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CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK



**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY WITH MANAGEMENT RESPONSE
AND
PROJECT COMPLETION VALIDATION REPORT**

RURAL COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT – HAITI



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OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT EVALUATION

SEPTEMBER 2017

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CARIBBEAN DEVELOPMENT BANK



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PROJECT COMPLETION VALIDATION REPORT

RURAL COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT – HAITI

SEPTEMBER 2017

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

PROJECT SUMMARY

1. Political instability and natural hazard events have devastated Haiti's economy and weakened state institutions. As a result, many Haitians, in particular those living in rural areas experience high levels of poverty and lack access to basic infrastructure and services and income generation opportunities. In an effort to break the cycle of poverty and social exclusion which for decades plagued Haiti's rural communities, the Government of the Republic of Haiti (GOH) in 2004 initiated, with funds of the World Bank (WB) Post-Conflict Facility, a One million dollar (\$1 mn) Rural Community Development pilot project. Following the success of the pilot operation, GOH obtained, in 2005, a grant equivalent to \$38 mn from WB and began the implementation of the Community Participation Development Project (PRODEP) Programme in 2006. Since then WB has provided two rounds of additional financing in response to increased pressures on rural communities associated with an influx of urban residents after the January 2010 earthquake. PRODEP was implemented in 59 (out of 140) municipalities in all Departments of Haiti and proved to be an effective mechanism for building social inclusion and social capital, community participation, transparency, trust and public/private partnerships at the local level. The programme's mechanism also efficiently transferred resources to local communities and reduced poverty by improving basic social and economic infrastructure and services, through the creation of income-generating opportunities for rural residents.

2. The Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) chose to add its financing to the PRODEP initiative in December 2011. It provides funding for rural investments (sub-projects) and for the capacity building of Community-based organisations (CBOs) and Community Development Councils (CADECs) with a focus on rural communities in northern Haiti.

3. The project targeted poor rural communities in 31 municipalities of 5 Departments, defined by the country's 2008 poverty map as the poorest in the country. Most of the municipalities in these Departments, which were also located away from major urban centres, had limited access to markets because of poor road and market infrastructure and suffered considerable damage from storms and hurricanes.

PROJECT OBJECTIVES OR EXPECTED OUTCOMES

4. The objectives of the project were to improve access by poor rural communities to basic and economic infrastructure; to improve income-generating opportunities; and to improve governance and build social capital at the local level.

EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT

Overall Assessment

5. The Project Completion Report (PCR) and the Evaluator rate the overall performance of the project as Satisfactory. The Evaluator's rating is determined by separately evaluating and rating the four core criteria: Relevance; Effectiveness; Efficiency and Sustainability, and then computing their arithmetic average.

6. Note that the PCR used the older Project Performance Evaluation System (PPES) rather than the current Performance Assessment System (PAS).

Relevance

7. Using the PPES, the PCR rates Strategic Relevance and Poverty Relevance as Highly Satisfactory. The project was a direct response to the need to reduce the levels of poverty in Haiti by improving the social and economic well-being of persons residing in poor rural communities. It contributed to the assistance framework outlined in the CDB Haiti Country Strategy Paper (CSP) (2009 - 2012) and the associated CDB strategy for assisting Haiti in the aftermath of the January 2010 earthquake. The Evaluator (using the PAS) also rates the project's relevance as Highly Satisfactory.

Effectiveness

8. The Effectiveness rating is a simple arithmetic average of the individual ratings for project outputs and project outcomes. The PCR rates Development Objectives (DO) as Probable and Project Outputs as Satisfactory. The Evaluator also rates both Outputs and Outcomes as Satisfactory.

9. The project financed three components which mirrored those of the WB-financed PRODEP:

- (a) Community sub-project financing for small-scale investments (basic social and economic infrastructure and services) proposed, implemented and managed by CBOs;
- (b) Capacity-Building and Technical Assistance (TA) for strengthening of CBOs, Conseils d'Appui au Developpement Communautaire/Community Development Councils (CADECS), and local government in the management and organisation of CBOs, project cycle management, mechanisms for the maintenance of sub-projects, municipal administration and management, and the promotion of the institutional sustainability of the CADECS; and
- (c) Management, Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) by the Project Coordinating Unit (PCU).

Efficiency

10. The PCR and the Evaluator rate this criterion as Satisfactory. Implementation of the project was completed on March 31, 2014, three months after the projected completion date of December 31, 2013. The various adjustments to the project did not affect the overall project cost. By the project completion date, 185 sub-projects were completed compared to the planned 180.

Sustainability

11. The PCR rates the sustainability of the project as *Satisfactory* citing institutional and maintenance/ technical reasons. It notes that GOH has expressed a concern with the heavy dependence on international Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) as field implementers.¹ The PCR acknowledges that there is a concern about the sustainability of the sub-projects due to a "weak decentralisation policy framework (lack of municipal funding)"² and the inability of CBOs to maintain facilities and infrastructure developed under the project as they do not have sufficient financial resources.

¹ PCR, Section VII page 21

² PCR page 18

12. However, with regard to the risks and assumptions outlined in the Log Frame, it is likely that the benefits will be realised, in the absence of adverse climatic events. The Evaluator agrees with the PCR's assessment of *Satisfactory*.

Beneficiary and Executing Agency Performance

13. The PCR rates the performance of the Beneficiary/Implemented Agency as Unsatisfactory. It states that the Implementation Agency, Bureau de Monetisation de l'Aide au Developpement, BMPAD, did not comply with all aspects of the terms of conditions of the Grant Agreement. It did not procure the consultant/firm to implement the capacity building for CADECs in the South municipalities nor the end-of-project evaluation. No reasons were provided for non-compliance. There was no evidence on file of reports submitted by BMPAD to CDB. The Evaluator, noting that in the absence of the required implementation reporting, CDB hired a team of engineers to supervise work, and using a broader band of performance criteria under the current project (PAS), rates the Beneficiary's performance as Marginally Unsatisfactory.

CDB Performance

14. The PCR rates CDB performance as Satisfactory. It states that CDB carried out three project supervision missions over the 15 months of project implementation. The supervision teams were adequately staffed with specialist skills in agriculture and rural development, social, and civil engineering. Given the large geographical area and number of sub-projects which were implemented, it was not possible to visit all of the sub-projects. The supervision mission accordingly utilised the next best option - a variant of stratified sampling on each mission.

15. The PCR states that stakeholders at the Project Exit Workshop were highly appreciative of the support which the CDB team provided and the insistence that the team placed on the need to ensure that sub-projects were of a high quality and implemented in a transparent manner.

16. The Evaluator assesses CDB's performance as Highly Satisfactory on the basis of the application of a wider set of performance measurement criteria under the current project assessment system which assesses CDB performance during the entire project cycle. This commences with Quality at Entry (QAE) and continues during implementation with regard to the Quality of Supervision (QOS) taking into account the project's operating environment, sector and country contexts as it affects the intervention's outcomes. The PCR's assessment was generally restricted to project supervision activities.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

17. The PCR's assessment for overall performance is Satisfactory. Based on the foregoing analysis and available data, the Evaluator agrees with this rating. The Evaluator's rating is determined by separately evaluating and rating the four evaluation core criteria: Relevance; Effectiveness; Efficiency and Sustainability. The overall performance score is an arithmetic average of the total scores for the core criteria and results in a score of 3.25 or Satisfactory. Details of the ratings and the justification for differences between ratings from the PCR and the Evaluator are provided at Table 1.

TABLE 1: SUMMARY RATINGS OF CORE EVALUATION CRITERIA AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE PROJECT

Criteria	PCR	OIE Review	Reason if any for Disagreement/Comment
Strategic Relevance	Highly Satisfactory (4)	Highly Satisfactory (4)	
Efficacy	Satisfactory (3)	Satisfactory (3)	
Effectiveness	Satisfactory (3)	Satisfactory (3)	
Cost Efficiency	Satisfactory (3)	Satisfactory (3)	
Sustainability	Satisfactory (3)	Satisfactory (3)	
Composite (Aggregate) Performance Rating	Satisfactory (3.25)	Satisfactory (3.25)	
Borrower & EA Performance	Unsatisfactory	Marginally Unsatisfactory	Using the criteria in the PAS 2013, the Evaluator assessed Borrower Performance over a broader set of indicators. (See Appendix 9)
CDB Performance	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory	The Evaluator's assessment of CDB's performance was based on a wider set of performance criteria under PAS. The PCR's assessment was generally restricted to project supervision activities.
Quality of PCR	Not Rated	Marginally Unsatisfactory	The PCR uses an obsolete template that is not consistent with that of the Bank's OPPM as it was prepared during transition from PPES to PAS. As a result, the criteria and sub-criteria provided in the PAS Manual were not used to guide the preparation of the PCR and justify ratings. As a result, the analysis is not comprehensive.

Lessons

18. The PCR identified four lessons learned from implementation of the project as:

- (i) An inherent risk in the Community-Driven Development (CDD) methodology is the heavy dependence on non-governmental structures. The approach is often a source of tension between community organisations who maintain control over the resources and elected officials charged with the responsibility of local/national development. Not surprisingly, GOH has expressed concerns with this approach. Future CDB-financed projects should recognise GOH's concerns while ensuring the participation of target beneficiaries in the development process.
- (ii) The administrative/project management cost in Haiti is very high. The CDD methodology, requiring sub-project implementation by beneficiaries, places a further layer of costs given its heavy emphasis on capacity building and establishment of new governance structures. The experience of staff is that even with the capacity building

interventions most communities were not fully equipped to effectively manage the entire sub-project cycle. In addition, there is a high level of internal migration in Haiti, and as a result, capacity building interventions may not necessarily translate into a long-term resource for community building. Given the considerable, ‘hand holding’ of CBOs under the project, community-based approaches that involve participation but not actual management implementation may be more cost effective than the CDD methodology in the current Haitian context.

- (iii) CDB should continue to explore opportunities for cost sharing – management of interventions to increase the percentage of resources that are channelled directly to sub-project financing. This could involve, in addition to working with other Development Banks, partnering with NGOs that contribute funds (cash or kind) to sub-project implementation.
- (iv) Beneficiary communities generally expressed appreciation for the sub-project interventions. Several rural residents contacted during implementation supervision, and the views expressed during the exit workshop, suggest that CDB future interventions should more aggressively explore opportunities to increase food and nutrition security and income-generating opportunities. The Departments where the project intervened – in particular the North West and North East – are among the poorest and experience the highest levels of food and nutrition insecurity in Haiti. Given limited opportunities outside of agriculture for large segments of the Haitian population, projects that directly impact the agriculture sector output should be encouraged.

19. Apart from the above observation with regard to Lesson 2, the Evaluator concurs with these lessons and also notes that important data collected and reported in the Project Supervision Report (PSR) can be included in the PCR to more effectively report on the achievements and success of the projects. Greater detail on the performance and results of sub-projects would be useful for future designs using this approach to community development.

COMMENTS ON PCR QUALITY

20. The Evaluator rates the PCR quality as Marginally Unsatisfactory. The PCR uses an obsolete template that is not consistent with that of the Bank’s Operational Policies and Procedures Manual. The criteria and sub-criteria provided in the PAS Manual were not used to guide the preparation of the PCR and justify ratings. As a result, the analysis is not comprehensive.

DATA SOURCES FOR VALIDATION

21. The primary data sources for this validation exercise were CDB’s AR and Grant Agreement; CDB’s Project Supervision Reports; WB’s Project Implementation Completion and Results Reports; CDB’s Registry files in respect of the project; communication material from CDB Staff; and Maîtres D’Ouvrage Délégués (MDOD) (CECI) Contract and End of Project Report. The Evaluator also held discussions with members of the PCR team.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-UP

22. No follow-up for OIE is required. The Evaluator does not consider that a Project Performance Audit Report would provide significantly more information or identify other lessons than those contained in the PCR.

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MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

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SEPTEMBER 2017

MANAGEMENT RESPONSE

Comments on Evaluation of Performance and Overall Assessment

We are pleased that the Evaluator has agreed with the PCR's assessment that the overall performance of the project was Satisfactory. We also welcome the recommendation that the PCR's rating of CDB's Performance be upgraded to Highly Satisfactory from Satisfactory.

We note the Evaluators' observation that, *'the PCR used the older Project Performance Evaluation System rather than the current Performance Assessment System (PAS)*. However, at the time when the PCR was completed, the use of PAS had not been officially sanctioned – a point that was raised during a Projects Department and Office of Independent Evaluation meeting of June 10, 2016.

