODEP or PRODEPUR, an audit of PRODEP sub-projects was done in 2012, mandated by BMPAD.\(^{60}\) The evaluation examined a sample of 20 sub-projects randomly selected and implemented in the period 2010-2012. Although the sample is small, it brings to light some common CDD issues. The audit concluded overall that quality varied extensively depending on the CADEC in charge of the sub-project but also due to high inflation which increased the costs of construction materials.

116. For example, because of high inflation, some road or social infrastructure were constructed below standards. Maintenance of social infrastructure sub-projects (school fences, rehabilitation of classrooms, market fences, etc.) was problematic, either because communities had no resources allocated for maintenance or had not been sufficiently trained in maintenance and repair. Capacity building of CADECs (offered by CECI and by PADF) was overall of good quality, although often too short or lacking sufficient pedagogical material.

117. Another issue was the role of women in these sub-projects. The audit revealed that in its sample review, although all sub-projects generally equally benefited men and women, less than 10% of the sub-projects were designed or identified by women, which is both surprising and problematic in a country where women are the central to the family unit. The audit also suggested that monitoring of sub-project implementation was poorly done by the communities, who were often ill-prepared to fulfill that role, despite some training to that effect. Several recommendations were made in the report to address the quality of sub-projects but it is not clear if these recommendations were taken on board. Interviews conducted in 2018 with CECI, PADH and Fonkoze\(^{61}\) suggest that the quality of PRODEP sub-projects remains uneven.

5.4 Capacity Building & Resilience

118. During the period covered by the CSP 2013-2016, the CDB provided USD9 mn in grants to three additional areas: regional integration and public-sector capacity building (USD1 mn); micro, small and medium size enterprise (MSME) development (USD0.8 mn); and resilience (USD6 mn).

Finding 18: CDB funded public-sector capacity building and support to MSMEs have been self-reported as effective.

Public sector capacity building

119. In the area of capacity building, CDB provided support to l’École Nationale d’Administration Financière (ENAF) which was created by the Ministry of the Economy and Finance (MEF) to train mid-level civil servants. CDB support responded partly to the MEF’s request to create suitable and efficient learning conditions, including the designs for a well-equipped classroom after ENAF’s original premises were destroyed in the 2010 earthquake. The MEF also wanted to create a pool of staff specialized in project cycle management.

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\(^{60}\) Rapport Final Audits techniques Sous Projet et Formation du PRODEP, Cecile Berut et Abel Jean Bernard -Novembre 2012

\(^{61}\) Fonkoze is a family of three organizations that work together to provide financial and non-financial services to empower Haitians—primarily women—to lift their families out of poverty.
120. ENAF records were lost during the earthquake, however according to stakeholder interviews, 20 participants were trained prior to the 2010 earthquake. Subsequently three cohorts were trained between 2014 and 2015, as shown in Table 5.7.\textsuperscript{62} CDB also provided equipment in the computer lab and a multifunctional room for training activities, including translation and simultaneous interpretation services.

121. Follow-up interviews conducted as part of the 2018 mission indicate that the multifunctional room for training activities provided by the CDB grant has been used extensively by ENAF but also by other GOH entities because it is well-equipped and, until recently there were very few alternatives for training delivery.

122. No documents were available on the degree of satisfaction of those who were trained, so it is difficult to assess the effectiveness of training. However, during the 2018 mission to Haiti, consulted ENAF stakeholders were positive overall regarding the effectiveness of the training. Training content is considered very appropriate because GoH civil servants often lack basic skills in management. A second positive note was that most of those who had been trained have remained in government, even if they changed ministries; fewer than 10\% had left the public sector to move outside Haiti. Consulted stakeholders said that there is also strong demand for M&E training, which they feel is not covered in sufficient depth in the existing curriculum. We have not been able to confirm this perspective from other sources.

\textsuperscript{62} The data for the period preceding the earthquake is limited. ENAF’s archives were destroyed in the 2010 earthquake.
Table 5.7  Participation in ENAF training between 2014 and 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SUBJECT OF PROJECT TRAINING</th>
<th>PERIOD</th>
<th>TOTAL TRAINEES</th>
<th># OF WOMEN</th>
<th>% OF WOMEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Appraisal and Economic Management (PAEM)</td>
<td>August 2014</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public-private partnerships</td>
<td>December 2014</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PAEM evaluation</td>
<td>March 2015</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Support to Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises

123. As part of the CSP 2013-2016, CDB, through its Caribbean Technological Consultancy Services (CTCS) invested USD0.8 mn to provide training activities to support the tourism sector. The implementation of some of these TA interventions was delayed beyond the 2016 end of the second CSP.

124. Evidence provided to the evaluators and included in Table 5.8 indicates that between 2010 and 2018, CDB provided technical assistance (TA) to many MSMEs in growth sectors, including agribusiness and agro-processing and tourism.

Table 5.8  CTCS Interventions in Haiti - 2010 to 2018 (Approvals and Disbursements, in USD)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>APPROVED</th>
<th>DISBURSED</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Workshops on Project Management and Labour Laws for SMEs</td>
<td>8,750.00</td>
<td>8,750.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Workshop on Financial Management Techniques for MSMEs</td>
<td>17,469.50</td>
<td>17,469.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Workshop on Enhancing Customer Service Delivery for MSMEs</td>
<td>27,520.00</td>
<td>22,447.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Attachment of Nine Haitians In Hospitality Services</td>
<td>79,893.89</td>
<td>79,893.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group Training Attachment Of Fourteen Haitians in Hospitality Services at the Crane Residential Resort</td>
<td>91,813.27</td>
<td>91,813.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Workshop on Enhancing Customer Service Delivery for MSME in Cap-Haitien, Haiti</td>
<td>17,311.63</td>
<td>17,311.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Workshop on Marketing Techniques for Small Hotels, Haiti</td>
<td>16,340.63</td>
<td>16,340.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Attachment To DAIDB of Two Officials from SOFIHDES, Haiti</td>
<td>9,685.00</td>
<td>9,685.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Train-The-Trainer Workshop/Training Attachment in Hospitality Services</td>
<td>34,293.70</td>
<td>34,293.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Workshop on Basic Garment Construction In Cap-Haitian, Haiti</td>
<td>26,843.46</td>
<td>26,843.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market Research And Development of a Marketing and Technical Plan For Star Industries S.A.</td>
<td>8,000.00</td>
<td>8,000.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESCRIPTION</td>
<td>APPROVED</td>
<td>DISBURSED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Train-The-Trainer Workshop on Enhancing Customer Service Delivery for MSMEs</td>
<td>20,140.47</td>
<td>20,140.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Workshop on Marketing Techniques for Small Hotels in Haiti</td>
<td>24,713.53</td>
<td>24,713.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Workshop on Enhancing Customer Service Delivery for MSMEs in Jacmel, Haiti</td>
<td>21,213.25</td>
<td>21,213.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer Service Delivery Workshop In Les Cayes</td>
<td>30,818.00</td>
<td>25,320.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer Service Delivery Workshop In Cayes-Jacmel</td>
<td>22,007.13</td>
<td>22,007.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer Service Delivery Workshop In Gonaives</td>
<td>21,335.50</td>
<td>21,335.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer Service Delivery For MSMEs (Grand Nord)</td>
<td>21,434.30</td>
<td>21,434.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer Service Delivery Workshop For MSMEs</td>
<td>19,270.25</td>
<td>19,270.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat'l Training Workshop In Haiti - Food And Beverage Managt - Port-Au-Prince</td>
<td>14,108.75</td>
<td>14,108.75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat'l Training Workshop In Haiti - Front Desk Operations - Port-Au-Prince</td>
<td>14,356.50</td>
<td>14,356.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat'l Training Workshop In Haiti - Housekeeping - Port-Au-Prince</td>
<td>14,612.50</td>
<td>14,612.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat'l Training Workshop In Haiti - Food And Beverage Managt - Cote Des Arcadins</td>
<td>18,051.60</td>
<td>18,051.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat'l Training Workshop In Haiti - Front Desk Operations - Cote Des Arcadins</td>
<td>17,862.50</td>
<td>17,862.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat'l Training Workshop In Haiti - Housekeeping - Cote Des Arcadins</td>
<td>18,179.00</td>
<td>18,179.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat'l Training Workshop In Haiti - Food And Beverage Managt - Cap Haitian</td>
<td>16,875.50</td>
<td>16,875.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat'l Training Workshop In Haiti - Front Desk Operations - Cap Haitian</td>
<td>16,440.02</td>
<td>16,440.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat'l Training Workshop In Haiti - Housekeeping - Cap Haitian</td>
<td>17,102.50</td>
<td>17,102.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat'l Training Workshop In Haiti - Food And Beverage Managt - Les Cayes</td>
<td>14,471.00</td>
<td>14,471.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat'l Training Workshop In Haiti - Food And Beverage Managt - Les Cayes</td>
<td>2,255.50</td>
<td>2,255.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat'l Training Workshop In Haiti - Front Desk Operations - Les Cayes</td>
<td>14,345.00</td>
<td>14,345.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nat'l Training Workshop In Haiti - Housekeeping - Les Cayes</td>
<td>16,690.50</td>
<td>16,690.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National Workshop on MFDR For Business Support Organisations – Haiti</td>
<td>56,805.00</td>
<td>50,089.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Attachment for Mervs Laguerre and Vital-Herne From Iphasa in Hot Pepper Sauce Manufacturing</td>
<td>10,154.61</td>
<td>10,154.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training Attachment for Theophile and Frederic Wiener of Geo Wiener in Man. Of Chocolate</td>
<td>5,159.70</td>
<td>5,159.70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>786,323.69</strong></td>
<td><strong>769,038.08</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Although there was not detailed data on all the CTCS interventions, available information suggests that the TA interventions reviewed were implemented with the appropriate target groups, were generally very well received, and are leading to expected changes.

125. Performance data made available to the evaluator were mostly about projects that began in 2014, and included:

- Train-the-Trainer Workshop (TTW) in Customer Service (CS) for MSMEs
- Workshop on Marketing Techniques (MT) for Small Hotels
- TTW/Training Attachment in Hospitality Services
- Training Attachment for two officials of SOFIHDES, a Haitian Development Bank
- Workshop on Basic Garment Construction (BGC)
- Market Research (MR), Marketing Plan (MP) and Technical Plan (TP) for Stars Industries S.A. (SISA), an Agro-processing Company
- Training Attachment for IPHASA executives in hot pepper sauce manufacturing.

126. The proposed CTCS interventions were expected to improve the competitiveness of MSMEs and their capacity to create and maintain jobs. The majority of the interventions targeted MSMEs in the tourism sector, which is a major source of employment for women. The project aimed at leading to more skilled and marketable hospitality.

127. The following provides a sense of the outputs and outcome achievements of some of the TA interventions for which data were available.

**Intervention 1: Enhancing Customer Service Delivery for MSMEs**

128. CDB supported a one-week train-the-trainer workshop (TTW) on customer service for a group of 14 Haitian nationals (5 female, 9 male). SOFIHDES, CTCS’s main Cooperating Institution was responsible for managing and delivering the workshop. It was developed in response to CTCS’ experience in Haiti, which showed that some MSMEs, including hotels, operate without a structured approach to customer service (CS) and, as such, they do not put into practice various fundamental controls required for the consistent delivery of quality CS.

129. It was envisioned that within four months of completion of the workshop, CTCS and SOFIHDES would host follow-on workshops, facilitated by the new trainers, in the six most developed departments in Haiti, and targeted at various MSMEs within the hospitality sector, including hotels. These were expected to benefit approximately 120 persons (70 females and 50 males).

130. The project achieved its output level objectives. As shown in Table 5.9, by the end of 2016, the 14 trainers had trained 330 individuals, far exceeding the original target, and the training is still going on. There is high demand for such courses and interviews with SOFIHDES in 2018 indicate that the workshops are continuing. Nine of the original 14 trainers are still active members of the pool of trainers, four years after their initial training. Five others have moved on to other professional careers.

131. Interviews conducted in 2018 with SOFIHDES indicated that the results of the training were mixed. On the positive side, the investment in the sector is very welcome and the needs are great. However, there were a few things that were problematic: targeting of participants was not optimal and those who participated were not always those who should have been trained; there was no planned follow-up to see if participants had been able to apply their skills on the job. A bigger question, however, is whether tourism

63 Société Financière Haïtienne de Développement S.A.
remains a significant potential vector of growth in Haiti. There are no indications that Haiti is becoming a
tourist destination, given the health and security issues and remaining political instability.

Table 5.9  Summary of training provided by SOFIHDES, 2015-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TRAINING CONTENT</th>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>CITY</th>
<th>PLANNED BUDGET</th>
<th>ACTUAL BUDGET</th>
<th># OF PARTICIPANTS</th>
<th>WOMEN</th>
<th>MEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Customer Service</td>
<td>09/13 to 09/18 2015</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince</td>
<td>11,875.00</td>
<td>11,330.00</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer Service</td>
<td>09/13 to 09/18 2015</td>
<td>Les Cayes</td>
<td>14,825.00</td>
<td>14,595.50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer Service</td>
<td>11/23 to 11/27 2015</td>
<td>Cap Haitien</td>
<td>12,885.00</td>
<td>13,447.75</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer Service</td>
<td>10/05 to 11/09 2015</td>
<td>Gonaïves</td>
<td>12,225.00</td>
<td>12,225.00</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer Service</td>
<td>08/31 to 09/04 2015</td>
<td>Cayes Jacmel</td>
<td>12,845.00</td>
<td>11,964.50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Customer Service</td>
<td>04/13 to 04/17 2015</td>
<td>Jacmel</td>
<td>13,125.00</td>
<td>12,289.50</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front Desk</td>
<td>06/13 to 06/15 2016</td>
<td>Cap Haitien</td>
<td>9,025.00</td>
<td>10,107.50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front Desk</td>
<td>08/01 to 08/03 2016</td>
<td>Cotes des Arcadins</td>
<td>9,975.00</td>
<td>10,090.50</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Front Desk</td>
<td>04/03 to 04/05 2016</td>
<td>Les Cayes</td>
<td>9,080.00</td>
<td>8,916.90</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Beverage</td>
<td>05/09 to 05/11 2016</td>
<td>Cap Haitien</td>
<td>9,955.00</td>
<td>8,959.00</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Beverage</td>
<td>04/18 to 04/20 2016</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince</td>
<td>9,025.00</td>
<td>8,168.75</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Beverage</td>
<td>06/13 to 06/15 2016</td>
<td>Cote des Arcadins</td>
<td>9,975.00</td>
<td>11,079.70</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Food and Beverage</td>
<td>00/19 to 07/21 2016</td>
<td>Les Cayes</td>
<td>9,025.00</td>
<td>8,168.00</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeeping</td>
<td>06/13 to 06/15 2016</td>
<td>Port-au-Prince</td>
<td>9,025.00</td>
<td>8,633.50</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeeping</td>
<td>08/03 to 08/05 2016</td>
<td>Cap Haitien</td>
<td>9,855.00</td>
<td>9,298.50</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housekeeping</td>
<td>08/01 to 08/03 2016</td>
<td>Cote des Arcadins</td>
<td>9,975.00</td>
<td>10,120.00</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>172,695.00</strong></td>
<td><strong>169,394.60</strong></td>
<td><strong>330</strong></td>
<td><strong>207</strong></td>
<td><strong>123</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: SOFIHDES 2018
Intervention 2: Workshop on Marketing Techniques for Small Hotels

132. CTCS conducted a 5-day workshop on “Marketing Techniques for Small Hotels in Haiti” targeted at approximately 25 to 30 managers and supervisors (approximately 60% female and 40% male) of hotels operating in Port-au-Prince, its environs and the south of Haiti. We know that the workshop was conducted, but do not have any information or feedback on the results or outcomes.

Intervention 3: TTW/Training Attachment in Hospitality Services

133. CDB funded a TA intervention to develop a cadre of trained Haitian trainers who could deliver training to a much larger number of employees/potential employees in the various areas of hotel management, front desk operations, food and beverage management and housekeeping. The CTCS facilitated a two-week train-the-trainer workshop (TTW) and training attachment in Barbados at the Accra beach hotel and Crane Residential Resort (The Crane) for a group of 21 employees of nine hotels selected by the Association of Hotel Industry of Haiti (see Table 5.10). One additional person, Executive Director of HTA (EDHTA), was attached to the Barbados Hotel and Tourism Association (BHTA). The training attachments were expected to equip participants with relevant information, knowledge and skill to be applied in their respective hotels and share with other hotels, thereby contributing to improving the operations of a number of hotels in Haiti.

Table 5.10 Participants in TTW/Training Attachment in Hospitality Services

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>HOTEL/AGENCY</th>
<th>FOOD AND BEVERAGE MANAGEMENT</th>
<th>FRONT DESK OPERATIONS</th>
<th>HOUSEKEEPING</th>
<th>INSTITUTIONAL STRENGTHENING</th>
<th>TOTAL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Le Plaza</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La Reserve</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Club Indigo</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kinam</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auberge Inn</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karibe</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Visa Lodge</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Octalliance</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Montana</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HTA</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

134. Following the training, CTCS conducted an evaluation that included interviews with trainees and their managers, videotaping trainees on the job, and reviews of customer comments. The evaluation concluded that the training attachment had led to remarkable improvement in skills, knowledge, language
(acquisition of English), attitude towards customers, and skills in front office operations, food and beverage management, and supervision.