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PROJECT COMPLETION VALIDATION REPORT

RURAL COMMUNITY-DRIVEN DEVELOPMENT PROJECT – HAITI



**OFFICE OF INDEPENDENT EVALUATION
SEPTEMBER 2017**

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENT

Dollars (\$) throughout refer to United States dollars (USD) unless otherwise noted

Gourdes 1.00	=	\$0.025
\$1.00	=	40 Gourdes

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AR	-	Appraisal Report
BMPAD	-	Bureau de Monétisation des Programmes d'Aide au Développement / Office of Monetisation of Development Aid Programmes
CADEC	-	Conseils d'Appui au Développement Communautaire / Community Development Council
CBO	-	Community-Based Organisation
CDB	-	Caribbean Development Bank
CDD	-	Community-Driven Development
CECI	-	Centre d'Etudes et de Coopération Internationale
EMF	-	Environmental Management Framework
GOH	-	Government of the Republic of Haiti
MDOD	-	Maîtres D'Ouvrage Délégués
M&E	-	Monitoring and Evaluation
MEF	-	Ministry of Economy and Finance
MIS	-	Management Information System
mn	-	million
NGO	-	Non-Governmental Organisation
PAS	-	Performance Assessment System
PCR	-	Project Completion Report
PCU	-	Project Coordination Unit
POM	-	Project Operational Manual
PPES	-	Project Performance Evaluation System
PRODEP	-	Projet de Développement Communautaire Participatif/ Community Participation Development Project
PSC	-	Project Steering Committee
PSR	-	Project Supervision Report
QAE	-	Quality at Entry
QOS	-	Quality of Supervision
SFR	-	Special Funds Resources
TA	-	Technical Assistance
USD	-	United States dollar
WB	-	World Bank

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1. BASIC PROJECT DATA

Project Title	Rural Community-Driven Development Project
Country	The Republic of Haiti
Sector	Multi-Sector
Grant No.	<u>GA10/HAI</u>
Beneficiary	
Implementing/Executing Agency	Bureau de Monétisation de l'Aide au Développement (BMPAD)

<u>Disbursements (\$ mn)</u>	<u>CDB LOAN (USD'mn)</u>		
	<u>OCR</u>	<u>SFR</u>	<u>Total</u>
Grant Amount	-	10.00	10.00
Disbursed	-	9.76	9.76
Cancelled	-	0.24	0.24

<u>Project Milestones</u>	<u>At Appraisal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Variance (months)</u>
Board Approval	Dec 8, 2011	Dec 8, 2011	0
Grant Agreement signed	February 08, 2012	Mar 14, 2012	(1.2)
Grant Effectiveness ³	May 13, 2012	Aug 16, 2012	(3.1)

<u>CDB Grant</u>	<u>At Appraisal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Variance (months)</u>
First Disbursement Date	June 30, 2012	Dec 17, 2012	5.5
Terminal Disbursement Date	Dec 31, 2013	March 21, 2014	(2.7)
TDD Extensions (number)	0	1	1

<u>Project Cost and Financing (\$ mn)</u>	<u>At Appraisal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Variance (mn)</u>
CDB Grant	10.00	9.76	0.24
Counterpart	10.00	10.00	0
Total	20.00	19.76	0.24

<u>Implementation</u>	<u>At Appraisal</u>	<u>Actual</u>	<u>Variance (months)</u>
Start Date ⁴	May 13, 2012	August 16, 2012	(3.1)
Completion Date	Dec 31, 2013	Mar 31, 2014	(3)
Implementation Period (years)	0.60 years	1.60 years	1 year

Economic rate of Return (%) Not Applicable

³ Date Conditions to First Disbursement satisfied.

⁴ Implementation begins with satisfaction of conditions precedent

2. PROJECT DESCRIPTION

Rationale

2.01 Political instability and natural hazard events have devastated Haiti's economy and weakened state institutions. As a result, many Haitians, in particular those living in rural areas experience high levels of poverty and lack access to basic infrastructure and services and income generation opportunities. In an effort to improve governance and living conditions of its citizens, GOH in 2004, with the support of the WB implemented a rural community-driven development programme which targeted rural residents (PRODEP). PRODEP was implemented in 59 (out of 140) municipalities in all Departments of Haiti and proved to be an effective mechanism for building social inclusion and social capital, community participation, transparency, trust and public/private partnerships at the local level.⁵ The programme's mechanism also efficiently transferred resources to local communities and reduced poverty by improving basic social and economic infrastructure and services, through the creation of income-generating opportunities for rural residents⁶.

2.02 Beginning in 2012, CDB financing was added to PRODEP in support of the GOH and its efforts to reduce poverty and increase social capital in Haiti through rural investments (sub-projects) and for the capacity building of CBOs and CADECs with a focus on rural communities in northern Haiti.

2.03 The CDB project targeted poor rural communities in 31 municipalities of five Departments, identified by Haiti's 2008 poverty map as the poorest in the country. Most were located away from major urban centres, had limited access to markets because of poor road and market infrastructure, and suffered considerable damage from storms and hurricanes.

2.04 Using measured poverty levels made for a transparent selection method minimised the scope for, or appearance of, political interference over the distribution of project funds. This helped project a sense of fairness in government operations. While there were municipalities in every Department that met the poverty criteria, operational and efficiency aspects contributed to limiting the project intervention to the chosen Departments.

Expected Impact

2.05 The project was expected to contribute to sustainable social and economic development in selected rural communities in the Republic of Haiti.

Objectives or Expected Outcomes

2.06 The objectives of the project were to:

- (i) improve access by poor rural communities to basic social and economic infrastructure;
- (ii) provide income-generating opportunities; and
- (iii) improve community governance and build social capital at the local level.

⁵ WB Implementation Completion and Results Report, PRODEP -Haiti, 2013

⁶ AR, Paper BD 116/11: Chapter 1 Strategic Context and Rationale – Page 8, Paragraph 1.26 Rationale for Project.

Components and/or Outputs

Components

2.07 The Project consisted of the following components:

- (a) *Component 1- Community Sub-Project Financing:* Provision of financing for small-scale investments (basic social and economic infrastructure and services) proposed, implemented and managed by CBOs and Municipal Councils;
- (b) *Component 2 - Capacity-Building and TA:* Strengthening of CADEC's, CBOs and Municipality Councils in the management and organisation of CBOs, project cycle management, mechanisms for the maintenance of sub-projects, municipal administration and management, and mechanisms to advance the institutional sustainability of CADECs; and
- (c) *Component 3 - Management, M&E:* Financing the costs of BMPAD/PCU) for the management, M&E, and auditing of the Project.

Outputs

2.08 The planned outputs were: By December 31, 2013

- (a) 180 CBOs and Municipality sub-projects financed and implemented.
- (b) 59 CADECs receive training and TA in Project cycle management, gender issues etc.
- (c) 31 CADECs supervise CBO/Municipal Council sub-project cycle.
- (d) 4 CADECs manage \$200,000 each (with minimal MDOD assistance) for CBO subproject implementation.
- (e) At least 10 CADECs obtain a total of \$1.2 mn additional funding for CBO sub-projects.

Provision of Inputs

2.09 In December 2011, CDB approved a grant in the amount of USD10 mn to support GOH to assist in continuing the implementation of the Haiti Rural Community-Driven Development Programme. The CDB grant was to finance 50% of the estimated project cost of USD20 mn. The grant funds were to be utilised in part-financing the following three components: (i) Community Sub-Projects; (ii) Capacity-Building and TA; and Management and M&E. WB was to co-finance the project in the amount of USD8.31 mn while GOH was to provide counterpart funding in the amount of USD1.69 mn. A summary of project costs and financing at appraisal is provided in Table 2.

TABLE 2: SUMMARY OF PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING
ESTIMATED AT APPRAISAL⁷
(\$'000)

Item	CDB	WB	GOH/ Sub-Project Beneficiaries	Total
A. Component 1: Sub-project Financing	7,075		1,690	8,765
B. Component 2: Capacity Building and TA	2,738	6,870	-	9,608
C. Component 3. Project Management	187	1,440	-	1,627
Total Cost	10,000	8,310	1,690	20,000
Composition (%)	50	41	9	100

Implementation Arrangements

Executing Agency

2.10 The Ministry of the Economy and Finance (MEF), assisted by a Project Steering Committee (PSC) had overall oversight of the Programme.

Overall Implementation of PRODEP - BMPAD

2.11 Bureau de Monétisation des Programmes d'Aide au Développement/Office of Monetisation of Development Aid Programmes (BMPAD), an autonomous public institution, had overall responsibility for the implementation of PRODEP. BMPAD through PCU had administrative and financial management units, responsible for all administrative, financial management, and M&E of PRODEP. BMPAD, through the use of subsidiary implementation agreements (contracts), delegated day-to-day field implementation of PRODEP activities – Components 1 and 2 - to Maîtres D'Ouvrage Délégués/(MDODs) (International NGOs with operations in Haiti).

2.12 Additional duties of the BMPAD/PCU include: (a) continuous oversight of the MDODs; (b) Programme reporting; (c) overall Programme financial management, procurement and M&E; (d) maintenance and updating of the Programme's Management Information Systems (MIS); and (e) conduct of Programme audits and evaluations, through consultants.

Field Implementation - Maîtres D'Ouvrage Délégués (MDODs)

2.13 MDODs operated field offices (Technical Co-ordination Bureaus) in the Programme's intervention areas. The primary responsibilities of the MDODs were to: (i) strengthen the organisational and operational capacities of CBOs, CADECs, and Municipal Governments; (ii) support CBOs and CADECs in the "on-the-ground" execution of sub-project activities; (iii) provide TA to CBOs and CADECs in project cycle management; (iv) undertake technical reviews of sub-projects approved by CADECs; (v) enter into sub-project agreements (contracts) with CBOs/Municipal Governments for the financing and execution of sub-projects; (vi) transfer funds for sub-project execution directly to the joint MDOD/CBO/Municipal Government bank accounts; and (vii) supervise financial management by CBOs and Municipal Governments during sub-project implementation.

⁷ Appraisal Document Page 13.

Community Mobilisation - Project Development Councils (CADECs)

2.14 CADECs were established in each of the 59 target municipalities and included representatives of CBOs (80%), civil society, and Municipal Government (20%). They performed a development agency function in their respective communities and served as community-run mechanisms for the transfer of public and donor funding to local communities.

2.15 Some of the core functions of CADECs under PRODEP included: (a) mobilising and promoting community participation in PRODEP; (b) receiving, ranking, and approving sub-project proposals originating from CBOs and Municipal Governments; (c) submitting approved sub-projects to their respective MDOD and to BMPAD for technical appraisal; and (d) supporting CBOs and Municipal Government during sub-project implementation, and subsequent operation and maintenance.

Identification, Design, Implementation, Operation and Maintenance of Community Sub-Projects – Community Based Organisations

2.16 CBOs were responsible for the identification, preparation, implementation, operation, and maintenance of community sub-projects. They were also responsible for the hiring of consultants (for sub-project design, general service delivery, etc.) and/or contractors to assist in the sub-project management process.

Municipal Governments

2.17 Municipal Government representatives played an active role throughout the sub-project cycle, as well as in the operations and maintenance of CADECs. A Municipal Government representative has a permanent seat on each CADEC. Municipal Governments were eligible to present sub-project proposals in partnership with CBOs, or directly to the CADEC.

Identification of Risks and Mitigation Measures⁸

2.18 In assessing risks, the AR pointed out that on the basis of observations and findings in the PRODEP mid-term review several innovations were included in the Project to build resilience and sustainability. It also stated that the willingness of BMPAD and MDOD to reinforce the principles enshrined in CDD methodology, and the extent to which success was achieved in building community social capital, would be key determinants of the Project's sustainability.

2.19 One of the risks identified in the AR was a reduction in support for the decentralised CDD process being utilised under the project as a result of any changes in GOH's approach to rural development. To mitigate this risk, the project proposed the continuation of policy dialogue with GOH to promote the CDD mechanism as one of the vehicles for GOH territorial development and decentralization strategy, since the new Government had signaled an intention to support the model.

2.20 The high dependence of sub-project quality on the technical capacity of CBOs and local professionals who were in short supply in rural areas of the sub project was identified as another risk. To address this, BMPAD developed a strategy to enhance sub-project quality through the conduct of bi-annual technical audits to monitor technical quality in addition to undertaking field visits to municipalities to monitor MDOD and sub-project implementation.

⁸ Appraisal Document Page 18.

2.21 The increase in the sub-project threshold created an additional financial management risk at the CBO level. The project sought to minimise this risk by increasing direct financial management and supervision by WB and CDB to ensure compliance with the POM and accounting procedures. MDOD also proposed to strengthen CBO financial management supervision and use contractors for larger sub-projects which would reduce the number of financial transactions.

2.22 Another risk identified at appraisal was the stress placed on BMPAD's management system as a result of the significant increase in the number of projects. The project sought to minimise this risk by recruiting additional staff and engaging a consultant to assist with BMPAD's reorganisation to cope with the additional workload.

3. EVALUATION OF DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION

Relevance of Design and Formulation

3.01 The project design built on a successful pilot Rural Community Development Project initiated by GOH in three Departments in 2004, and the PRODEP Programme which was subsequently developed and funded by WB in 2006, 2009 and 2010. The capacity built in the programme institutions - CBOs, CADECs and BMPAD - the key stakeholders in the CDD approach, provided the foundation for the continuation of the initiative using a combination of grant funds from CDB and WB, and counterpart contributions from GOH.

3.02 The AR provided a detailed assessment of the PRODEP institutional capacity built over the years. A summary of the evaluations of PRODEP's achievements was presented in the AR indicating that PRODEP's management and the MDODs followed established procedures, built social capital, instituted community decision making, transparency and decentralised governance.

3.03 There were some areas of PRODEP that required adjustment:

- (a) The threshold for CBO sub-projects, (\$17,500 per sub-project) was found to be inadequate and increased to \$35,000.
- (b) Improvement in capacity building and training.
- (c) The need to aggressively promote productive sub-projects to address the critical issue of income poverty.
- (d) The issue of sub-project quality and maintenance to ensure sustainability.

3.04 The PCR states that the PRODEP CDD model was considered to be appropriate at the time of project appraisal for the following reasons:

- (a) CDB was already involved with WB on the implementation of an Urban CDD project - PRODEPUR;
- (b) Given CDB's limited experience in Haiti and concerns over the capacity of GOH which were exacerbated by the January 2010 earthquake, the CDD approach was seen as an effective mechanism to promote transparency in the allocation of investment resources

and to increase the likelihood that these resources would be utilised in a manner consistent with local demand; and

- (c) CDD projects had been proven to be effective mechanisms for building social cohesion, community participation, transparency, trust and public/private sector partnerships at the local level, while at the same time improving basic social and economic infrastructure and services.

3.05 The PCR also refers to the following “downside” issues:

- (i) CDD projects tend to be characterised by relatively small grants given the limited capacity of communities to plan and effectively implement/supervise large projects - limiting the reach of project solutions;
- (ii) Given the limitations in governance structures in countries where CDD projects are implemented, there is a heavy emphasis on NGOs which brings into question the long-term sustainability of interventions; and there are no formal mechanisms for building the capacity of national and regional governance structures; and
- (iii) CDD projects can build parallel structures which could potentially compete with or undermine democratically elected local or national governments.