**Intervention 4: Training Attachment of Two Officials from SOFIHDES to DAIDB**

135. CTCS provided two officials from SOFIHDES (the General Manager and the Marketing and Quality Director) with an opportunity to participate in a one-week training attachment at the Dominica Agricultural and Industrial Development Bank (AID BANK). The attachment took place from 6 to 10 October 2014 and included meetings with Bank executives and managers to better understand the Bank’s business model, field visits to customer projects in agro-processing and tourism, and a conference call with the Director of the CARICOM Development Fund.

136. The SOFIHDES officials considered the mission a success and a great learning experience. They reported that it helped them validate some strategic decisions and offered possibilities to explore, such as expanding credit facilities to other sectors, and ways to improve profitability.

**Intervention 5: Training Attachment for IPHASA at Baron Foods**

137. In 2010, CDB supported a training attachment for two employees of IPHASA, an agro-processing company in Haiti, to gain hands-on knowledge and understanding of some technical requirements for the commercial manufacturing of hot pepper sauce. The attachment took place from 18-22 October 2010 at Baron Foods Ltd., one of the foremost hot pepper sauce manufacturing companies in the Caribbean region, based in St. Lucia. Based on feedback from these two employees obtained by CTCS the training attachment was successful IPHASA benefitted from new knowledge acquired to modify its approach to manufacturing its hot pepper sauce.

**Intervention 6: Market Research and Marketing Plan for SISA**

138. CTCS provided TA to SISA, a female-led micro agro-processing enterprise specializing in the production of pepper sauce, green seasoning sauce, barbecue sauce, vinegar, plantain chips and potato chips. The TA was conducted to help SISA develop a better understanding of the pepper sauce market, supply and demand trends, factors that determine success, and opportunities for SISA to increase its share of the market.

139. The TA was participatory as SISA engaged in talks with farmers to discuss the quality of peppers required for a higher end product. It was completed successfully and allowed SISA to develop a new formula for a pepper sauce that is now sold to mass market.

140. After completing the TA, SISA entered a business plan competition organized by LEAD, a USAID programme that aims to attract investment in Haitian commercial enterprises. SISA was one of the winners and received a matching grant of USD 50,000.
Resilience

Finding 19: Although CDB has paid Haiti’s insurance premiums to CCRIF since May 2013, CDB’s support for resilience remains hard to assess due to lack of evidence.

141. As noted in the literature, Haiti is among the top five countries worldwide in respect to exposure to multiple hazards, with 93% of the area and 97% of the population exposed to two or more hazards. Its Disaster Risk index is 6 and its WorldRisk index is 11.45%, placing it 32nd in the global ranking.

142. Although Haiti is covered to some extent by the Caribbean Catastrophe Risk Insurance Facility (CCrif), the Micro-Insurance Catastrophe Risk Organization (MiCRO), and the Alternative Insurance Company (AIC), the catastrophe insurance sector is weak in Haiti. The GOH received a CCRIF payout of USD7.8 mn in 2010 for the earthquake, but the effects of the disaster are still being felt.

143. Due to the current social, economic and fiscal challenges being faced by the people of Haiti, GOH was not able to make its regular payments to CCRIF. Since May 2013, CDB has paid the country’s insurance premiums to CCRIF which covers Haiti’s earthquake, tropical cyclone and excess rainfall policies. Under this arrangement, the country has received three major payouts, most recently following Hurricane Matthew in October 2016. Since then, later in 2016 for example, GOH requested grant assistance of USD3.5 mn to cover its CCRIF premiums for the period 1 June 2016 to 31 May 2017. CDB was the only institution to assist GOH to pay its CCRIF premium coverage for these hazards over this period.

144. Being covered by CCRIF is crucial for a country like Haiti. The Project Completion Report (PCR) of CDB’s support for CCRIF coverage presents evidence that CCRIF payment for the January 12, 2010 earthquake was believed to be the first significant financial inflow after the earthquake. Possibly influenced by the earthquake of 2010, Haiti later increased its earthquake coverage and reduced its hurricane coverage.

145. Based on interviews with CDB project teams, the payout for the earthquake was made available within a few weeks, which enabled GOH to continue to pay civil servants. While such funds are fungible, keeping civil servants working was probably important in getting quick action for recovery. However, this is only indirectly linked to CDB’s financial vulnerability objective and it is unclear if the payment systems, such as salary payment, functioned adequately following the disaster.

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64 Political Champions Group - Partnership for stimulating insurance penetration in lower income countries. “Initial Market Assessment - Country Scoping Note: Haiti”, September 2013, p.2
65 The Disaster Risk index is a mortality-based Index (7 classes; 7-high mortality)
66 The WorldRisk index indicates the probability that a country will be affected by a disaster by combining exposure to natural hazards, susceptibility (as a function of public infrastructure, housing conditions, nutrition and the general economic framework), coping capacities and adaptive capacities to future natural events and climate change.
70 Ibid
Gender

Finding 20: During the period 2007-2015, CDB’s overall portfolio was not managed through a gender lens, but there are recent indications of better support for gender equality initiatives.

146. CDB aims to be a leading catalyst promoting gender equality (GE) in the region by working with Borrowing Members and other development partners in a responsive and collaborative manner to analyze the economic and social causes of gender inequality in order to reduce poverty and vulnerability. The Bank adopted a Gender Equality Policy and Operational Strategy (GEPOS) in 2008 and gender objectives were also elaborated in the CSPs for Haiti, but without specific expected results or indicators. The 2016 evaluation report noted that CDB’s programmes in all sectors typically kept gender disaggregated data, but had not done anything specific to mainstream or improve GE.

147. The 2018 evaluation team found that, more recently:

- The Bank helped Haiti undertake capacity-building initiatives with a focus on women’s empowerment and gender equality.
- The TVET Project II Components funded by CDB (2016) included the development of a gender strategy for TVET.
- In the PRODEP component 2, capacity building and TA, 59 CADECs were trained in project cycle management and a gender-based approach.
- The new CSP (2017-2021) features gender equality as a cross-cutting issue.

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6. MANAGEMENT AND EFFICIENCY

148. With the information available, this section focuses on the efficiency of implementation and on CDB’s overall management of the portfolio (M&E).

Finding 21: The 2010 earthquake created tremendous capacity shortages in Haiti that affected the efficiency of CDB project implementation. Other political and contextual factors also affected efficiency.

149. CDB has experienced extraordinary challenges in Haiti, with the 2010 earthquake occurring during the implementation of its first CSP. Due to the loss of life, human resources, infrastructure, and documents, the GOH had to refocus its priorities after January 2010. This meant that all GOH technical and financial partners had to halt or revisit their country strategies or re-design their projects. Given this context, the fact that CDB projects were implemented at all is in itself an accomplishment.

150. Most of CDB’s interventions in Haiti were designed to be implemented in partnership with the GOH, and national systems were supposed to help programme implementation. However, the 2010 earthquake and subsequent natural disasters, as well as political turmoil, restricted the development of national systems and hindered the institutional strengthening of bodies and agencies that were supposed to undertake CDB’s programme (INFP, MENFP, ENAF). This resulted in delays in disbursements and execution of projects funded by CDB. However, there were no reported problems related to CDB’s management of funds or procurement and project funds were eventually disbursed in full.

151. With respect to the education sector, Haiti’s generally slow bureaucracy and political turmoil did not favour the efficiency of the EFA project and its implementation, and these factors were exacerbated in the post-earthquake context. The GOH had difficulties in fulfilling the legislative requirements necessary to sign the EFA Grant Agreement and this led to almost two years of delays in all phases of execution. The first phase of CDB’s support for the EFA project was approved in September 2007 but the first disbursement from CDB was only made in July 2009. This had a significant impact on the pace of implementation of CDB’s education programming in Haiti. Phase 1 of the EFA project was supposed to be implemented between 2007 and 2010, Phase 2 from 2010 to 2012, followed by a Phase 3 between 2012 and 2015. In fact, Phase 2 of the EFA project was approved by CDB Board of Directors in December 2013, and project implementation started in 2014.

152. The TVET project also encountered difficulties related to delays at the initial stage. Although conditions were satisfied by GOH in July 2010, which was 22 months after the grant approval in September 2008, the 2010 earthquake severely impacted implementation and caused many losses to the National Vocational Training Institute (INFP). As described in the effectiveness section (paragraph 90), other factors, including security, land tenure, and soil contamination affected the pace of implementation.

153. Haiti’s Ministry of Education (MENFP) was characterized by limited experience and insufficient fiduciary capacity, and therefore extensive capacity building was planned through EFA project activities.

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72 CDB. "Education for All Project, Republic of Haiti, Revised Scope and Additional Grant", Appraisal Report, Port-au-Prince, October 2010, p.3.
73 CDB. "Education for All Project, Republic of Haiti, Revised Scope and Additional Grant", Appraisal Report, Port-au-Prince, October 2010.
74 CDB. "Education for All Project, Republic of Haiti, Revised Scope and Additional Grant", Appraisal Report, Port-au-Prince, October 2010, Appendix 2.2.
76 CDB. "Technical and Vocational Education and Training Project, Republic of Haiti, Revision in Scope and Additional Grant", Appraisal Report, November 2012, p.3.
However, in spite of delays in submitting annual audit reports and financial reports, no major concerns or breaches were reported. Following the earthquake and the loss of significant human and material capacities of the MENFP, the EFA project coordination unit (PCU) operated more autonomously. This facilitated project implementation and alleviated some disaster consequences, but reduced GOH’s EFA ownership and capacity building.

154. The CDD projects experienced fewer delays and were completed only two months after planned completion. These projects were implemented in areas less affected by the earthquake and not reliant on GOH for implementation.

Finding 22: CDB’s project management in Haiti benefitted from the systems of other partners such as the WB and IDB. The Bank still manages by outputs rather than outcomes, and its monitoring and evaluation were weak for several reasons: lack of baseline data; data gaps due to the earthquake, and monitoring systems that were not always compatible.

155. CDB’s strategy and programme were generally considered to be relatively efficient as the Bank was able to count on the reliable and established presence of its strategic joint funding partners. The Bank benefited from their procurement platforms and financial procedures, as well as their respective reporting systems for monitoring, evaluation and audits.

156. Interviewed GOH representatives and other donor agencies had a generally positive impression of how CDB managed its projects, with a few exceptions (e.g., delays in obtaining responses to non-objection requests, in particular in the TVET project).

157. However, from the perspective of managing for development results, a close look at CDB’s project results frameworks (RF) indicates that while they included output and outcome targets, there is no evidence that any reporting was done at the outcome level and there were no apparent systems in place to collect (and thus report on) outcome level results. CDB is managing by outputs. In very vulnerable countries like Haiti it is even more crucial to manage at the outcome level (i.e., to identify and monitor the expected change) so that, if necessary, changes can be made quickly at the activity level in order to achieve the intended outcome.

158. The crucial data gap in Haiti is an ongoing issue, and the situation was worsened by the earthquake when the data and systems of many GOH ministries were destroyed.

159. Another issue is the lack of alignment between some of the systems used by project implementing partners and GOH. As an example, in the CDD projects, the monitoring systems used by CECI and PADF were not correlated with the systems used by various sectoral ministries. For example, the Ministry of Agriculture established its own benchmarks and identified the expected impact of CDB projects. It would have been beneficial to make a connection between the project benchmarks and those of the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development (MARNDR). In addition, CDB monitoring missions could have included officials from the ministries involved. The creation of steering committees would have also made it possible to share information with the sectoral ministries involved.

Finding 23: Given its lack of in-country presence, CDB’s decision to implement projects in collaboration with agencies that were on the ground in Haiti was a smart move that supported the efficiency of its programmes.

160. Until September 2018, CDB had no presence in Haiti. In 2007, when Haiti joined CDB, the Bank recognized that it had no experience working in countries in a humanitarian context like Haiti and had no familiarity with the French language. To mitigate its inexperience, CDB decided to support other initiatives implemented by donors with significant experience and actual presence in Haiti. CDB favoured joint approaches and joint funding in most projects implemented with the World Bank, CIDA, and IDB.
161. This proved to be a good thing for a number of reasons. First, in a context that is so chaotic and unpredictable, project efficiency depends heavily on the ability to react quickly and take necessary actions to ensure projects are well implemented. Because the WB and IDB were on site, they were able to visit projects as often as necessary and report back to CDB. That was a huge benefit and CDB supervision reports testify that CDB project supervisors were satisfied with this arrangement.

162. The choice of CECI and PADF as implementing partners for PRODEP and PRODEPUR also supported the efficiency (and effectiveness) of the projects because the partners had an intimate knowledge of the community areas and were able to point out any emerging problems to CDB. These two NGOs were also able to provide CDB with accurate and timely technical and financial reports.

*In a situation where almost on a weekly basis one needed to interact with the construction workers who had stopped all work (in Cap Haitien) because of security issues, we needed the presence of the IDB who were our ears and our eyes in between our supervision missions. Without this presence, addressing project issues would have been challenging, delays would have been greater.*  
(CDB staff member)
7. SUSTAINABILITY

Introduction

163. In the context of natural disaster and political turmoil, sustainability of results is often challenging and in the case of Haiti the sustainability of many investments is weak. However, to complicate the matter, CDB did not monitor or report on project outcomes (expected changes), so it is sometimes challenging to determine if changes that could have resulted from CDB investments have been sustained. Therefore this section includes qualitative data obtained through interviews with other stakeholders.

Basic Education & Technical and Vocational Education Training

Finding 24: Access to basic education in Haiti has improved significantly and has been sustained over the past decade. Quality of education remains a huge challenge and there is no sign of any sustainable results. In the TVET sector, the new prototype designs for vocational centres are being used and are considered sustainable.

164. Access to education, which was one of the goals of the EFA projects in which CDB invested, has increased dramatically in Haiti the last twenty years. All interviews conducted in 2016 and 2018 suggested that access to education was no longer a critical issue for the country, with 80% of children having access to school, should they wish to attend. Whether this encouraging and long lasting result is due to the EFA or to investments made by NGOs, religious communities or other private groups is difficult to assess.

165. One thing is certain, however: the quality of education in Haiti remains a major preoccupation and challenge for GOH. In spite of investments made by EFA, there is profound discouragement among donors and other stakeholders about the lack of evidence of improvements in the quality of education after a decade of effort. Consulted stakeholders continue to highlight the insufficient number of qualified teachers, the weak quality of teaching, the challenges of delivering a curriculum in a country where a significant percentage of the population speaks only Créole and where pedagogical materials and manuals have not fully adapted to that reality. In spite of efforts made to train teachers, and to experiment with approaches aimed at improving literacy, there are few results to show and no likelihood of sustainability.

166. A key challenge for the sustainability of results is the lack of capacity in the education sector at central and decentralized levels. Technical and financial partners are questioning the ability of the central level (MENFP) to play the required leading role in the education system. Representatives of the donor community interviewed during the 2016 and 2018 missions are discouraged about their failed attempts to build capacities at the central level and are questioning if this is the right model in a country where national institutions are so vulnerable. In future education initiatives, they are considering using more targeted approaches focusing on the Departmental or Commune levels.

167. In the TVET sector, sustainability of investments is more encouraging. Despite delays that occurred during the 2007-2015 period, the main outputs, the new vocational centres, have been built and are operating. Interviewed TVET stakeholders, including engineers in charge of construction and rehabilitation of the Centres, say that the prototype design work supported by CDB through the TVET project is being used in the design of new centres and is therefore considered a sustainable result. There is no evidence that other TVET project outputs are being used; the framework for employability of youth exists but is not reported as having been used extensively.

Community-Driven Development & Agriculture

Finding 25: Overall, CDD projects relied on the participation of local communities and grassroots community organizations, and therefore had an impact on local capacity building and autonomy. However, long-term impact cannot be assured and is threatened by GOH’s lack of involvement, and project dependency on international assistance.

168. It takes time for social development that creates links between civil society organizations, local community organizations, neighbourhood associations, and elected officials. These long-term changes also require a favourable and stable political context with a genuine commitment by the State to the decentralization process. However, CDD projects in Haiti are taking place without clear State commitment; recent governments have not prioritized decentralization and the postponement of local elections also weakened local institutional structures. 79

169. For PRODEP and PRODEPUR, sustainability strategies were put in place by the various implementing partners. These included investment management plans, the creation of accountable management committees, and business plans for productive enterprises. By the end of the CDD programme, the projects had developed sustainability strategies such as investment in infrastructure maintenance. Elected officials and organization leaders had also received training and capacity building to ensure better management of investments and to monitor sub-projects more effectively. Dialogue was opened with several municipalities regarding investment budgets and operations, and tools were developed to improve consideration and management of investments in their communities.