3.06 In the Evaluator’s assessment, lessons learned from WB’s experience in financing the PRODEP programmes were effectively incorporated into the design of this project. A short gender analysis was included but it was very limited in data and scope. It could have included data on men and women in leadership, labour force participation, fertility rates and education. It is noteworthy that the brief gender analysis in the CSP 2013-16 for Haiti was more rigorous.⁹ The AR included an adequate Environmental Analysis as it related to the design of the project.

3.07 Overall, the Evaluator considers the relevance of Design and Formulation as Satisfactory. The Project responded well to the social and economic situation of Haiti at the time of design. It was technically sound with a very good institutional framework and rigorous sectoral analyses. There could have been clearer links in the vertical logic of the Logical Framework Matrix and the Project Results Matrix, and greater attention paid to the measurability of the outcome indicators.

Project Outputs

3.08 The Outputs were clearly stated and had well developed indicators and targets. The PCR provides the relevant data to support the achievement of the outputs of the project, although it did not reference the source of the data.

Component 1

3.09 The project utilised 100% of the funding allocated for this component with the actual number of sub-projects implemented (185) exceeding the planned number (180) by 5. (See Component 1 of Projects Results Framework at end of this section, page 9). While the change was small there was no discussion in the PCR on this nor on the high volume of proposed projects, except for a footnote explaining why some approved projects were not implemented. The PCR did not include a breakdown of sub-projects between CBOs and Municipalities and the associated costs to match against the planned detailed budget in

⁹ CSP 2013-16 Haiti, Page 4/

Appendix 2.1 of the AR. Neither did the PCR give a breakdown of the expenditure among the various categories of projects funded. There was a discussion on aspects of the steps adopted to improve project implementation in the field.

3.10 It would have been informative if data presented in the PCR for this component had been disaggregated by sector and region. This kind of analysis would be helpful in understanding the approach of sub-projects financing for future design of similar projects funded by CDB. Some of this data was presented in the PSRs.

3.11 The PCR rated Component 1 as Very Satisfactory. The Evaluator agrees with this rating of highly satisfactory, noting that targets for number of sub-projects implemented, and women’s participation in CBO and CADEB executive roles were exceeded.

TABLE 3: COMPONENT 1 OF PROJECT RESULTS FRAMEWORK

Component	Results Indicators	Data Collection Instrument	Responsible Agency
CBOs in poor rural municipalities identify, prioritise, select, implement and maintain subprojects - basic small-scale economic and social infrastructure, and productive investments.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Number of subprojects by type (infrastructure, productive and social): <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - proposed - 300 - approved - 200; and - completed -180. • At least 30% of CBO and 15% of CADEC executive committee members are women. • At least 75% of sub-projects with adequate O&M arrangements implemented 	Project Progress reports Field supervision field Survey part of Project impact study	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BMPAD/PCU Consultant • MDOD • BMPAD/PCU

Component 2

3.12 The data presented for Component 2 was not complete and the discussion was limited. The PCR states that it was not possible to determine the exact membership of CBOs in the project intervention areas. However, an estimated 7,387 CBO members (of which 3,180 were women) attended a total of 198 workshops which disseminated information on the project. There was insufficient data to determine the percentage CBO members who attended training events.

3.13 The PCR indicates that all 31 CADECs in municipalities in the north, the Project’s focal area, received training and TA. (See Component 2 of Projects Results Framework at end of this section, page 10). However, the planned capacity building intervention for CADECs in the south was not implemented. There were no reasons provided for the non-implementation of the capacity building for the 28 CADECs in the south municipalities.

3.14 The 31 CADECs trained represented 52.5% of the planned number of 59 CADECs to have received training. Although the PCR indicated that 85% of the CADECs members were trained, the actual number of persons trained in these CADECs should have been included in the PCR with a male/female breakdown along with a baseline total number of members in the CADECs.

3.15 The PCR reported that 31 CADECs “successfully supervised CBO/municipal government sub-project cycles” but did not discuss how this was done. The types of training delivered could have been included in the PCR, as it was in the Project Exit Workshop report.

3.16 The PCR states that 86% of sub-projects were implemented within six months of start-up of activities on the ground compared to the planned 80%.

3.17 The indicator of four CADECs managing \$200,000 each was substantially but not fully achieved as the four CADECs managed a total of \$700,000 or about 88% of the expected target. A discussion on what accounted for the lower performance of this indicator could have been included.

3.18 Only 2 of a target of 10 CADECs were able to obtain funding from other development programmes. They received \$200,000 (16%) of the \$1.2 mn planned. It would have merited a discussion on what accounted for this low performance. The Evaluator is of the view that this was an ambitious target.

3.19 The PCR rated Component 2 as Satisfactory. The Evaluator concurs with this rating on the basis that 6 of the 7 indicators were fully or partly achieved.

TABLE 4: COMPONENT 2 OF PROJECTS RESULTS FRAMEWORK

Component	Results Indicators	Data Collection Instrument	Responsible Agency
Build and strengthen capacity of CBOs and CADECs in subproject execution, environmental and social dimensions, fund sourcing, and roles and responsibilities as described in the Project operational manual.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At least 75% of CBO members have attended at least one training event. • 59 CADEC receive training and TA in subproject cycle management • 90% of CADEC members have attended at least two training events • 31 CADECs supervise CBO/municipal government sub-project cycle • 80% of subprojects are implemented within 6 months • CADEC manage \$200,000 each (with minimal MDOD assistance) for CBO subproject implementation • 10 CADECs obtaining a total of \$1.2 mn from other development programs. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Project Progress reports Field supervision field Survey part of Project impact study 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • BMPAD/PCU Consultant • MDOD • BMPAD/PCU

Component 3

3.20 The performance of the major indicators for this Component was poor as the PCU fell well below the required 62 supervision visits to sub projects (See Component 3 of Projects Results Framework at end of this section, page11) Neither did the PCU submit quarterly status reports. The PCR did not include a discussion on the reasons why the PCU did not undertake the visits and why reports were not submitted despite the existence of the MIS.

3.21 An end of project evaluation was projected in the AR but was not implemented. It was not even reported on in the PCR.

3.22 The PCR rated this component as Unsatisfactory. The Evaluator agrees with this rating.

TABLE 5: COMPONENT 3 OF PROJECTS RESULTS FRAMEWORK

Component	Results Indicators	Data Collection Instrument	Responsible Agency
PCU carries out adequate supervision of MDOD implementation MIS tracks and monitors subproject implementation, and overall physical and financial performance of PRODEP.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> PCU carries out at least 62 supervision visits (two visits to each municipality over the Project period) MIS provides complete quarterly reports within 30 days after the end of each quarter. Timely unqualified technical and financial audits Amount of Project funds disbursed within the Project timeframe. 	Field visit reports attached to quarterly reports MIS quarterly reports Audit reports MIS/BMPAD reports CDB disbursement reports	BMPAD

Project Cost, Disbursements, Borrower Contribution and Conformance to Schedule

Project Cost

3.23 The project was estimated to cost \$20 mn to be divided among WB, CDB and GOH.

TABLE 6: SUMMARY OF ACTUAL PROJECT COSTS AND FINANCING

Item	Actual Project Cost and Financing				Appraisal Estimate	Variance (Actual - Appraisal) ^U	
	CDB	WB	GOH	Total		(\$'000)	(%)
	(\$'000)						
Sub-project Financing	7,075	-	1,690	8,765	8,765	0	0
Capacity Building and TA	2,500	6,870	-	9,370	9,608	(238)	2.5
Project Management	181	1,440	-	1,621	1,627	(6)	0.4
Total Cost	10,000	8,310	1,690	19,756*	20,000	(244)	1.2
Composition (%)							

*Unutilised balances were cancelled.

Disbursements

3.24 The PCR does not address the schedule of disbursement of CDB's resources over the life of the project which is important to an understanding of implementation issues. The project was implemented over 15 months, 3 months beyond the time estimated at appraisal. The PCR should have included a table of actual disbursements compared to planned disbursements over the period (as an Appendix). It was proposed that the funds would have been disbursed in seven quarterly tranches. However, the actual disbursements were made in five tranches. The terminal disbursement date (TDD) was extended on one occasion.

3.25 The cumulative disbursement profile is shown in Table 7.

TABLE 7: SUMMARY OF PLANNED VS ACTUAL DISBURSEMENTS

	2012				Total 2012	2013				Total 2013	2014 Q1	Project Total
	Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4		Q1	Q2	Q3	Q4			
1. WB Financing Sub-Projects	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
MDOD Capacity Building	1,400	1,460	1,400	1,250	5,510	940	420	-	-	1,360	-	6,870
BMPAD/PCU Audit and Evaluation	180	250	180	180	790	440	210	-	-	650	-	1,440
Sub-Total	1,580	1,710	1,580	1,430	6,300	1,380	630			2,010		8,310
2. CDB Financing PLANNED	0	0	2,051	2,174	4,225	3,350	2,358	40	27	5,775		10,000
CDB Financing ACTUAL*	0	0	0	1,445	1,445	-	-	3,854	3,974	7,829	482	9,756
3. GOH/Beneficiaries	-	-	345	370	715	565	410	-	-	975	-	1,690
TOTAL	1,580	1,710	3,976	3,974	11,240	5,295	3,398	40	27	8,760		20,000

* Actual Schedule of Disbursement, Finance Department, CDB

Beneficiary's Contribution

3.26 GOH contributed \$1.69 mn representing GOH's and Beneficiaries' in-kind contribution to individual sub-projects over the life of the Project.

Conformance to Schedule

3.27 The Grant Agreement was signed on March 14, 2012, approximately three months after Board approval on December 8, 2011. The projected implementing period was 21 months from April 1, 2012 to December 31, 2013¹⁰. The actual project completion date was March 30, 2014, approximately 3.1 years later than the projected period. There was one request for extension of the TDD, however the request was not on the file.

3.28 There was a six-month extension for project implementation from the appraisal estimate of December 31, 2013 to June 30, 2014. According to the PCR, the following events necessitated the extension:

- (a) the postponement of municipal elections negatively impacted project start-up and implementation time of municipal sub-projects;
- (b) delays were experienced as a result of a more rigorous participatory methodology adopted by the MDOD;
- (c) the introduction of a more rigorous process for sub-project identification; and
- (d) changes in Haitian banking laws which imposed additional requirements for the opening of CBO bank accounts. All CBOs benefiting from sub-projects were required to have bank accounts.¹¹

Implementation Arrangements, Conditions and Covenants, Related TA, Procurement and Consultant and/or Contractor Performance

Implementation Arrangements

3.29 The project adopted the decentralised implementation structure of PRODEP, based on the principle of subsidiarity, utilising the smallest unit in the communities, CBOs, for sub-project

¹⁰ Project Summary, AR

¹¹ PSR for period 2012-01-01 to 2012-12-31, page 6

implementation. It also utilised a decentralised and collaborative approach to development at the Municipal level, involving civil society and public sector personnel in the structure of CADEC. The sub-project solutions which were promoted by an International NGO, CECI and designed to improve food security, enhance agricultural productivity and reduce post-harvest losses were innovative. Implementation arrangements sought to increase the levels of participation of persons/beneficiaries in the communities in decision-making and increase their involvement in implementing and maintaining the projects.¹²

Component 1

3.30 Given the lessons learned from the earlier versions of PRODEP and PRODEPUR, the process of identifying and prioritising sub-projects was modified with the following new steps and changes made to the PRODEP Operations Manual:¹³

- (a) An evaluation of past activities and sub-projects implementation;
- (b) A participatory community needs assessment in 31 municipalities included in the project;
- (c) Adjustment of the procurement process to include the CDB requirements;

3.31 CECI introduced the following measures to improve the quality of sub-projects:

- (a) Increased capacity of the organisation to oversee field operations;
- (b) Implemented a strategy for operation and maintenance of sub-projects;
- (c) Established a Head Office in Port-au-Prince and localised sub offices in municipalities;
- (d) Engaged an independent engineering firm to train Haitian staff;
- (e) Simplified and more efficient accounting process between field offices and headquarters as well as designing an effective communication system with speedy transfer of information between CECI, BMPAD and CDB

Component 2

3.32 CECI was able to effectively combine activities under Component 2 with those under Component 1. As a result, all CADEC's, CBO's and Municipal Councils in the Project target communities were involved in on-going training and capacity building programmes.¹⁴ The capacity building workshops started from needs assessment and project identification to project cycle management.

Component 3

3.33 With regard to this Component of the project, BMPAD did not mirror the performance of the field implementation agency CECI, and did not:

¹² PSR for period 2012-01-01 to 2012-12-31, page 4

¹³ PSR for period 2012-01-01 to 2012-12-31, page 6

¹⁴ *ibid*

- (a) undertake regular field supervision visits;
- (b) develop a programme for capacity building of CADEC's in the South as provided for in the AR¹⁵
- (c) submit reports to CDB on a timely basis despite the operationalisation of the MIS;¹⁶

3.34 To compensate for this shortcoming BMPAD, in consultation with CDB, hired six Civil Engineers to supervise sub-project implementation. This was deemed to be more effective than the use of Technical Audits as it ensured the viability at all stages in the sub-project cycle.

3.35 It must be noted here that BMPAD Project Implementation Unit (PCU), whose personnel cost was covered by WB until June 30, 2013, had responsibility for supervising/monitoring the project implementation and therefore limited CDB funds were allocated for this activity except for PCU operations cost. When the project went beyond June 30, CDB collaborated with WB to extend the period of employment of the PCU staff. The initial delay in implementation was from July to October 2012.

Procurement

3.36 The AR outlined a procurement plan for each of the components of the Project.¹⁷ The PCR indicated that the Financial Audits undertaken by external consultants found that the procurement procedures were followed.¹⁸

Beneficiary/Implementing Agency Performance

3.37 Although its Finance Department “did an excellent job” in the financial and procurement aspects of the project, the PCU performed unsatisfactorily in the area of field supervision. On the recommendation of CDB the Executing Agency engaged Engineers to ensure quality control supervision and monitoring. BMPAD also delivered on the semi-annual audits as reported in PCR and PSRs. Additionally, the Unit was unable to deliver the capacity building for the 28 CADECs in the south municipalities nor the Impact Evaluation of the Project. It is noteworthy that neither the PCR nor the PSRs provided reasons for the non-implementation of these activities.

Monitoring and Evaluation Design, Implementation and Utilisation

Design

3.38 M&E of the Project was well developed in the AR and included the completion of a MIS that would have provided detailed up-to-date data on project activities to be gleaned from 62 field visits by BMPAD/PCU staff. The PCU would have “exercised quality control through biannual technical audits to evaluate (on a sample basis) the sub-project selection, prioritising process and technical quality”. The M&E design also included a “small baseline study to measure ex-ante situation of sub-project’s objectives

¹⁵ ibid

¹⁶ ibid, page 7

¹⁷ AR, Procurement, pages 20-21

¹⁸ PCR, Section VI, page 20

and an ex-post impact of the sub-projects against the baseline”. BMPAD/PCU was also required to undertake a beneficiary assessment and an institutional assessment of CADECs. There was also a schedule, of reports that were to be submitted by BMPAD.¹⁹

3.39 MDOD, together with the CADECs, implemented community needs assessments via workshops involving the entire target community, (it was originally intended for the representative CBOs)²⁰ in each municipality to prioritise projects which fulfilled the baseline study requirement. . CDB indicated that this approach replaced the Technical Audits in the M&E Design and that stakeholders were of the view that the TAs were “backward looking” while what was necessary was ongoing support “to ensure viability at all stages of the sub-project cycle”.²¹

3.40 The MIS was completed and implemented. However, BMPAD/PCU undertook very few of the 62 supervision visits (2 visits per municipality) to monitor project implementation and did not provide relevant reports.²² CECI, according to the PSRs, did a very good job of collecting and reporting the data using the field reports from field officers. CECI field staff and supervising Engineers employed “provided a robust system for monitoring the entire sub-project cycle”.²³

3.41 BMPAD also did not hire a consultant to evaluate, ex-post, the impact of the sub-projects. CDB Supervisors reported that it would be difficult to assess impacts of the sub-projects due to small size and limited scope of these projects. The Evaluator disagrees with this position as small projects in communities do have effects that can be observed and analysed. The point is that, the only way to have found out was to remain faithful to the M&E Design.

3.42 BMPAD did hire consultants to undertake semi-annual Financial Audits. There were no adverse findings in these reports.

3.43 Monitoring and Evaluation, as a critical project management activity in the project cycle, was not implemented at the planned level, with a number of reports not received.

3.44 The PCR included all the relevant data that were needed to complete the various sections of the report. There were some areas that the data could have been presented differently. For instance, a table showing the number of projects implemented in each category in each municipal region and the funding allocated for each project would have been useful. The Supervisors assured the Evaluator that the data was collected and submitted in reports received from CECI which were in French. The data was also collected by CDB Project Supervisors and included in their annual PSRs.

3.45 The absence, in English, of quarterly and final administrative reports made it difficult to determine the full extent of how data collected was utilised in decision making during implementation. The PCR clearly indicated that the data collected from the community needs assessment workshops in the 31 Municipalities was used for identification and prioritisation of projects.

¹⁹ AR, Section M&E , page 20

²⁰ PSR 2013-01-01 to 2013-12-31 Section 4, page 4

²¹ PSR 2013-01-01 to 2013-12-31 Section 7, page 6

²² Design Considerations, AR, page 14

²³ PSR, 2014-1-1 to 2014-12-31, Section 7, page 7

4. EVALUATION OF PERFORMANCE (PCR ASSESSMENT AND VALIDATION)

Relevance

4.01 The PCR does not provide an assessment of Relevance at project completion. However, Strategic Relevance, a criterion of the former (PPES), was rated as Excellent each year in CDB's Supervision Reports over the period 2012 to 2015. The justification for this rating was that the project was identified as a key intervention to improve governance and reduce poverty in the Republic of Haiti. It was consistent with CDB's Strategic Objectives of fostering the economic growth of its Borrowing Member Countries, reducing poverty, promoting good governance and fostering inclusive social development.

4.02 The PCR states that the project contributed to the assistance framework outlined in the CDB Haiti CSP (2009 - 2012) and the associated CDB strategy for assisting Haiti in the aftermath of the January 2010 earthquake. It indicates that the project was also consistent with CDB's strategic objectives of: (i) promoting broad-based economic growth and inclusive social development (ii) supporting environmental sustainability and disaster risk management (iii) CDB's Corporate Priorities of: (a) supporting agriculture and rural development; (b) improving the protection and sustainable management of natural resources; and (c) promoting social partnerships. The PCR pointed to other areas of consistency including the Special Development Fund VII themes of strengthening poverty reduction and human development; supporting environmental sustainability and advancing the climate change agenda.

4.03 The project was in direct response to the need to improve access by the poor to social and economic infrastructure and services, income generating opportunities and improved community governance and social capital. The CDD approach was integrated into the project design as it was seen as a vital tool in building social capital through capacity building and decentralised and collaborative intervention. In light of the foregoing, the Evaluator rates the Relevance of the project as Highly Satisfactory.

Effectiveness

Achievement of Outcomes

4.04 The achievement of the development objectives (outcomes) is rated in the PCR as Probable. The PCR states that the number of members of CBOs and/or municipalities who benefitted from at least one basic social and infrastructure service or income generating activity was significantly higher than the appraisal estimate. The PCR indicates that as at December 31, 2014 all productive / income generating sub-projects were operational and had maintenance arrangements in place. The PCR states that all of the targeted 31 CADECs in the focal project area were following democratic and open-meeting procedures to select sub-projects as detailed in the modified Project Operational Manual (POM) by the end of the project. It is pointed out, however, that there was no formal assessment of the percentage of CBO members who expressed a positive change in terms of their organisational capacity and ability to work together constructively.

4.05 In view of the fact that all project objectives have either been exceeded or satisfactorily met, the Evaluator concurs with the PCR rating of Satisfactory.

Achievement of Outputs

4.06 PCR Assessment: As indicated in Chapter 3 of the Project Completion Validation Report: Project Outputs, the PCR gave three individual ratings for the three components/Outputs of the project. The

ratings for Components 1, 2 and 3 were “Very Satisfactory, Satisfactory and Unsatisfactory, respectively, which average to an overall rating of Satisfactory.

4.07 On the basis of the ratings for the three components of the project, (which are detailed at Chapter 3 - Project Outputs) i.e. Highly Satisfactory for Component 1; Satisfactory for Component 2; and Unsatisfactory for Component 3, the Evaluator rates Project Outputs as Satisfactory. This is an average rating of the three components based on the individual scores attached to each rating.

Overall Rating of Effectiveness: (This rating is a combination of the ratings for project outputs and project outcomes)

4.08 *PCR Assessment:* The PCR rates Development Objectives as Probable and Project Outputs as Satisfactory. This equates to an overall rating of Satisfactory for Effectiveness.

4.09 *Evaluator’s Assessment:* On the basis of the composite score resulting from the Evaluator’s ratings of outputs (SAT) and Project Outcomes (SAT), the Effectiveness rating which is calculated as an average of the two categories is Satisfactory. The Evaluator therefore agrees with the Satisfactory rating of the PCR for this criterion.

Efficiency

4.10 The PCR rates the performance of this criterion as Satisfactory. It is however deficient in addressing efficiency in project implementation and does not utilise any efficiency measures to report on the performance related to output vis-a-vis inputs.

4.11 In assessing the efficiency of this project it is noted that the AR, in its Project Performance Evaluation Matrix justified its expected performance rating of Satisfactory (score of 5.0) for the Cost Efficiency criteria, indicating that sub-projects would be based on “least cost effectiveness approaches while demonstrating best practice that could be adopted by the wider community.”²⁴

4.12 The PSRs consistently rated the cost efficiency criteria as Satisfactory throughout the short project period and rated it as Satisfactory using the PPES framework. The Evaluator was unable to find evidence of the least cost analysis for sub-projects. Nevertheless, the PAS guide to efficiency assessment suggests that where only qualitative assessments of benefits are possible, such as in the case of social interventions, the Efficiency assessment should take into account the following factors where appropriate for which data might be available in the monitoring reports:

Implementation Progress (delays and redesign may increase costs)

4.13 The project completed implementation on March 31, 2014, three months after the projected completion date of December 31, 2013. The various adjustments to the project did not affect the overall cost. By the projected completion date 160 sub-projects were completed with the other 24 completed by March 31, 2014. The outputs at the original project completion date were impressive.

Timeliness in the Delivery and Management of the Inputs

4.14 It would seem that not all disbursements were delivered in a timely manner. The Exit Workshop reported that “processing of the sub-projects including disbursements flows should be faster once the sub-

²⁴ AR, Table 5.1 page 22

projects have been officially selected.”²⁵ After the first disbursement of 24% of grant in December 2012 the next disbursement of 39% was in the 3rd quarter of 2013 long after the projects would have started implementation. By the end of 2013, 78% of the grant was disbursed and at the end of project period 97.6% was disbursed. The undisbursed balance was due to non-implementation of some planned activities. The hiring of technical expertise was done in a timely manner to allow for their input into the project and thus avoided delays. There was no evidence in the PCR to support the detailed usage of the grant. However, project supervisors indicated that this information is included in the end of project report from CECI.

Appropriateness and manner in which the intervention’s activities were organised

4.15 It is difficult to assess the appropriateness and manner in which the intervention’s activities were organised without relevant documents like work plans and status reports from the implementing organisations which were not available to the Evaluator. The PSRs indicated that in the early stages of project implementation CECI revised/modified their approach to sub-project identification and prioritisation and the quality control of sub-projects. There was agreement, early in project start up, among key stakeholders the WB, CDB, CECI and GOH, BMPAD on other key activities critical for success – Communications between CECI, CDB and BMPAD, Training and Capacity Building, Municipal Development Plans, Gender Strategy, MIS, Project Management.²⁶

Whether the stream of benefits has reached significant levels and is growing at reasonable rates and in accordance with appraisal plans or redesign

4.16 It was expected that the project, through the CDD approach would have developed human potential and poor communities would be empowered with capacity to improve economic and social conditions. It is not very clear that this was achieved as there needs to be an evaluation of the impact. However, as noted before, the project superseded the number of beneficiaries targeted.

Good Practice Standards for Services

4.17 One of the risks identified for this project was the quality of sub-projects which is highly dependent on technical capacity of CBOs and local professionals who are in short supply in remote locations and may impair sub-project sustainability. CADECs were trained, and technical Audits were designed but were replaced by use of civil engineers who managed quality throughout the project cycle.

4.18 Based on the foregoing, the Evaluator agrees with the PCR rating of Satisfactory.

Sustainability

4.19 The PCR rates the sustainability of the project as Satisfactory citing institutional and maintenance /technical reasons. It notes that GOH has expressed a concern with the heavy dependence on international NGOs as field implementers.²⁷

4.20 The PCR acknowledges that there is a concern about the sustainability of the sub-projects due to a “weak decentralisation policy framework (lack of municipal funding)”²⁸ and the risk that CBOs may not have adequate resources to maintain facilities and infrastructure.

²⁵ PCR Annex 1, CDB-Financed PRODEP/PRODEPUR Exit Workshop, page 27

²⁶ PSR 2013-1-1 to 2013-12-31 pages 6 and 7

²⁷ PCR, Section VII page 21

²⁸ PCR page 18

4.21 The Evaluator is in agreement with the PCR's assessment of *Satisfactory*. (Appendix 7)

Thematic Areas and Institutional Assessments

Socioeconomic Assessment

- (a) The majority of the grant funding went directly to the benefit the poorest communities in the Country. The CBOs that were engaged in the process did contribute in kind resources to supplement the costs of the sub-projects through their participation in project identification, implementation and monitoring.
- (b) The active participation of stakeholders and beneficiaries, as a policy of CDB, was encouraged and was synonymous with the CDD methodology adopted by the project. The greater participation of beneficiaries in project identification and prioritisation, was with the direct intention of improving outcomes and impact.
- (c) Disaggregated data should have been collected as was required by the AR and the reporting criteria of the PCR. For example, data might have been collected by project type, gender and age, to facilitate an assessment of costs and benefits for vulnerable groups.

Beneficial impacts and adverse impacts

4.22 Thirty-one Productive/Income Generation sub-projects were funded in this project. There is no evidence in the PCR nor in the PSRs to indicate which groups received the grants or what the immediate results were. The PCR did not report any adverse impacts.

Environment, Disaster Risk Management and Climate Change Assessments

Assessment of the environmental, DRM and CC results of the intervention should:

4.23 The Project was categorised 'B', based on the CDB's Environmental and Social Review Procedures because of the sub-projects potential for limited adverse impacts for which appropriate mitigation measures can be identified and designed. The AR outlined a plan for mitigation measures to be adopted using the Environmental Management Framework included in the Project Operations Manual (POM). All projects would have been assessed for environmental impacts and mitigation measures developed and implemented for any negative fallout. In fact, it was expected that the sub-projects would contribute to an improvement in environmental health and safety. There were seven sub-projects in waste removal (drainage) and solid waste (latrines)

4.24 However, neither the PCR nor the PSRs provided information on the measures taken to mitigate environmental impacts. The reason given was that the small sub-projects did not have any negative impacts.

Institutional Development Assessment

4.25 The use of the CDD approach was an exercise in institutional development. A small portion of the grant was allocated to capacity building and strengthening the decentralised institutions in the CDD. The Project, through Component 2, trained CBOs and CADECs in project cycle management, conflict resolution, accountability, environmental and waste management and gender equality.²⁹ Additionally, 31 CADECs in the 31 municipalities received training and TA through the implementation of 37 training workshops. 85% of CADEC members attended these workshops.³⁰ The PCR does not provide much information on the skills gained or procedures instituted in the CBOs/CADECs.