170. In a technical audit of sub-projects financed by PRODEP conducted in 2012, it was noted that:

- Projects that are genuinely led by communities, and therefore characterized by strong social cohesion and clearly identified needs, seem to be more sustainable.
- Project heads must oversee the quality of construction and social investments to ensure greater durability.
- Certain infrastructure projects could not be completed, primarily because budgets were insufficient. It is unlikely that these projects will be viable without sound infrastructure, adapted to the context.
- One of the roles of the CADECs is to monitor sub-projects, but they do not have the means to do this, hence the importance of institutionalizing with other stakeholders to monitor sub-projects.

171. It would have been beneficial for CDB to work more closely with the GOH Ministry of Agriculture (MARNDR) to build consensus, particularly with respect to local development. While there was dialogue and collaboration at a local level with some decentralized administrations (MSPP, MENFP, DNEPA and EDH) for the implementation of smaller projects, including discussions on strategy, co-financing, construction standards, material allotments, these did not lead to formal agreements on how to more effectively sustain the investment grants. CDB relations with MARNDR department heads on CDD projects were limited.

172. Furthermore, there were no national agreements to ensure the sustainability of sub-projects or that structures like the CADECs were called on to ensure follow-up on investments. At present, very few CADECs are still operating. Alongside PRODEP and PRODEPUR, other changes have emerged in the last

79  Alterpresse: Haiti-Élections : Les Nations unies préoccupées du retard mis pour le scrutin local, municipal et sénatorial, jeudi 23 février 2012, “Since November 2011, a vote was supposed to be held to replace 1/3 of the Haitian senate (that is, 10 senators out of 30), and on the second Monday of the month of January (2012) to elect municipal and local authorities, that is, 140 municipal administration councils (of 3 members) and 560 communal administration councils (of 3 members).”
few years in Haiti, with a desire to gather rural organizations, establish umbrella management structures, and build links between CBOs and elected officials. Unfortunately, these changes rarely survive beyond project closure, because, all too often, these programmes are driven by international cooperation and without any direct link to the federations, local community and social movements, and no institutionalization of structures in the context of decentralization. This is a major concern for GOH, which has mentioned the heavy dependence of CDD initiatives on international NGOs as field implementers.

**Capacity Building & Resilience**

**Finding 26:** In capacity building and resilience, the sustainability of outcomes remains largely dependent on the willingness of the GOH to invest resources to support these results. Technical assistance and training attachments for MSMEs seem to be achieving sustainable results, although very often on a small scale.

**Capacity Building**

173. There were two types of assistance offered in public sector capacity building: infrastructure and training. The infrastructure supported in the ENAF project is reported to be widely and sustainably used.

174. The sustainability of training outcomes depends on several factors: ongoing availability of trained trainers to teach new public administration staff; and effective mobilization and use of the knowledge and skills acquired in the public administration entities in question. These factors depend on the GOH and its capacity to mobilize the necessary resources.

175. A core group of 10 trainers was trained with CDB’s support. Seven of these trainers are public servants integrated into other ministries and they could, in theory, be mobilized if necessary. However, it is unlikely that they will have retained learning acquired several years after the training if they have no opportunity to practice.

**MSME Capacity Building**

176. The CTCS technical assistance (TA) interventions and training attachments for MSMEs for which we received information and feedback appear to have achieved their expected outcomes. Their degree of sustainability would need to be reviewed case by case. Some participants and trainees reported that they were able to apply their new skills and this would demonstrate a high degree of sustainability if they remain in their positions, which was the case in TAs that we reviewed. By and large the CTCS small scale interventions seem to be sustainable.

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80 Execution of communal plans and funding of sub-project by Initiative Développement dans le Nord Ouest, Projet de Transport et Développement Territorial funded by WB, the Programme d’Appui aux Initiatives Locales (PAIL) project funded by FIDA (Plateau Central, Nord Ouest, etc.).

81 Caribbean Development Bank, OIE. “Validation of Project Completion Report on Rural Community Driven Development Project – Haiti”, September 2017, p.ii

82 One trainer died during the earthquake, another left the country and a third could not be traced.
8. CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATIONS, CORPORATE CONSIDERATIONS

Conclusion

177. CDB completed its first decade of work in Haiti in a high-risk environment exacerbated by a major natural disaster. Overall, the strategic objectives and proposed interventions of the CSP 2009-2012 and CSP 2013-2016 were well aligned with the SDF 7 and SDF 8 themes and directions. Both of the CSPs supported the priorities developed by the GOH in 2007 and revisited after the 2010 earthquake.

178. Although its project areas in Haiti were highly impacted by the 2010 earthquake, CDB maintained its focus and demonstrated significant flexibility to adapt and reallocate funds as deemed necessary by GOH. In addition to the relevance of its programming, the recent presence of the CDB as a financial and technical partner in Haiti is seen by the GOH as highly relevant.

179. Given its lack of in-country presence, CDB’s decision to implement projects in collaboration with agencies that were on the ground in Haiti was a smart move that supported the efficiency of its programmes. CDB’s project management benefitted from the systems of other partners such as the WB and IDB. The Bank still manages by outputs rather than outcomes, and its monitoring and evaluation were weak for several reasons: lack of baseline data; data gaps due to the earthquake, and monitoring systems that were not always compatible.

180. Despite some delays, the Bank managed to deliver on all its projects with a smart choice of delivery approach. Results have been mixed, and for all international partners there has been concern that project outputs cannot necessarily be traced through to significant changes at the sector or national level.

181. In such a context, the sustainability of results achieved remains weak. In the education and training sector sustainability largely dependent on the willingness of the GOH to invest resources to support results. In the CDD sector several communities are still lacking skills or resources required to sustain results.

Recommendations

182. CDB is now at a turning point in Haiti, with a new Country Strategy (2017-2021), and a significant investment in its first country office. In its work to date with the World Bank and IDB in education and community development, the Bank was able to rely on their experience, proximity and knowledge of fragility in the national situation. While not abandoning those relationships, the CDB now contemplates a more direct role in managing and implementing projects in a fragile state.

183. There is a considerable literature on good practices in international assistance to fragile states, including the OECD DAC principles. Among others, these emphasise the importance of a deep understanding of national and local context, and of doing no harm.

184. The findings of this evaluation, and the principles for fragile state programming, suggest areas where the Bank may wish to reflect on its management and implementation approaches, at a number of levels, to best ensure sustainable development outcomes.

185. While good MfDR practice is important in any context, it is particularly so in situations of fragility. Clear understanding of expected outcomes, risks and assumptions to achieving them; and sufficient supervision, are key enablers of sustainable results achievement.

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83 For example, the OECD-DAC principles for programming in fragile states: https://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/docs/38368714.pdf
Recommendation 1: CDB should review and update the results framework for its Haiti Country Strategy at an appropriate interval over the CS cycle. The review should emphasise focused and realistic outcome statements, indicators, risks and assumptions, so that the framework can be used to manage and report on the Bank’s overall engagement.

186. At the time of approval of the Haiti Country Strategy in December 2017, the expected programme details in some sectors were still evolving, and the results framework could not be fully developed. Advances in planning are however underway, and some revisiting of the results framework has already taken place. When judged appropriate, and in advance of the mid-term review, it would be opportune to revise and update the CSP results framework.

Recommendation 2: CDB should ensure that its approach to project design, and level of effort in supervision, are commensurate with the challenges of programming in Haiti.

187. In a fragile context, project design must be supported by a robust theory of change that fully accounts for the complexities of the local and national context. CDB’s emerging experience in the TVET sector illustrates some of these complexities. To get regional centres built involved significant land suitability and engineering hurdles being overcome initially. Then there were questions of whether training to be delivered would be suited to the current labour market. Curriculum redesign in turn raised issues of how to appropriately equip classrooms. Links to the private sector, to both influence curriculum and place trainees were not strong. The policy and regulatory environment for the sector has taken time to put in place, and may not yet be achieving the desired effect. These challenges have carried over into problems of employability upon graduation. Some NGOs have found that without taking a multiple intervention approach with specific individuals, it is difficult to break the cycle of poverty and vulnerability. All this to say that cookie cutter designs that make unwarranted assumptions about enabling environments are unlikely to succeed in Haiti. As projects are now starting under the new CSP, it is a good time to closely examine their theories of change and make necessary refinements.

188. With respect to project supervision, the evaluation team observed that to date it had been managed with relatively infrequent visits. While this is acceptable when other agencies (such as WB and IDB) have taken the lead in supervising a project and then relay to CDB any issues emerging during implementation, it is not likely to be adequate when CDB is implementing projects on its own. Supervision will be needed at a frequency that CDB has not previously experienced, perhaps even every quarter, to ensure that necessary corrective measures happen expeditiously. Consideration will also be needed of what role the country office will play in these efforts (see next).