Performance of the Borrower and Executing Agency

4.26 The PSRs rating moved from Satisfactory in 2012 to Marginally Unsatisfactory in 2013, to Satisfactory in 2014 and then back to Marginally Unsatisfactory in 2015. Justifications were provided in each assessments/ratings. The final rating provided in the PCR is *Unsatisfactory*.

4.27 The design and preparation of the CDD Project involved a range of stakeholders including senior GOH officials and staff of BMPAD, the Executing Agency. BMPAD, an autonomous public institution, had been implementing the PRODEP since 2004 and had developed the capacity and undergone “considerable institutional strengthening since the commencement of PRODEP” and was being reorganised at the time of the project start up to “increase its efficiency and co-ordination between the different units.”³¹

4.28 The PCR reports that “BMPAD, through its Finance Department did an excellent job in managing the financial and procurement related aspects of the project. On the other hand, the PCU performed unsatisfactorily on matters related to field supervision of CECI and sub-projects.”³² Due to CDB’s Project Supervisors lobbying, BMPAD engaged Engineers to assist with monitoring and quality control of sub-projects. BMPAD acknowledged an increase in their field visits but however did not rate Borrower/IA Performance during Project Supervision.³³

4.29 BMPAD did not comply with all aspects of the terms of conditions. It did not procure the consultant/firm to implement the capacity building for CADECs in the South municipalities nor the end-of-project evaluation. No reasons were provided for non-compliance. There was no evidence on file of reports submitted by BMPAD to CDB.

4.30 The PCR rated the performance of the Borrower/Implementing Agency as *Unsatisfactory*. The Evaluator assessed the Borrower’s performance against the PAS criteria. On the basis that 50% of the criteria was partially satisfied and 40% was fully satisfied, the Evaluator rates Borrower’s performance as Marginally Unsatisfactory. (Appendix 9)

Performance of the Caribbean Development Bank

²⁹ PCR, Annex 1 – CDB-Financed PRODEP/PRODEPUR Exit Workshop – Main Findings+

³⁰ PSR 2014-01-01 to 2014-12-31, page 6

³¹ AR, page 4

³² PCR, Section VI page 20

³³ PCR, Annex 2 page

4.31 The PCR rates CDB's performance as Satisfactory. The justification is that CDB carried out three project supervision missions over the 15 months of project supervision and the supervision teams were adequately staffed with specialist skills in agriculture and rural development, social and civil engineering and economics. It states that given the large geographical area and number (185) of sub-projects which were implemented, it was not possible to visit all of the sub-projects. The supervision mission accordingly utilised a variant of stratified random sampling on each mission. The PCR indicates that stakeholders at the Project Exit workshop were highly appreciative of the support which the CDB team provided and the insistence which the team placed on the need to ensure that sub-projects were of a high quality and implemented in a transparent manner.

4.32 CDB's Project Supervisors, in their PSRs, rated CDB's performance as Satisfactory in 2012 and 2014; and Highly Satisfactory in 2013. The PSRs reported, *inter alia*, that CDB staff made several adjustments to the CDD methodology introduced by WB and introduced measures to improve sub-project quality and sustainability. The reports also stated that CDB included several initiatives in PRODEP that were based on lessons learnt during the implementation of another phase of PRODEP, namely PRODEPUR, which proved effective in increasing community participation at all stages of the sub-project cycle and in improving the quality of sub-projects.

4.33 The PCR also provides ratings by the Beneficiary/Implementing Agency of the Bank's performance during preparation and supervision. In each case, the rating awarded was Satisfactory. It states, *inter alia*, that CDB improved the PRODEP design characteristics, increasing the fund allocations to sub-projects and respecting the wishes of GOH. The PCR states that during supervision CDB adequately managed the project with multiple field visits to determine the true conditions in the country.

4.34 In light of the foregoing and the substantial satisfaction of QAE and QOS performance sub-criteria outlined in PAS to assess CDB performance, the Evaluator rates the performance of CDB as Highly Satisfactory. A detailed justification for this rating is provided at Appendix 10.

5. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

Overall Performance (Outcome) Rating

5.01 The overall performance rating of the project is determined by separately evaluating and rating the four evaluation core criteria. The arithmetic average of the scores for the core criteria in this case is 3.25, or Satisfactory. The Evaluator therefore concurs with the PCR's rating of Satisfactory. Details of the ratings and the justification for differences between ratings from the PCR and the Evaluator are provided in Table 8.

TABLE 8: SUMMARY RATINGS OF CORE EVALUATION CRITERIA AND OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE PROJECT

Criteria	PCR	OIE Review	Reason if any for Disagreement/Comment
Strategic Relevance	Highly Satisfactory (4)	Highly Satisfactory (4)	
Efficacy	Satisfactory (3)	Satisfactory (3)	
Effectiveness	Satisfactory (3)	Satisfactory (3)	
Cost Efficiency	Satisfactory (3)	Satisfactory (3)	
Sustainability	Satisfactory (3)	Satisfactory (3)	
Composite (Aggregate) Performance Rating	Satisfactory (3.25)	Satisfactory (3.25)	
Borrower & EA Performance	Unsatisfactory	Marginally Unsatisfactory	Using the criteria in the PAS 2013, the Evaluator assessed Borrower Performance over a broader set of indicators. (Appendix 9)
CDB Performance	Satisfactory	Highly Satisfactory	The Evaluator's assessment of CDB's performance was based on a wider set of performance criteria under PAS. The PCR's assessment was generally restricted to project supervision activities.
Quality of PCR	Not Rated	Marginally Unsatisfactory	The PCR uses an obsolete template that is not consistent with that of the Bank's OPPM as it was prepared during transition from PPES to PAS. As a result, the criteria and sub-criteria provided in the PAS Manual were not used to guide the preparation of the PCR and justify ratings. As a result, the analysis is not comprehensive.

Lessons

5.02 The PCR identified the four (4) lessons learned from implementation of the project as:

- (a) An inherent risk in the CDD methodology is the heavy dependence on non-governmental structures. The approach often is a source of tension between community organisations who maintain control over the resources and elected officials charged with the responsibility of local/national development. Not surprisingly, GOH has expressed concerns with this approach. Future CDB-financed projects should recognise GOH's concerns whilst ensuring the participation of target beneficiaries in the development process.
- (b) The administrative/project management cost in Haiti is very high. The CDD methodology places a further layer of costs given its heavy emphasis on capacity building and establishment of new governance structures for beneficiaries. The experience of staff is that even with the capacity building interventions most communities were not fully equipped to effectively manage the sub-project cycle. In addition, there is a high level of internal migration in Haiti, and as a result, capacity building interventions may not necessarily translate into a long-term resource for community building. Given the considerable, 'hand holding' of CBOs under the project, CDB approaches may be more cost effective than CDD in the current Haitian context.
- (c) CDB should continue to explore opportunities for cost sharing – management of interventions to increase the percentage of resources that are channeled directly to sub-project financing. This could involve, in addition to working with other Development Banks, partnering with NGOs that contribute funds (cash or kind) to sub-project implementation.
- (d) Beneficiary communities generally expressed appreciation for the sub-project interventions. Several rural residents contacted during implementation supervision, and the views expressed during the exit workshop, suggest that CDB future interventions should more aggressively explore opportunities to increase food and nutrition security and income-generating opportunities. The Departments where the project intervened – in particular the North West and North East – are among the poorest and experience the highest levels of food and nutrition insecurity in Haiti. Given limited opportunities outside of agriculture for large segments of the Haitian population, projects that directly impact the agriculture sector output should be encouraged.

5.03 The Evaluator concurs with these lessons and also notes that important data collected and reported in the PSR can be included in the PCR to more effectively report on the achievements and success of the projects. Greater detail on the performance and results of sub-projects would be useful for future designs using this approach to community development.

6. COMMENTS ON PCR QUALITY

6.01 The Evaluator rates the PCR quality as Marginally Unsatisfactory. The PCR uses an obsolete template that is not consistent with that of the Bank's OPPM. The criteria and sub-criteria provided in the PAS Manual were not used to guide the preparation of the PCR and justify ratings. As a result, the analysis is not comprehensive.

7. DATA SOURCES FOR VALIDATION

7.01 The primary data sources for this validation exercise were CDB's AR and Grant Agreement; CDB's Project Supervision Reports; WB's Project Implementation Completion and Results Reports; CDB's Registry files in respect of the project; Communication material from CDB Staff; MDOD (CECI) Contract and End of Project Report. The Evaluator also held discussions with members of the PCR team.

8. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FOLLOW-UP

8.01 No follow-up for OIE is required. The Evaluator does not consider that a Project Performance Audit Report would provide significantly more information or identify other lessons to be learnt than those contained in the PCR that would serve to further inform the Bank on a future Community-Driven Development Project.

LOGICAL FRAMEWORK MATRIX

Narrative Summary	Objectively Verifiable Indicators	Means of Verification	Assumptions																				
<p>Goal:</p> <p>To contribute to sustainable social and economic development of residents in selected rural communities.</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poverty, health, education, access to rural infrastructure and basic needs indicators in project target areas. • Social Capital Index 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – World Health Organisation statistics. – Poverty Maps and Analysis. – Food security statistics (World Food Programme). – Human development index (United Nations). 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Stable political environment. – Absence of major natural disasters. – Donor support is available, well coordinated and effective 																				
<p>Purpose:</p> <p>Improved access by poor rural communities to basic social and economic infrastructure, services and income-generating opportunities; and improved community governance and social capital</p>	<p>By December 31, 2013:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 25,000 members of 180 CBOs and/or municipalities benefit from at least one basic social and infrastructure, service or income generating activity. – 31 CADECs in the focal Project area follow democratic and open meeting procedures to select sub-project as detailed in the POM. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – Sub-project design and AR provide baseline data. – Sub-project closure reports and MIS provide information on beneficiaries (direct and indirect). – Ex-post evaluation provides information on beneficiaries of sub-project sample. – CADEC and CBO meeting minutes provide information on selection processes. 	<p>Assumptions for achieving purpose:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • GOH continues to be supportive of the decentralisation process being utilised under the project. • CBOs and Municipality Councils remain interested in participating in the project and in presenting sub-project proposals. 																				
<p>Outputs:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – CBO and Municipal Council sub-projects approved and implemented. – CADECs trained in project cycle management – CADECs adequately supervise CBO sub-project cycle – CADECs capable of sourcing funds and managing the implementation of community sub-project 	<p>Operating: By December 31, 2013:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – 180 CBOs and Municipality sub-projects financed and implemented. – 59 CADECs receive training and TA in Project cycle management, gender issues etc. – 31 CADECs supervise CBO/Municipal Council sub-project cycle. – CADECs manage \$200,000 each (with minimal MDOD assistance) – At least 10 CADECs obtain a total of \$1.2 mn additional funding for CBO sub-projects. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – MDOD and BMPAD/PCU reports. – BMPAD MIS system data. – BMPAD Financial reports. – Project Technical and Financial audits. – PCU Field visits. – Ex-post evaluation report. 	<p>Assumptions for Achieving Project</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> – BMPAD/PCU is reorganised to increase its efficiency and ensure adequate supervision – MDOD maintain high performance standards and implement quality-enhancing procedures 																				
<p>Inputs:</p> <p>Community Sub-project financing Capacity building and TA Management and M&E</p>	<p>(\$ '000)</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th style="width: 25%;">2012</th> <th style="width: 25%;">2013</th> <th style="width: 25%;">2014</th> <th style="width: 25%;">Total</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td style="text-align: right;">7,075</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td style="text-align: right;">2,738</td> </tr> <tr> <td></td> <td></td> <td></td> <td style="text-align: right;">187</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Base Cost</td> <td style="text-align: right;">4,225</td> <td style="text-align: right;">5,775</td> <td style="text-align: right;">1,690</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>	2012	2013	2014	Total				7,075				2,738				187	Base Cost	4,225	5,775	1,690	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> – BMPAD progress reports. – CDB and WB disbursement records. – MDOD Reports. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timely disbursement of resources
2012	2013	2014	Total																				
			7,075																				
			2,738																				
			187																				
Base Cost	4,225	5,775	1,690																				
World Bank Counterpart			8,310																				
GOH/Beneficiary																							
IDC and Committee Fee			1,690																				
Total Project Cost			20,000																				

PCR and PSR: PROJECT PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Criteria	PSR			PCR		Justification	PAS Equivalence	
	Expected Score ³⁴	Current Score	Rating	Score	Rating		Score	Rating
Strategic Relevance/ <i>Relevance</i>	8.0	8.0	Excellent		Satisfactory		4	Highly Satisfactory
Poverty Relevance/ <i>Relevance</i>	9.0	9.0	Excellent		Highly Satisfactory			
Efficacy/ <i>Effectiveness</i>	6.0	6.0	Highly Satisfactory		Satisfactory		4	Highly Satisfactory
Cost Efficiency/ <i>Efficiency</i>	5.0	5.0	Satisfactory		Satisfactory		3	Satisfactory
ID Impact/ <i>Thematic Areas and ID Assessments</i>	7.0	6.0	Highly Satisfactory		Satisfactory		4	Highly Satisfactory
Sustainability	5.0	5.0	Satisfactory		Satisfactory		3	Satisfactory
Composite (Aggregate) Performance Score and Rating	6.8	6.6	Highly Satisfactory		NA		3.75	Highly Satisfactory

³⁴ This column was not filled in the PSRs. The scores are taken from the AR, Page 22.

OTHER GRANT CONDITIONS – NOT MET OR PARTIALLY MET

Reference	Critical Conditions	Compliance	Comments
<p>Appraisal Report BD 116/11</p> <p>Terms and Conditions, Page 23</p>	<p>Disbursement:</p> <p>(a) The first disbursement of the Grant shall be made by June 30, 2012, and the Grant shall be fully disbursed by December 31, 2013, or such later dates as CDB may specify in writing.</p> <p>(b) Disbursements shall be made by CDB in the manner specified in paragraph 5.12 of this Report.</p>	<p>Non Compliance</p>	<p>The implementation was delayed. The first disbursement was made in October 2012.</p> <p>The actual disbursements did not follow the disbursement schedule as at Appendix 3.1 of the AR.</p>
	<p>Conditions Precedent to First Disbursement: GOH shall furnish or cause to be furnished to CDB:</p> <p>(i) one (1) or more legal opinions, satisfactory to CDB, of a legal practitioner, acceptable to CDB, showing that:</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">(aa) GOH has complied with all the necessary requirements under the constitution of Haiti and the laws and regulations in force in Haiti in order to enter into the Grant Agreement;</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">(bb) the Grant Agreement has been properly executed on behalf of GOH; and</p> <p style="padding-left: 20px;">(cc) the Grant Agreement has been duly authorised by and executed and delivered on behalf of GOH and constitutes a valid and binding obligation of GOH in accordance with its terms; and</p> <p>(ii) proof, satisfactory to CDB, that the person or persons who signed the Grant Agreement on behalf of GOH were legally empowered to do so.</p>	<p align="center">√</p> <p align="center">√</p> <p align="center">√</p> <p align="center">√</p> <p align="center">√</p>	
	<p>Other Conditions:</p> <p>(a) GOH shall continue to act in accordance with the Project Operations Manual. The Project Operations Manual may only be amended after consultation with, and after written approval of, CDB and WB.</p> <p>(b) Except as CDB may otherwise agree, GOH shall during the lifetime of the Project maintain, the established PSC chaired by the MEF or his representative, with the composition and functions set out or referred to in Appendix 5.2 of this Report.</p> <p>(c) Except as CDB may otherwise agree, GOH shall carry out the Project through BMPAD of MEF, in accordance with the Project Operations Manual.</p> <p>(d) Except as CDB may otherwise agree, GOH shall, during the implementation of the Project, maintain PCU of BMPAD which shall have fiduciary and coordination responsibilities for the Project with terms of reference, composition,</p>	<p align="center">√</p> <p align="center">√</p> <p align="center">√</p> <p align="center">√</p>	

APPENDIX 3

Reference	Critical Conditions	Compliance	Comments
	<p>functions and resources acceptable to CDB.</p> <p>(e) Except as CDB may otherwise agree, GOH shall:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(i) operate and maintain the MIS referred to in paragraph 5.07; and</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(ii) facilitate the conduct of the, audits, and evaluation referred to in paragraph 5.10 of this Report within the periods specified therein.</p> <p>(f) GOH shall maintain the M&E plan in existence under the Programme and shall ensure that such plan indicates the appropriate gender equity indicators and targets (e.g. the percentage and number of sub-projects targeting women etc.).</p> <p>(g) GOH shall ensure that CADECs have the composition, functions and responsibilities outlined in paragraph 1.17 of this Report.</p> <p>(h) GOH shall ensure that technical audits of the Project are carried out semiannually by independent professionals and that within four (4) months thereafter, the ensuing audit reports are furnished to CDB for its review.</p> <p>(i) GOH shall cause PCU and each MDOD, during the implementation of the Project, to furnish to CDB audited financial statements of their business activities within six (6) months of the close of the relevant annual fiscal year.</p> <p>(j) Except as CDB may otherwise agree BMPAD shall as part of its monitoring and oversight responsibilities for environmental management ensure that the requirements of EMF as set out at paragraph 4.12 above are adhered to.</p> <p>(k) Except as CDB may otherwise agree, GOH shall:</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(i) through BMPAD engage MDODs as contracted service providers with primary responsibility for the day-to-day implementation of activities under Components 1 and 2 of the Project.</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(ii) through BMPAD enter into an agreement (the Service Agreement) with each eligible MDOD setting out therein the respective obligations of the parties thereunder and</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">(iii) cause MDODs to enter into agreements (the CBO and Municipal Government Grant Agreements) with CBOs and Municipal Governments which are countersigned by CADECs.</p> <p>(l) GOH shall require that MDODs have sound financial capacity including the characteristics outlined in paragraph 7 of Appendix 5.2 of this Report.</p>	<p>Partial</p> <p>Partial</p> <p>√</p> <p>√</p> <p>√</p> <p>Uncertain</p> <p>√</p> <p>√</p> <p>√</p>	<p>The Evaluation was not implemented</p> <p>Monitoring visits were not undertaken by the PCU. Neither was the data on gender equity indicators gathered.</p> <p>The MDOD assisted the CADECs</p> <p>Reported as complied in PCR and PSRs. Although these reports were not seen by Evaluator.</p> <p>These were not on the main Project File</p> <p>Since the 62 site visits were not carried out it may be assumed that this function was not effectively performed.</p> <p>Reported in the PCR and PSR but there was no Service Contract on main file.</p> <p>Reported in the PCR and PSR but there was no Service Contract on main file.</p>

APPENDIX 3

Reference	Critical Conditions	Compliance	Comments
	<p>(m) GOH shall obtain rights adequate to protect its interests and those of CDB and WB, including the right to:</p> <p>(i) suspend or terminate the right of any beneficiary CBO, Municipal Government or MDOD to use the proceeds of any sub-project agreement, or to obtain a refund of all or any part of the amount of any sub-project grant then withdrawn, upon the CBO's, Municipal Government, MDOD's or CADEC's failure to perform any of its obligations under the sub-project agreement; and</p> <p>(ii) require each CBO or Municipal Government to:</p> <p>(aa) carry out the sub-project with due diligence and efficiency and in accordance with sound technical, economic, financial, managerial, environmental and social standards and practices;</p> <p>(bb) provide, promptly as needed, the resources required for the purpose of such sub-project;</p> <p>(cc) procure the goods, works and services to be financed out of the Grant in accordance with the provisions of the Grant Agreement;</p> <p>(dd) maintain policies and procedures adequate to enable it to monitor and evaluate in accordance with indicators acceptable to CDB and WB, the progress of the sub-project and the achievement of its objectives;</p> <p>(ee) maintain a financial management system and prepare financial statements in accordance with consistently applied accounting standards acceptable to CDB, both in a manner adequate to reflect the operations, resources and expenditures related to the sub-project, and, at CDB's or GOH's request, have such financial statements audited by independent auditors acceptable to CDB, in accordance with consistently applied auditing standards acceptable to CDB, and promptly furnish the statements as so audited to GOH and CDB;</p> <p>(ff) establish sub-project maintenance plans and community-funded budgets which shall be monitored by CADECs and MDODs;</p> <p>(gg) enable GOH, CDB and WB to inspect the sub-project, its operation and any relevant records and documents; and</p>	<p align="center">√</p> <p align="center">√</p> <p align="center">√</p> <p align="center">√</p> <p align="center">√</p> <p align="center">Uncertain</p> <p align="center">Uncertain</p> <p align="center">Uncertain</p>	<p>Not Applicable. No reports of this occurring</p> <p>Reported in the PCR and PSR</p> <p>CDB visited a sample of these projects as it was not feasible to visit all sub-projects</p> <p>It is uncertain whether additional micro information was requested relating to the sub-projects.</p>

APPENDIX 3

Reference	Critical Conditions	Compliance	Comments
	<p>(hh) prepare and furnish to GOH, CDB and WB all such information as GOH, CDB and WB, shall reasonably request relating to such sub-project.</p> <p>(n) GOH shall exercise its rights under each grant agreement for a sub-project in such manner as to protect the interests of GOH and CDB and to accomplish the purposes of the financing.</p> <p>(o) Except as CDB may otherwise agree, GOH shall furnish or cause to be furnished to CDB the reports referred to at paragraph 5.07 and Appendix 5.3 of this Report.</p> <p>(p) GOH shall maintain a financial management system, including records and accounts and shall cause BMPAD and each MDOD to establish and maintain, for the purposes of the Project, a financial management system, including records and accounts;</p> <p>(q) Except as CDB may otherwise agree, GOH shall prepare semi-annual financial statements and shall cause BMPAD and each MDOD to prepare semi-annual financial reports which shall be used by GOH in preparing the said financial statements for the Project, all in accordance with consistently applied accounting standards acceptable to CDB adequate to reflect the operations, resources and expenditures related to the Project.</p> <p>(r) GOH shall:</p> <p>(i) have the financial statements and the financial reports referred to in subparagraph (q) above semi-annually for each fiscal year (or other period agreed to by CDB) audited, in accordance with consistently applied auditing standards acceptable to CDB, by independent auditors acceptable to CDB;</p> <p>(ii) furnish to CDB as soon as available, but in any case not later than four (4) months after the end of each such semester (or such other period agreed to by CDB), certified copies of the financial statements referred to in sub-paragraph (q) above for such semester (or other period agreed to by CDB), as so audited; and an opinion on such statements by said auditors, in scope and detail satisfactory to CDB; and</p>	<p>Uncertain</p> <p>Uncertain</p> <p>Uncertain</p> <p>Uncertain</p> <p>Uncertain</p> <p>Uncertain</p> <p>Uncertain</p> <p>Uncertain</p>	<p>These reports were not on the Main Project File.</p> <p>These reports were not on the Main Project File.</p> <p>These reports were not on the Main Project File.</p> <p>These reports were not on the Main Project File.</p>

RELEVANCE CHECKLIST FOR PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT LENDING

RELEVANCE SUB-CRITERIA		
1. ADEQUACY OF THE ASSESSMENT OF PROBLEMS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND LESSONS AT TIME OF APPROVAL (assessments may be a reconfirmation of the problems and lessons outlined in the CSP)		
(a) adequacy/depth of sector analysis and political economy with regard to the economic rationale for project		√
(b) adequacy/depth of assessment of the cross-cutting themes of poverty, gender, institutional development, environment, DRM, CC and citizen security		√
(c) consideration of lessons learned from related projects or the operations in the BMC		√
(d) consideration of constraints to the achievement of results		√
(e) appropriateness of project outcome and outputs		√
(f) appropriateness of the timing of the intervention		√
(g) soundness of the contribution of project preparatory technical assistance		√
2. CONSISTENCY OF THE EXPECTED OUTPUTS, OUTCOME AND IMPACT WITH BMC'S DEVELOPMENT PRIORITIES, CDB'S STRATEGY AND PROGRAMME FOR BMC, AND CDB'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND CORPORATE PRIORITIES		
(a) consistency with national requirements and priorities		√
(b) consistency with regional requirements and priorities		√
(c) appropriateness and timeliness of changes made to maintain the relevance of the intervention		√
3. EXTENT OF STAKEHOLDERS' OWNERSHIP		
(a) participation of stakeholders and beneficiaries in preparation of the intervention		√
4. CHOICE OF MODALITY AND INSTRUMENT		
(a) selected investment/financing modality is an appropriate response to the development problem identified		√
(b) balance between public and private provision (extent of involvement of the private sector)		NA
(c) appropriateness of technical assistance provided		NA
5. DEGREE OF COORDINATION AND/OR COMPLEMENTARITY WITH DEVELOPMENT PARTNERS		
ASSESSMENT	SCORE	RATING
Sub-Criteria [1 to 5] Met	4	Highly Satisfactory
Sub-Criteria [1 and 2] and One Sub-Criteria From [3 to 5] Met	3	Satisfactory
Sub-Criteria [1 or 2] together with Sub-Criteria [3] Not Met	2	Marginally Unsatisfactory
Sub-Criteria [1 and 2] Not Met	1	Unsatisfactory
Comments/Justification: For decades Haiti had experienced a steady decline in economic and social development culminating in very high levels of poverty and indigence. The Project was designed to meet the urgent needs of poverty and underdevelopment in Haiti. The CSP 2009 provided a detailed analysis of the macro-economic, social and political situation in Haiti as a strong justification for the intervention. The earthquake of 2010 also exacerbated problems and created an urgent demand for the project. According to the CSP, there were several factors that impeded social and economic development and make the country unattractive to investors, among these are: (i) weak educational attainment by the majority of citizens; (ii) poor infrastructure; (iii) environmental degradation; (iv) deep domestic institutional and structural weaknesses; and (v) weak governance, political instability and insecurity. CDB's core areas of operations in Haiti are consistent with the Bank's strategic focus and as such interventions supported efforts to promote inclusive social development, support environmental sustainability and promote good governance, as well as initiatives geared towards fostering regional cooperation and integration. ³⁵ The CDD approach used in the Project is based on beneficiary and stakeholder participation – over 7,387 CBO members attended 198 workshops for disseminating project information. The approach also seeks to strengthen the decentralisation governance in Haiti. The Project design considered important lessons from the previous iterations of the CDD implemented by WB. CDB's interventions in Haiti have been through grant financing under its SDF. CDB worked with WB as Co-Funders in this project. The Supervision Mission reported, "In general there appears to be an improvement in the relationship between implementation partners, community based and local authorities in target communities."	4	Highly Satisfactory

Determination of the rating when there are indicators that are not applicable to the intervention: The number of indicators in the range of each rating category is reduced by the number of indicators that are deemed "Not Applicable". Example: If 1 indicator is deemed "Not Applicable", then HS = 1 to 5 met will be 1 to 4 met; S = 1 and 2 and one from 3 to 5 met; will be S = 1 and 2 and one from 3 to 4 met; MUS = 1 or 2 with 3 not met remains unchanged; and US = 1 and 2 not met remains unchanged.