Recommendation 3: CDB should take full advantage of its new Haiti Country Office, by formally setting out its mandate, responsibilities, and authorities in a way that maximizes its contribution to in-country coordination (with other international partners and the GoH), and to achievement of expected development results.

189. CDB’s new Haiti country office has been universally welcomed by international and Haitian authorities. For the latter in particular, there is a view that as an institution of the region, CDB can achieve a special understanding and affinity with Haitian aspirations, including facilitating its greater integration in the Caribbean region.

190. Other multilateral and bilateral donors and major NGOs in Haiti have well staffed country offices that play a strong role in planning and managing their programmes, coordinating with others, and working with the GoH. There are various sector coordination structures in place that are intended to facilitate harmonisation, although it was reported to the evaluation team that not all of these have so far been effective in practice.

191. There is an opportunity for CDB’s country office to play a meaningful role within this architecture, and to actively develop and communicate the deep understanding of local context that will enable the
success of Bank interventions. It will have to be clearly tasked and mandated to do so however, with specific expectations of its contribution to facilitation of Country Strategy objectives. This will involve careful delineation of its relationship with HQ teams, and of the extent to which it can speak with authority on project issues during in-country coordination processes.

Corporate Considerations

Corporate Consideration 1: What is the most appropriate delivery mechanism for stand-alone CDB interventions?

192. In 2007, when Haiti first joined CDB, the Bank adopted the logical approach of joint funding with other agencies. This made sense because CDB had little experience in the country, limited knowledge of national stakeholders and dynamics, and wanted to minimize any potential difficulties arising from language barriers between English, Creole and French. As such, it decided to co-fund projects that had been designed by agencies that were already on the ground in Haiti. This choice also made sense as the GOH asked the Bank to come on board as quickly as possible.

193. Ten years later, the situation has evolved. The Bank has started the implementation of its third CSP, it has a decade of experience in understanding the country, and it now has a country presence. Its portfolio of projects no longer rely exclusively on joint funding and it is working in sectors (such as TVET) that other GOH partners are no longer supporting.

194. As CDB moves ahead in the implementation of its CSP and considers its future programming, it may want to start gathering lessons from its own experience and the experience of other donors about programme delivery mechanisms. What model would be most appropriate for its interventions, in particular in sectors where it intervenes alone? Different models exist: a Project Coordination Unit (PCU) with representatives from Ministries; a PCU with staff recruited externally; or an independent unit (such as the AFD is using). Each has its advantages and limitations. Which one(s) will be most appropriate?

Corporate Consideration 2: Where to target capacity building interventions?

195. The evaluation noted the concerns in the donor community about the weak capacities of GOH. Despite ongoing efforts by all donors to build GOH capacities, lack of stability and high turnover in Ministries have been impeding the implementation of projects for many years.

196. Donors in Haiti are considering increasing the emphasis in their capacity building efforts at the Commune and Departmental levels. Their hypothesis is that building capacities closer to where projects are being implemented will increase the effectiveness and efficiency of their programming. These donors are also expanding and strengthening their programming delivery with non-state actors as partners.

197. Going forward, CDB may want to reflect on the balance to strike between centralized and decentralized capacity building.
CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

TERMS OF REFERENCE

COUNTRY STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME EVALUATION (2007-15)
COUNTRY STRATEGY (2017-21) BASELINE AND EVALUABITIY ASSESSMENT

HAITI

OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT EVALUATION
March 2018
1. Background

Haiti remains a fragile Low Income Country (LIC) with high levels of poverty and inequality and a large segment of the population dependent on the agricultural sector, which accounts for over 25% of GDP. Haiti still relies heavily on international assistance, given its vulnerability and fragility, with official pledges of assistance rising to USD10 bn following the earthquake, of which just over USD6.5 bn was estimated to have been received at the end of 2012.

CDB supported Haiti with just under USD79.3 million (mn) in approved Grants between 2007 and 2015, with total disbursements close to USD68.7 mn, with the most significant investments dedicated to education and agriculture and rural development.

Over 2015 and 2016, the Office of Independent Evaluation (OIE) planned and commissioned an evaluation of the Caribbean Development Bank’s (CDB) Country Strategy and Programme for Haiti, for the period 2007-2015. The evaluation reviewed the relevance of CDB’s country strategy and the performance of its grant portfolio. It reported limitations including a less than complete results framework for the 2013-2016 CSP, and difficulty in obtaining data to test it. Preliminary findings found strong alignment of the programme with GoH priorities, and responsiveness to changing needs. This included community development, education and disaster management initiatives tailored to post earthquake needs. There was evidence that outputs were substantially achieved, and some of the more quantifiable outputs exceeded. Institutional strengthening and capacity development performed less well. Outcome and impact level results were difficult to judge.

A new Country Strategy Paper (CSP) (2017-21) was prepared, and approved by the Board of Directors (BOD) in December 2017. The 2017-21 CSP focuses CDB assistance in three areas: i) education and training; ii) community development and agriculture; and iii) sustainable energy development. Crosscutting interventions that promote environmental sustainability including disaster risk management (DRM), as well as gender equality also feature. A results monitoring framework (RMF) accompanies the CSP, outlining expected outcomes, indicators, targets, and baselines. However, a number of gaps remain in the RMF, particularly with respect to baselines and targets.

2. Scope of Assignment

Objectives

Three key objectives guide this assignment:

a) Gather additional evidence in support of the findings of the 2016 evaluation exercise in order to complete the Country Evaluation report.

b) Based on findings and newly gathered evidence, review the proposed results framework in the 2017-2021 CSP and as necessary outline a revised edition of outcomes, indicators and targets to ensure a clear, coherent, feasible and relevant results framework.

c) Based on findings and newly gathered evidence, propose baseline data for the results framework.

Methodology

To address each of the objectives above, the Consultant will be expected to design and implement a data gathering and analysis plan, drawing on both quantitative and qualitative data. Evidence will be developed
using document review, portfolio analysis, structured interviews and/or survey internal to CDB, and a field visit to Haiti for key informant interviews.

(a) Desk review: In order to effectively complete the 2016 Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation (CSPE), the Consultant will review reports of other agencies with whom CDB cooperated, and Project Completion Reports (PCRs) and Project Supervision Reports (PSRs) that have been completed in the period since 2016. This desk review will be a main means of data triangulation in support of the 2016 evaluation mission findings.

(b) Interviews: Interviews with CDB staff as well as in-country interviews with sector experts, other development agencies, and GoH officials will allow for both the completion of the 2016 evaluation triangulation as well as the validation and completion of the 2017 CS results framework and baseline.

(c) Review of CSP 2017-2021: Using the data generated from the desk review and interviews, there will be an evaluability assessment of the new Haiti Country Strategy (2017-2021) that examines the quality and feasibility of outcome statements, the appropriateness of indicators and targets, and clarity and evidence for baselines. Where necessary, new baselines will be constructed. Sustainable energy development is a new emphasis in the 2017 CS, whose outcomes, indicators, targets and baselines will also need examination to complete the evaluability assessment.

3. Assignment timeframe and deliverables

The estimated level of effort for this assignment is 70 day person days, over the period May to December 2018. This will include travel to Haiti, as well as onsite work at CDB offices.

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity / Deliverable</th>
<th>Estimated Dates</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Contract Signature</td>
<td>May 1 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Document Review and Analysis</td>
<td>June-August 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inception Report</td>
<td>May 30 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission to Haiti</td>
<td>September 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Draft Report</td>
<td>November 30 2018</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Final Report</td>
<td>January 15 2019</td>
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The inception report will be based on an initial review of documents, and discussions with Bank staff, and will include a workplan as well as a data collection and analysis design. Comments from OIE expected to be provided within one week of submission.

The draft report will contain the initial compiled, organised and analysed evidence from the desk review, interviews and field mission, with a clear indication of the data which supports the 2016 findings, as well as recommendations for the 2017-2021 country strategy results framework and baseline. Comments to be provided by OIE within three weeks of submission.

All deliverables must be submitted in English.

4. Consultant Qualifications

Qualifications of an individual include the following expertise:
(a) Masters or equivalent in relevant fields including economics, environmental science, evaluation, sociology, anthropology or other;

(b) Extensive experience (at least 10 years) in the design and conduct of country assistance evaluation;

(c) A strong record in designing and conducting evaluability assessments;

(d) Experience working in Haiti;

(e) Experience participating in evaluations with MDB and government clients;

(f) Strong inter-cultural communication skills in English and French/Creole;

(g) Knowledge of, and experience in applying qualitative and quantitative evaluation methods, including the ability to integrate qualitative and quantitative data;

(h) Strong report writing and presentation skills, ability and experience in communicating concepts using non-technical language to diverse audiences;

(i) Ability to work in an iterative, collaborative approach; and to give and receive constructive feedback.