³⁵ CSP 2013-16 Haiti

EFFECTIVENESS CHECKLIST FOR PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT LENDING

RELEVANCE SUB-CRITERIA		
1. ACHIEVEMENT OF THE DESIRED OUTCOMES AS DEFINED IN THE LFM/RFM		
(a) objectives of the intervention were achieved as planned; or are likely to be achieved as planned	√	The achievement of the DO was rated as Probable in PCR.
(b) objectives of cross-cutting themes were achieved as planned; or are likely to be achieved as planned where poverty, gender, environment, DRM, CC and citizen security are specific components of the intervention or explicit outputs or outcomes	√	Achievement of Cross Cutting themes was likely to be achieved Project was targeted at poor communities, Increased participation of women in decision making roles; sub-projects followed environment impact assessment guidelines
(c) intended results produced consistent with targets	√	According to the PCR, the two outcomes at the Purpose level were achieved.
(d) target group reached	√	Poor Rural Populations
(e) specific components contributing to achievement of expected outcomes	√	Component 1 (implementation and maintenance of sub-projects) and Component 2 (Capacity Building of CBOs and CADECs) contributed to achievement of expected outcomes.
(f) unintended results (positive/negative)	√	Number of actual beneficiaries (353,000) greatly exceeded the projected number (25,000)
2. REALISM OF THE EXPECTED OUTCOMES DEFINED IN THE LFM/RFM		
(a) defined objectives were realistic and met the requirements of stakeholders	√	The Purpose outlined in the LFM included 3 objectives – Improved access to social and economic infrastructure, services and opportunities; improved community governance and improved social capital. While all realistic, data was not collected on two of the outcome indicators.
(b) planned objectives and expected outcomes addressed the binding constraints	√	The Project was completed within the timeframe and budget. One element was not implemented.
3. FACTORS INFLUENCING THE ACHIEVEMENT OF THE EXPECTED OUTCOMES		
critical factors for achievement or failure to achieve the objectives (assumptions and risks to achieving outcomes, e.g. macroeconomic and sector policies, socioeconomic conditions, economic growth, poverty level, resettlement issues, institutional capacity, environmental considerations, beneficiary participation, prices, actual and forecast demand and supply, availability of inputs, partnerships)	√	The two assumptions in the LFM at the Purpose level were realised – GOH continued to be supportive of the decentralisation process and CBOs and Municipal Councils maintained their interest in participating in the project
4. INFLUENCE OF IMPLEMENTATION PROCESS ON OUTCOMES		
(a) positive side effects	√	The Implementation process modified by CECI and adopted by the CDB contributed to the smooth implementation of the sub-projects component – rigorous process for identification and prioritisation of sub-projects.
(b) influence of implementation delays on realisation of the full potential outcomes	√	Although there was a delay in start-up, this did not affect the full realisation of the full potential of the project.
ASSESSMENT	SCORE	RATING
Sub-Criteria [1 to 4] Met	4	Highly Satisfactory
Sub-Criteria [1 and 2] and One Sub-Criteria from [3 to 4] Met	3	Satisfactory
Sub-Criteria [1 or 2] together with Sub-Criteria [4] Not Met	2	Marginally Satisfactory
Sub-Criteria [1, 2 and 3] Not Met	1	Unsatisfactory
Comments/Justification:		
<p>Defined objectives at the Impact level addressed the issues of poverty through social and economic development of Haitians in rural communities with relevant outcomes in access to education and health, physical infrastructure – roads, irrigation and amenities – water and lighting. The Purpose Outcome indicators were SMART however the Impact indicators were not.</p> <p>Both the macroeconomic and social policies existed and provided the overall framework to guide the nature of the intervention. The socioeconomic conditions were sufficiently analysed and informed project design</p> <p>The projects have had a positive impact on: (i) community participation; (ii) social cohesion and dialogue; (iii) the preparedness to make voluntary contributions; (iv) economic development; (v) emergence of new leaders; (vi) environmental management; and (vii) temporary employment.³⁶</p> <p>The Implementation process modified by CECI and adopted by CDB contributed to the smooth implementation of the sub-projects component – rigorous process for identification and prioritisation of sub-projects.</p> <p>The 3-month delay in implementation did not negatively impact implementation. The number of sub-projects targeted increased.</p>		
	4	Highly Satisfactory

³⁶ PCR, Annex 1 – Minutes from Exit Workshop of CDB, Borrower/Implementing Agency/Stakeholders, page 27

EFFICIENCY CHECKLIST FOR QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT LENDING

EFFICIENCY QUALITATIVE SUB-CRITERIA		
1. Sound conceptualisation and robust assumptions applied to achieve the objectives on a sustainable basis	√	General agreement
2. Identification and assessment of alternatives available for generating the expected results with less resources	NA	No evidence that this was done. This was not necessary as the Project built on existing PRODEP initiative which was deemed a viable intervention since 2004.
3. Cost-efficiency/effectiveness in achievement of the results and outputs (within budget or over budget)	√	97.6% the CDB Grant funds utilised. Least Cost approach was proposed to be utilised for sub-projects. There is no evidence that this was implemented. The average cost per sub-project was estimated in the project design as USD35,000 for 149 CBO sub-projects and USD60,000 for 31 Municipality sub-projects. The PCR did not provide a breakdown of projects by CBOs and Municipalities. However, assuming all the projects were CBOs then the average cost per project was USD38,243 higher than the projected USD35,000. (USD7,075,000/185)
4. Appropriateness and justification for the level of resources applied and the outputs achieved	√	100% of sub-project funds expended with more projects completed than was targeted. The actual number of beneficiaries significantly exceeded the proposed number targeted.
5. Quality, timeliness and appropriate utilisation of services and capacities created	Partial	PCR indicated that measures were taken to ensure quality throughout the sub-projects lifecycle through the employment of civil engineers. The sub-projects were implemented in a timely manner with 78% within the initial project period. The capacities created were well utilised in the CADECs and CBOs trained to manage projects as well as source funding for projects. As at December 31, 2014 all (21) productive/income generating sub-projects were operational. ³⁷ It is difficult to assess capacity utilisation rates if this data is not collected. There is no evidence to suggest that it was.
6. Management performance and implementation efficiency (including staffing, functions and responsibilities of the implementing agency, inter-ministerial co-operation, stakeholder participation)	Partial	Good stakeholder participation was identified throughout the project cycle. The use of MDODs was innovative and effective for field implementation. The performance of the Implementing Agency, CECI, was rated as Highly Satisfactory. No annual administrative reports from BMPAD were on file to validate the assessment of performance. The PSR reported the non-implementation of Supervision visits and capacity building CADECs in southern municipalities. No reports of Staffing problems.
7. Criteria and methodology used in the selection of the implementing agency (comparative advantage or other)	√	Good assessment of CECI done to justify its choice as IA. CECI's proposal closely mirrored the projections of the CDB's Project Appraisal Document. ³⁸
8. Achievement of outputs within the planned implementation period.	√	Achieved.
ASSESSMENT	SCORE	RATING
Sub-Criteria [1 to 8] Met	4	Highly Satisfactory
Sub-Criteria [1, 3, 4, 6 and 8] Met	3	Satisfactory
Sub-Criteria [3, 6 and 8] Not Met	2	Marginally Unsatisfactory
Sub-Criteria [1, 3, 4, 6 and 8] Not Met	1	Unsatisfactory
Comments/Justification: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Least Cost approach used for sub-projects Actual number of sub-projects exceeded the planned Wide stakeholder consultation Outputs achieved in a timely manner Highly Satisfactory performance of IA Individual sub project cost higher than projected Non implementation of supervision visits and Capacity Building of CADECs in South EA Status Reports were not timely 	3	Satisfactory

Determination of the rating when there are indicators that are not applicable to the intervention: The number of indicators in the range of each rating category is reduced by the number of indicators that are deemed "Not Applicable". Example: If 1 indicator is deemed "Not Applicable", then HS = 1 to 8 met will be 1 to 7 met; S = 1, 3,4,6 and 8 met; will be S = 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 met; MUS = 3, 6 and 8 not met, will be 3, 6 and 7 not met; and US = 1, 3, 4, 6 and 8 not met will be 1, 3, 4, 6 and 7 not met.

³⁷ PCR, Section III page 12

³⁸ PSR 2012-01-01 to 2012-12-31 page 6; It is to be noted that there were no evidence on file that the project was tendered and a report on the procurement submitted.

**THEMATIC AND ID ASSESSMENTS CHECKLIST
FOR PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT LENDING**

THEMATIC AND ID ASSESSMENTS SUB-CRITERIA		
<i>In addition, assessment of the intervention's sustainability should take into account the extent to which an intervention is likely to have other influences such as:</i>		
1. Improving or weakening a country's ability to make more efficient, equitable, and sustainable use of its human, financial, and natural resources	√	The CDD Intervention, with the funding of social and physical infrastructure sub-projects and capacity building component, is an attempt to improve the country's ability to use its resources sustainably, more efficiently and effectively including ensuring a more equitable distribution.
2. Intended and unintended effects that may result from the intervention	√	The Project achieved most of its intended effects – Institutional development of CBOs and CADECs and to a lesser extent the Municipal Authorities; met its target of participation of women in CBOs and CADECs executive committees;
3. Results that enhance governance, specifically transparency, accountability, predictability, and participation	√	Use of wide community participation in needs assessment and sub-project prioritisation; use of CADECs and CBOs, use of transparent procedures of IFIs endorsed by GOH; use of standard reporting formats and processes; use of engineers for quality control throughout the sub-project cycle;.
4. Contribution to stability, transparency, enforceability, and predictability of institutional arrangements by enhancement of laws, regulations, and procedures; improved coordination of external relationships; and norms and practices	NA	NA
5. Alignment of the implementing/executing agency with its mandate through improved internal use of resources and improved efficiency of processes; enhanced skill levels; and equitable reward systems and motivation	√	The IA introduced several measures intended to improve sub-project design and implementation improved. The EA was effective in managing finances and procurement, but was not as effective in the supervision of project implementation.
6. Distribution of economic benefits and costs		
7. Social outcomes and issues such as beneficiary participation; resettlement; poor and vulnerable groups, gender equality, ethnic minorities, marginalised and/or vulnerable groups; and citizen security	√	The CDD model is based on beneficiary participation. The intervention targeted the vulnerable rural populations in municipalities with the highest levels of poverty and
8. Environmental issues; DRM; remedial measures that have been taken or may be needed; adequacy of environmental mitigation measures and environmental monitoring; the extent to which these measures were implemented, and compliance with environment-related loan covenants	√	Although the sub-projects were deemed unlikely to have significant environmental effects/impacts, appropriate measures and assessments were instituted to mitigate any negative environmental effects.
9. Improved definition, stability, transparency, enforceability, and predictability of institutional arrangements		The institutional arrangements used in the PRODEP and adopted seems to have worked. Although the PCR in lessons learned suggests that the use of international NGOs is not acceptable to the GOH. But the arrangements have been well defined, stable and transparent.
10. Contribution to improving national capacity (in economic management, civil service reform, legal and regulatory systems, sector development, private sector capacity, and others)	NA	
11. Contribution to improving agency capacity (in planning, public awareness building and consultation, management, restructuring, decentralisation, management information systems, financial controls, financial restructuring, regulatory enforcement, and agency governance) through.	√	GOH through the PRODEP has implemented an acceptable MIS and has strong financial and procurement controls. Weak Monitoring through field visits

THEMATIC AND ID ASSESSMENTS SUB-CRITERIA		
<i>In addition, assessment of the intervention's sustainability should take into account the extent to which an intervention is likely to have other influences such as:</i>		
12. Contribution to improving non-governmental organisation and civil society capacity (including participatory attitudes and involvement of society in the reform process)	√	The Project has reinforced and further strengthened the use and capacity of CBOs and CADECs in sub-project identification and implementation. The training and experience in sourcing funds have improved the management capabilities of these agencies. Utilised the CDD Approach with key involvement of NGOs and CBOs in collaboration with municipal authorities and government Ministries
13. Contribution to improving the governance of the reform process (that is, transparency, checks and balances, public participation and accountability in the process of reform)	√	The Project contributed to the local governance reform through the use of a decentralised approach engaging the local municipal authorities and CADECs in delivering the project outputs. The procedures adopted allowed for transparency and accountability as well as public participation.
14. Contribution to better definition of, the stability of, transparency of, enforceability and predictability of institutional arrangements (accountability, good governance etc) in the country	√	The institutional arrangements used in the Project have been used and refined over the years since 2004. The roles and functions of the entities in each municipal region are well defined and the structures enforce transparency and predictability.
15. Facilitation of better alignment of the mission and capacity of the organisation with its mandate (upgrading skills, information systems, planning)	√	BMPAD has undergone considerable institutional strengthening since the start of PRODEP and was at the time of project design undergoing internal reorganisation to increase efficiency. BMPAD's capacity was enhanced through the upgrading of skills, the development of a MIS. Prior to the Project PRODEPs terms of reference was broadened to function as a development agency
ASSESSMENT	SCORE	RATING
Sub-Criteria [1 to 15] Met	4	Highly Satisfactory
Sub-Criteria [1 to 10] Met	3	Satisfactory
Sub-Criteria [3, 4, 5, 7 8 and 9] Not Met	2	Marginally Unsatisfactory
Sub-Criteria [1 to 10] Not Met	1	Unsatisfactory
<p>Comments/Justification:</p> <p>2 Indicators were NA. The Project met the other 13 indicators.</p> <p>The Project contributed to capacity building in an attempt to improve the country's ability to use its resources sustainably, more efficiently and effectively. By focusing on rural poor populations it sought to ensure a more equitable distribution.</p> <p>It strengthened key stakeholders – CBOs, CADECs, Executing Agency, Municipalities</p> <p>Project was amended considering the lessons learned from the previous project implementation</p> <p>The Project contributed to the strengthening local government reform measures through the CADECs</p> <p>There was greater transparency and accountability using the project governance structure.</p> <p>Improved Agency capacity – MIS, POMs,</p> <p>Improved National social and economic development through infrastructure, economic and social projects.</p>	4	Highly Satisfactory

Determination of the rating when there are indicators that are not applicable to the intervention: The number of indicators in the range of each rating category is reduced by the number of indicators that are deemed "Not Applicable". Example: If 1 indicator is deemed "Not Applicable", then HS = 1 to 15 met will be 1 to 14 met; S = 1 to 10 met; will be S = 1 to 9 met; MUS = 3, 4, 5, 7 8 and 9 not met, will be 3, 4, 5, 7 and 8 not met; and US = 1 to 10 not met will be 1 to 9 not met.