5. Management of the Evaluation

The consultant will report to CDB’s Office of Independent Evaluation (OIE) which will oversee the evaluation, providing overall direction and guidance, and monitoring and approving deliverables. OIE will provide feedback on the inception report, and draft and final reports.
## Appendix II  EVALUATION MATRIX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CRITERIA</th>
<th>Key Evaluation Questions</th>
<th>Sub-Questions</th>
<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Data Collection Methods</th>
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</thead>
</table>
| 1. Relevance | 1.1 To what extent was CDB’s country programme adequate to help Haiti to address its principal structural development challenges? | To what extent was CDB’s country programme adequate to help Haiti to address:  
- A weak education system and skills base?  
- Poor infrastructure?  
- Environmental degradation?  
- Institutional and structural weaknesses?  
- Weak governance, political instability and insecurity? | Degree of thematic and alignment between CDB country programmes and Haiti’s development challenges.  
Percentage of CDB’s country programme investments made in priority sector areas.  
Perceptions of CDB Managers and staff and GOH that CDB’s country programme is relevant to help Haiti address its structural issues. | Country Strategy Papers 2010-2012 & 2013-2016  
CDB Annual Reports  
CDB staff/managers Partners representatives  
GOH representatives | Document Review  
Semi-structured Interviews |

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<th>Indicators</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Data Collection Methods</th>
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<tr>
<td>1.2 To what extent was CDB’s country programme adequate to help Haiti to address challenges that emerged during implementation of the CSP?</td>
<td>To what extent was CDB’s country programme adequate to help Haiti address challenges related to devastating and recurring natural disasters? (e.g. issues with displaced people; building capacity in the public sector; cholera outbreak, etc.) In particular, challenges related to the following events: The 2010 earthquake; Hurricane Tomas (2010); Hurricane Irene (2011); Hurricane Sandy (2012). To what extent was CDB’s country programme adaptable to an unstable political context, marked by several local and presidential election periods?</td>
<td>Adequacy of the nature, type and scope of interventions proposed in the CDB Haiti country programme to address all issues that emerged during the implementation. Degree of satisfaction of CDB and GOH stakeholders with the alignment of activities, projects, programs with implementation issues.</td>
<td>Country Strategy Papers 2010-2012 &amp; 2013-2016 CSPE Approach Paper (2015) CDB Annual Reports CDB staff/managers Partners representatives GOH representatives</td>
<td>Document Review Semi-structured Interviews</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2. Efficiency</strong></td>
<td>2.1 What are the main factors explaining the successes or failures of programme implementation (including operational design and portfolio management)?</td>
<td>What are the main factors explaining the successes of programme implementation? What are the main factors explaining the failures of programme implementation?</td>
<td>Enabling and limiting factors cited by CDB and GOH stakeholders as well as listed in key documents</td>
<td>Country Strategy Papers 2010-2012 &amp; 2013-2016 CSPE Approach Paper (2015) CDB staff/managers GOH representatives</td>
<td>Document Review Semi-structured Interviews</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2 How has CDB’s support to Haiti’s institutional framework developed to alleviate any emerging problems with execution?</td>
<td>What is the nature of CDB’s support towards Haiti’s institutional framework? How has this support evolved? To what extent was this support adapted to alleviate risks related to any emerging problems (political crises, natural disasters)?</td>
<td>Nature of CDB’s support to GOH. Amounts granted by CDB to GOH and by type of Ministry, by year. Perceptions that CDB’s support was adapted to alleviate any emerging problems.</td>
<td>CDB Annual Reports Grant Disbursement Details 2015 Policy-Based Grant, Staff Report 2009 Grant Portfolio Details by Fund, 2014 CDB staff/managers GOH representatives</td>
<td>Document Review Semi-structured Interviews</td>
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<td>2.3 To what extent did the risks identified in the CSP adequately identify operational design elements?</td>
<td>What were the risks identified in the CSPs?</td>
<td>Nature of risks identified in the CSP. Evidence that operational design elements were identified as risks. Perceptions that operational design elements were identified as risks.</td>
<td>Country Strategy Papers 2010-2012 &amp; 2013-2016 CSPE Approach Paper (2015) CDB staff/managers</td>
<td>Document Review Semi-structured Interviews</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2.4 Given the importance of international cooperation in Haiti, what role has CDB played in working together with other Development Partners?</td>
<td>How has CDB coordinated and harmonized its activities with other Development Partners of GOH?</td>
<td>Scope (sector, investments) of the National Development Plan of Haiti supported by the CDB. Harmonization of CDB’s support (scope and investment) to GOH with other key development partners (IDB, bilateral agencies, UN, etc.). Perceptions of GOH stakeholders and key development partners.</td>
<td>Country Strategy Papers 2010-2012 &amp; 2013-2016 Partnership Framework Partners representatives CDB staff/managers GOH representatives</td>
<td>Document Review Semi-structured Interviews</td>
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<tr>
<td>3. Effectiveness&lt;sup&gt;87&lt;/sup&gt;</td>
<td>3.1 To what extent have the project outputs been achieved?</td>
<td>To what extent were the key output results articulated in project of each of the three areas (Basic Education, Community-driven development and agriculture, and capacity building and resilience) achieved?</td>
<td>Number / percentage of outputs planned vs. actual and explanation of variance. Perception of CDB and GOH stakeholders on the quantity and quality of outputs delivered.</td>
<td>Appraisal Reports&lt;br&gt;Project Supervision Reports&lt;br&gt;Completion reports (where available)&lt;br&gt;Annual reports&lt;br&gt;Haiti CSP from other Multilateral Banks&lt;br&gt;CDB staff/managers&lt;br&gt;GOH representatives</td>
<td>Document Review&lt;br&gt;Semi-structured Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.2 To what extent have the projects’ outcomes been achieved or how likely is it, based on the information available, that the project’s outcomes will be achieved?</td>
<td>To what extent where the key output results articulated in project of each of the three areas (Basic Education and TVET, Community-Driven Development and Agriculture, and Capacity Building and Resilience) achieved? How likely is it, based on the information available, that the project’s outcomes will be achieved in the three areas (Basic Education and TVET, Community-Driven Development and Agriculture, and Capacity Building and Resilience)?</td>
<td>Number /percentage of outcome achievement by area, and /OR Perception of CDB and GoH stakeholders on the quantity and quality of outcomes achieved. Expert judgment and GoH and CDB stakeholders on the likelihood of project outcome achievement.</td>
<td>Appraisal Reports&lt;br&gt;Project Supervision Reports&lt;br&gt;Haiti CSP from other Multilateral Banks&lt;br&gt;Completion reports&lt;br&gt;Annual reports&lt;br&gt;CDB staff/managers&lt;br&gt;GOH representatives&lt;br&gt;Partners representatives</td>
<td>Document Review&lt;br&gt;Semi-structured Interviews</td>
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</table>

<sup>87</sup> Due to the significant shortage of results data (outputs and outcomes), the evaluation will rely on a combination of perceptual data, secondary sources from other Multilateral Banks, and the CDB’s modest set of data available on results achieved. As such, the evaluation may not be able to provide evidence on some of the questions and sub-questions presented in the matrix and emanating from the Terms of Reference.
<table>
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<tr>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>What specific contributions did CDB make to help Haiti reduce its fiscal constraints and address climatic vulnerability?</td>
<td>Did CDB take action to help Haiti reduce its fiscal constraints? &lt;br&gt;Did CDB create an emergency fund to help Haiti address climatic vulnerability?</td>
<td>Amounts granted by CDB to GOH and by type of Ministry, by year, to help Haiti reduce its fiscal constraints. &lt;br&gt;Amounts granted by CDB to GOH to help Haiti address climatic vulnerability.</td>
<td>CDB Annual Reports&lt;br&gt;Grant Disbursement Details 2015&lt;br&gt;Policy-Based Grant, Staff Report 2009&lt;br&gt;Grant Portfolio Details by Fund, 2014&lt;br&gt;CDB staff/managers&lt;br&gt;GOH representatives</td>
<td>Document Review&lt;br&gt;Semi-structured Interviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Sustainability</td>
<td>What evidence is there that the outcomes obtained with CDB’s programme are sustainable?</td>
<td>To what extent has GOH demonstrated an ability to sustain outcome results? &lt;br&gt;Are other technical and financial partners supporting GOH to sustain CDB country programme’s outcomes?</td>
<td>Evidence of GOH (or other financial partner) investment in sustaining outcomes achieved by the CDB country programme.</td>
<td>End of project reports&lt;br&gt;Completion reports&lt;br&gt;Annual reports&lt;br&gt;Results monitoring framework&lt;br&gt;CDB staff/managers&lt;br&gt;GOH representatives&lt;br&gt;Partners representatives</td>
<td>Document Review&lt;br&gt;Semi-structured Interviews</td>
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EVALUATION 2016

CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK

Country Strategy and Programme Evaluation

**Financial Documents**


**Education for All**


**Capacity Building: Micro, Small and Medium Size Enterprises**


**Technical and Vocational Education and Training**


**Rural Community Driven Development**


**Urban Community Driven Development**


**Disaster Risk Management**


**Other Sectors**


Berut, Cecile and Bernard, Abel Jean. « Rapport Final – Audits techniques sous projet et formation du PRODEP », November 2012


**HAITI GOVERNMENT**


**OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS**

**Inter-American Development Bank**


International Monetary Fund


International Monetary Fund. "2015 Staff Report for the Article IV Consultation and Request for a Three-Year Arrangement under the Extended Credit Facility", Press Release, Staff Report and Statement by the Executive Director for Haiti, Washington, D.C., June 2015.