SUSTAINABILITY CHECKLIST FOR PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT LENDING

SUSTAINABILITY SUB-CRITERIA		
1. Availability of adequate and effective demand for the intervention's outputs	√	The extremely high poverty rates in northern municipalities and the fact that rural communities lacked physical and social infrastructure and were not adequately serviced justifies that there was effective demand for the intervention's outputs. The weak decentralised local government system also exacerbated the demand for the products and services.
2. Pricing of outputs reflecting the cost of production	NA	Not applicable
3. Financial viability of operating entities	NA	Not applicable
4. Presence of policies and procedures to ensure continued funding for operation and maintenance of the assets financed by the intervention	X	The continued funding of operation and maintenance remain a source of concern as CBOs and CADECs lack the resources to maintain the infrastructure. The poverty levels in Haiti continue to be a severe constraint. Also, the weak decentralised local government structures mitigate against effective maintenance.
5. Resilience to risks of net benefit flows and sensitivity of the intervention to changes in the operating environment (resilience aspects include – technical, financial, macroeconomic, environmental, government commitment/ownership, other stake holder ownership; institutional support including legal and regulatory framework, organisational and management effectiveness; exogenous factors including trade and economic shocks)	√	The benefits of the infrastructure sub-projects (social & economic) are subject to environmental risks particularly hurricane. However, there were quality control measures implemented to mitigate The fact that PRODEP's use of CDD and decentralised community development has been operated since 2004 across political administrations gives a sense of the resilience of the capacity built to changes in government.
6. Application of appropriate policies to ensure the maintenance of required human resources	√	The Capacity built in the CADEC and CBOs were expected to be available for future interventions.
7. Adequacy of policies, institutions, markets and the regulatory environment	NA	
8. Government ownership of and commitment to the intervention	√	GOH piloted the CDD approach in 2004 and received World Bank financing from 2006. The CDB has endorsed the model and has supported projects under the PRODEPUR and PRODEP. Given the high priority placed on poverty reduction/alleviation programmes
9. Adequacy of incentives for continued stakeholder participation	NA	
10. Low level of political and other risks (environment, CC, natural hazards, social, citizen security, technological and natural resources)	√	While the political risks were noted, the CDD projects were operational since 2004 and were not stopped with changes in administration. The nature of the project posed very low level environmental risk. Natural Hazards posed a high level risk given the location of Haiti making it prone to hurricanes/storms/flooding. Low social risks due to demand driven project identified through highly participatory process and active use of social infrastructure facilities, in-kind contribution. The sustainability of the sub-projects is threatened due to lack of resources for maintenance.
ASSESSMENT	SCORE	RATING
Sub-Criteria [1 to 10] Met	4	Highly Satisfactory
Sub-Criteria [1, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 10] Met	3	Satisfactory
Sub-Criteria [3, 4, 5, 6 and 10] Not Met	2	Marginally Unsatisfactory
Sub-Criteria [1, 2 and 5] Not Met	1	Unsatisfactory
Comments/Justification: There was a demand for the deliverables of the project. The Project built human capacity at the municipal region level both of Local Authorities and CBOs involved in the CADECs. This capacity is available to future interventions. GOH exhibited commitment to the Project and the methods used to build capacity and ensure sustainability.	3	Satisfactory

Determination of the rating when there are indicators that are not applicable to the intervention: The number of indicators in the range of each rating category is reduced by the number of indicators that are deemed "Not Applicable". Example: If 1 indicator is deemed "Not Applicable", then HS = 1 to 10 met will be 1 to 9 met; S = 1, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 10 met; will be S = 1, 3, 4, 5, 8 and 9 met; MUS = 3, 4, 5, 6 and 10 not met, will be 3, 4, 5, 6 and 9 not met; and US = 1, 2 and 5 not met will be 1, 2 and 4 not met.

TABLE 5: BORROWER'S PERFORMANCE CHECKLIST FOR PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT LENDING

BORROWER PERFORMANCE		
Factors for Assessing Borrower's Performance	 √ 	Comments
1. High-level support for the intervention; adequacy and timeliness of the provision of counterpart funding	√	The Project was supported by the GOH and the Ministry of the Economy and Finance. The GOH counterpart funding was considered as the WB funds used to keep the PCU operational for the duration of the Project.
2. Timeliness in meeting loan effectiveness requirements (conditions precedent to first disbursement)	X	All conditions precedent satisfied August 16, 2012, three months after the latest date, May 13, 2012. ³⁹ The first disbursement was made December 2012. BMPAD contracted CECI on October 16, 2012. The Project Implementation period at appraisal was 18 months from June 2012 to December 2013. Delays in implementation of activities under WB financed PRODEP and the fact that the new methodology for identification and selection of sub-projects was time consuming negatively impact start up/implementation.
3. Timeliness of establishment of administrative and technical mechanisms for management and implementation (including staff recruitment)	partial	Key MIS was developed. The MDOD established offices to operationalise field activities. MIS was implemented. Additional independent (engineers) recruited in September 2013 to allow for supervision and implementation of sub-projects within the until March 2014. ⁴⁰ BMPAD did not implement the training programme for 28 CADECs in the South.
4. Administrative capacity of project steering/implementation committee; effective coordination arrangements between cooperating agencies; staff quality (appropriate mix of expertise and experience) and continuity in key executing/ implementing agencies; efficiency in executing roles and responsibilities	partial	There were no reports of the PSU nor the BMPAD on the main project file. However, the PSRs do indicate that the external agencies collaborated in the financing and facilitating the smooth delivery of the Project. The staff of BMPAD were experienced as they were implementing the PRODEP for over 5 years since 2006. The MDOD was already delivering on the WB CDD and was retained to be the implementing agency for greater efficiency. BMPAD “did an excellent job in managing the financial and procurement aspects of the project.” ⁴¹ The PCU of BMPAD did not conduct 62 site visits as planned. Neither did BMPAD deliver on the institutional strengthening of the municipalities in the South.
5. Timeliness of procurement process for consultancy services, equipment, supplies, construction and installation; quality control of implementation performance of consultants and contractors	partial	The PSR reported that 78% of sub-projects were implemented by December 31, 2013, an indicator of the timeliness of the procurement process for consultancy, construction etc. Also, engineers were hired in September 2013 to ensure quality control on sub-projects.
6. Compliance with terms and conditions and procurement guidelines	partial	Borrower did fulfil the main terms and conditions – Procurement Guidelines followed, Conditions Precedent to First Disbursement met albeit 3 months delay. Of the 21 Other Terms and Conditions the Borrower complied with most except submission of Status and Audit reports, the PCR and PSRs indicate that the semi-annual Audits were done (not on Main File); Impact Evaluation was not done. There were no Audit Reports on Main File. (

³⁹ Main File 27/13/15, Folio 11

⁴⁰ PSR 2013-01-01 to 2013-12-31, page 8

⁴¹ PCR Section VI page 20

BORROWER PERFORMANCE			
Factors for Assessing Borrower's Performance		[√]	Comments
7. Adoption of agreed policy, financial (cost recovery mechanisms) and institutional reform measures; mitigation of inconsistencies or conflicting policy or procedures with the implementation and/or operation of the intervention; implementation of recommendations of technical or operational studies		√	The Process for identification and prioritisation of sub-projects was modified using lessons learned from PRODEP and PRODEPUR. The PRODEP Operations Manual was amended accordingly to reflect changes introduced under this project. The IA (CECI) introduced new measures to improve the quality of sub-projects.
8. Timeliness and accuracy of submission and dispatch of disbursement claims		X	Unable to assess. Relevant documents were not available on the main file.
9. Adequate revenue/budgetary resources available for sustained operation and maintenance of the intervention's assets; accuracy of record-keeping and funds accounting		Partial	Costs associated with maintenance of the sub projects were not allocated by Government.
10. Participation at the design and preparation stages; support for CDB's supervision and performance evaluation processes; stakeholder/beneficiary consultation, participation and support demonstrated		√	It is CDB's policy that the projects submitted for funding are demand driven. The Identification and prioritisation of sub-projects used participatory community needs assessments. The PSRs reflect support for CDB during supervision visits both at the operational and policy levels. Evidence of participation also demonstrated in sub-projects being demand-driven and implemented by CBOs, and local authorities. ⁴²
11. Effective coordination and cooperation of implementing agencies' in the engagement with stakeholders and boundary partners		√	The IA (CECI) collaborated closely with the stakeholders and funding partners in the delivery of the project. PSR 2013 indicated that there appeared to be an improvement in the relationship between implementation partners, CBOs,
Assessment	Rating		
[1 to 11] Met	Highly Satisfactory		
[1 to 7] Met	Satisfactory		
[2, 3, 5 and 7] Met	Marginally Unsatisfactory	√	
[1 to 9] Not Met	Unsatisfactory		
Comments/Justification:			
The Evaluator was able to assess the Borrower in 10 of the indicators. In giving a Marginally Unsatisfactory rating, Indicators 3, 4, 5, 6 and 9 were partially met 2 was not met and 8 could not be rated due to insufficient evidence. The other indicators 1, 6, 10, 11 were met.			

Determination of the rating when there are indicators that are not applicable to the intervention: The number of indicators in the range of each rating category is reduced by the number of indicators that are deemed "Not Applicable". Example: If 1 indicator is deemed "Not Applicable", then HS = 1 to 11 met will be 1 to 10 met; S = 1 to 7 met; will be S = 1 to 6 met; MUS = 2, 3, 5 and 7 not met, will be 2, 3, 5 and 6 not met; and US = 1 to 9 not met will be 1 to 8 not met

CONSOLIDATED CDB PERFORMANCE RATING FOR PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT LENDING

CDB PERFORMANCE SUB-CRITERIA		
1. QAE		
(a) Strategic relevance and approach defined		√
(b) Clear statement of development objectives and expected results represented in an LFM/RFM		√
(c) Selection of options to address identified problem		NA
(d) Soundness of the intervention’s design (robustness of assumptions and appropriateness of methodology)		√
(e) Policy and institutional assessment		√
(f) Technical, financial and economic analyses applied to determine viability of the intervention (including analysis of the counterfactual situation – “Without the intervention Scenario”)		√
(g) Fiduciary and legal assessment		√
(h) Qualitative analysis conducted where benefits are not measurable		√
(i) Poverty, Gender and Social Development assessment		√
(j) Environmental, CC and DRM assessment		√
(k) Risk identification and assessment and mitigation measures		√
(l) Implementation arrangements appropriate/realistic with regard to capacity of the Borrower and/or EA/IA		√
(m) Roles and responsibilities of borrower, stakeholders and cooperating agencies defined		√
(n) Assessment of borrower and /or EA/IA capacity for timely fielding of consultants and monitoring performance of consultants and contractors		√
(o) Monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements (results framework)		√
(p) Incorporation of lessons learned from related projects/programmes to avoid problems encountered by previous projects		√
(q) Bank inputs and processes adequate, efficient and timely		√
2. QOS		
(a) QAE characteristics of the design have an acceptable impact on implementation performance (design clarity, robustness of assumptions, soundness of projections, results framework)		√
(b) Management of fiduciary and legal aspects (compliance with procurement, financial and legal covenants)		√
(c) Timeliness in identifying and assessing threats to achievement of DOs; and actions taken		√
(d) Adequacy of supervision inputs (budget; staff; technology, systems) and processes (results framework)		√
(e) Adequacy of beneficiary targeting and use of annual project planning and progress monitoring		√
(f) Analysis of key quantitative and qualitative data to assess progress towards expected outcomes		√
(g) Timeliness and quality of responses to requests for changes during implementation (variation in scope)		√
(h) Supervision staff continuity; and frequency, composition and length of supervision missions		√
(i) Timeliness, candour and realism in reporting progress, results, issues and time-bound actions		√
(j) Degree of consistency between performance progress, results, issues/constraints and rating		√
(k) Timeliness and quality of reviews and consultations, integration of findings into implementation plans for the remaining project period, and subsequent monitoring of any remedial measures		√
(l) Efforts to build and maintain good relationships with development partners and stakeholders		√
ASSESSMENT	RATING	
90% of (1) and (2)	Highly Satisfactory	
80% of (1) and (2)	Satisfactory	
50% of (1) and (2)	Marginally Unsatisfactory	
< 50% of (1) and (2)	Unsatisfactory	
Comments/Justification:		
With regard to the QAE, the Evaluator is satisfied that the project met (a), (b), (d), (e), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (l), (m), (n), (o), (p) and (q) which represent 94.1%		
QOS		
The Evaluator is satisfied that the lack of supervision visits of sub-projects by BMPAD affected the quality of supervision. The CDB responded in a timely manner in lobbying for the hiring of Engineers to ensure quality control and supervisory visits. The quality and length of Supervision missions of the CDB, however, seemed to have worked well. All the other criteria were met to large extent which represent 100%		
The Overall rating is Highly Satisfactory		

**COMPUTATION OF THE COMPOSITE (AGGREGATE) SCORE FOR
A PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT INTERVENTION**

Core Criteria	PERFORMANCE RATING				ENTER SCORE [HS= 4]; [S =3]; [MUS = 2]; [US= 1]
	RATING [√]				
	HS	S	MUS	US	
Relevance	√				4
Effectiveness	√				4
Efficiency	√				4
Sustainability		√			3
Total Score = [Sum of Scores for Core Criteria]					15
Overall Average Score = [Total Score / 4]					[15/4] = 3.75
OVERALL ASSESSMENT [Based On Overall Average Score]					OVERALL RATING [√]
HS	Highly Satisfactory	> 3.25 and ≤ 4.00		√	
S	Satisfactory	> 2.50 and ≤ 3.25			
MUS	Marginally Unsatisfactory	> 1.75 and ≤ 2.50			
US	Unsatisfactory	> 1.00 and ≤ 1.75			
Comments/Justification: The project, generally, achieved most of its outputs that it was designed to achieve.					