International Monetary Fund. “Haiti Ex Post Assessment of Longer-Term Program Engagement”, January 2015.


The World Bank


**Other International Organizations**


USAID, “Haiti, Success Story, Better Prospects for Out-of-School Youth”, date unknown.
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<tr>
<td>ADAM Pierre Jean Marie</td>
<td>Coordonnateur de l’Unité de Coordination de Projet de renforcement du système de formation professionnelle (August 2017 – to date)</td>
<td></td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALTINE Daniel</td>
<td>Coordonnateur de l’Unité de Coordination de Projet de renforcement du système de formation professionnelle (Nov 2005 – Aug 2016)</td>
<td>✓</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>BARON Juan</td>
<td>Education Manager, World Bank</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>DURCÉ Maguy</td>
<td>Directrice Général, Institut National de Formation Professionnelle (INFP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EWALD Anouk</td>
<td>Membre du Cabinet du Ministre de l’Éducation; Ancienne gestionnaire du portefeuille FTP, BID-Haïti</td>
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<tr>
<td>GENIN Matthieu</td>
<td>Program Manager AFD, Formation professionnelle</td>
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<td>GONZALEZ Alison Elias</td>
<td>Spécialiste en Éducation, BID-Haïti</td>
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<tr>
<td>GUILLAUMETTE Mervil</td>
<td>Directeur Général, Institut National de Formation Professionnelle (INFP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JANTZEM Yves</td>
<td>Bureau Chargé de Programme en Éducation, Banque Mondial</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEAN Abadiasse</td>
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<td>JEUNE Méniol</td>
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<td>MAJÈROME Jean Milet</td>
<td>Coordonnateur Programmes/Équipements, Unité de Coordination du Programme de Formation Professionnelle</td>
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<td>MARGRON Eveline</td>
<td>Spécialiste en Education, BID-Haïti</td>
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<td>NARCISSE Harold</td>
<td>Coordonnateur Technique, Cabinet du Ministre de l’Éducation Nationale</td>
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<tr>
<td>PAUL Réginald</td>
<td>Ancien Ministre de l’Éducation; Ancien coordonnateur de l’EPT; Spécialiste sénior en éducation-formation</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>PIERRE (Dr.) Délima</td>
<td>Directeur Général, ONAPE</td>
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<td>PREVILON Edgard</td>
<td>Coordonnateur Gouvernance et Coordonnateur Général a.i. (August 2016 – July 2017) Projet de renforcement du système de formation professionnelle</td>
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<td>SALOMON Jean Bonheur</td>
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<td>STIMPHIL Norbert</td>
<td>Ancien Coordonnateur du projet Éducation Pour Tous</td>
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<tr>
<td>TELFORT Rénold</td>
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<tr>
<td>BOYER Dominique</td>
<td>Directrice Financière, FONKOZE</td>
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<tr>
<td>LESPERANCE Fedner</td>
<td>Chef de Site Jean Rebel, Welt Hunger Hilfe</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>LOMBARDO Annalisa</td>
<td>Country Director, Welt Hunger Hilfe</td>
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<td>ROENEN Carine</td>
<td>Directrice Exécutive, FONKOZE</td>
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<tr>
<td>THERMIL Alain</td>
<td>Contact person, MARNDR; Conseiller Senior, UPISA/MARNDR; Point Focal, USAID/USDA; Régisseur Programme, 11e FED/SAN</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADMETTRE Alphonse Junior</td>
<td>Secrétaire Exécutif, Commission de Réforme des Finances Publiques et de Gouvernance Économique (CRFP-GE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ALDONZA Ken</td>
<td>Operations Officer (Energy), Projects Department, Economic Infrastructure Division</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ALLIEN Nicolas</td>
<td>Coordonnateur des Projets Énergies Renouvelables et Accès à Énergie, Projet SREP et CTF, Cellule Énergie, Ministère des Travaux Publics, Transports et Communications (MTPTC)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>AMOS C. Peters</td>
<td>Economist, Caribbean Development Bank</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>CADET Charles (Dr.)</td>
<td>Consultant au Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances (MEF); ancien collaborateur du Comité de Pilotage de Revalorisation de la Fonction Économique du MEF (2010-2011); Coordonnateur, Commission de Réforme des Finances Publiques et de Gouvernance Économique (CRFP-GE)</td>
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<td>CELICOURT Moïse</td>
<td>Secrétaire Exécutif, Commission de Réforme des Finances Publiques et de Gouvernance Économique (CRFP-GE)</td>
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<td>CHERY Moïse Galilé</td>
<td>Secrétaire Exécutif, Commission de Réforme des Finances Publiques et de Gouvernance Économique (CRFP-GE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ELYSEE Rose-Lourdes</td>
<td>Coordonnatrice Générale, Unité Centrale de Gestion des Partenariats Public-Privé (PPP), Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>JEAN-BAPTISTE Jessie Rameau</td>
<td>Officier de Formation, Direction des Services Non-Financiers, Société Financière Haïtienne de Développement (SOFIHDES)</td>
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<tr>
<td>JULIEN Pierre Raynaud DUVERT Farell</td>
<td>Directeur Général de l’École Nationale d’Administration Financière (ENAF)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAMOTHE FORTUNE Michaelle</td>
<td>Director of Non-Financial Services, Société Financière Haïtienne de Développement (SOFIHDES)</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LOUIS Fritz Gérald STAMAR Catex</td>
<td>Cellule de la Direction des Etudes Économiques (DEE) du Ministère de l’Économie et des Finances (MEF) chargée du suivi de la coopération externe</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>MARCELIN Jean Josué</td>
<td>Secrétaire Exécutif, Commission de Réforme des Finances Publiques et de Gouvernance Économique (CRFP-GE)</td>
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<td>NELSON Guerda</td>
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<td>PIDOUX Caroline</td>
<td>Chargé de Projets, Direction des Services Non-Financiers, Société Financière Haïtienne de Développement (SOFIHDES)</td>
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**Caribbean Development Bank**

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<tr>
<td>CLARENDON Deidre</td>
<td>Social Sector division chief, CDB</td>
<td>✓</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAWRENCE Stephen</td>
<td>Country Office Representative, CDB Haiti; Supervisor, Former Projects (EFA, TVET, PRODEP-PRODEPUR)</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIERRE-LOUIS Hancy</td>
<td>Conseiller pour Haïti au Conseil d’Administration, CDB</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>ST VILLE Luther</td>
<td>Operations Officer, CDB</td>
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<td>ZIEGLER Maria</td>
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**Other**
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<td>ANDRECY Robens</td>
<td>Chargé de projets, Agriculture et sécurité alimentaire, CECI</td>
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<td>BARBOT Ernest</td>
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<td>BELLONY Anabelle</td>
<td>Gestionnaire du portefeuille du FTP, BID-Haïti</td>
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<td>BONNEAU Pierre Xavier</td>
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<tr>
<td>CARMEL BELIARD André</td>
<td>Chargé de suivi, BMPAD; Ancien Coordonnateur de Projet PRODEP-PRODEPUR; Ancien Ministre Agriculture</td>
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<tr>
<td>DAMAIS Gilles Georges</td>
<td>Former Chief of Operations, IDB Country Office; former Consultant of MARNDR</td>
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<td>EUGENE Jaquelin</td>
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<td>MICHEL Guypsy</td>
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<td>PIERRE John</td>
<td>Responsable de Suivi et Évaluation, PADF</td>
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